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Global Social Security: 
How the Rules are Changing in Certain Countries 
Robert J. Myers* 
Abstract 
Social security programs (i.e., national pension systems) differ widely between 
countries. This is only natural, and desirable, because of varying social and economic 
conditions and philosophies. 
This paper discusses some of the general worldwide trends, such as the equal 
treatment of men and women, increases in the normal retirement age, projection of 
future costs, and the different philosophies of social security. Some of the interesting 
and unique changes recently made in selected countries-Canada, Chile, Eastern 
European countries, Germany, Japan, People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and United States-are described. 
Key words and phrases: global social security, social security, national pension systems, 
phzlosophies of SOCIal security 
1 Introduction 
There have been several interesting and significant developments 
that recently have occurred in social security around the world. Some 
of these suggest worldwide trends, whereas others are unique to par-
ticular nations. This paper describes such developments in several 
selected countries. 
The term social security as used here means only the limited con-
cept of a national pension system. It does not include programs such as 
unemployment insurance, family allowances, workers' compensation, 
and health care that some persons consider to be branches of social 
security. 
2 Worldwide Major Developments 
In recent years two major developments in social security have 
occurred in most countries. The first one is equal treatment for men 
* Robert J. Myers, F.5.A., M.A.A.A., F.C.A., held various actuarial positions with the 
Social Security Administration beginning in 1934 and was Chief Actuary from 1947-
1970. In 1981, he was named Deputy Commissioner of Social Security and became 
Executive Director of the 1982-1983 National Commission on Social Security Reform. 
He is Professor of Actuarial Science Emeritus at Temple University. 
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and women. This is an easy concept to understand. If a higher retire-
ment age applies for men than for women (often a difference of five 
years), for example, this is not equal treatment. Also, many differ-
ences occur where women have been treated less favorably than men: 
survivor benefits, for example, have been available in some countries 
for male workers, but not for female workers. Many technical diffi-
culties arise, however, in implementing equal treatment. 
The second major development in many countries is the likely 
future financing problem as the population ages; in other words, as 
there are relatively more persons at retirement age compared to per-
sons of working age. This growing proportion of older persons creates 
(or can create) financial problems, especially if a country does not 
recognize that financing problems are likely to occur in the future. 
Some years ago, few countries did any serious forecasting of what 
their social security programs would cost 20, 30, or even 75 years 
hence. Many countries merely looked ahead a year or two. This 
worked well for some years, but as the aging of the population has 
continued, the financial burden has become heavier. In contrast, some 
countries (such as the United States) have made long-range projec-
tions for many years. 
Projecting 50 to 75 years into the future cannot be done with great 
precision, any more than one can predict with precision what the 
weather will be in several weeks. But just as with the weather, one 
does know that, if it is summer and winter is coming in about six 
months, it will be colder then. One may not know exactly how much 
colder, though. Long-range projections have given many countries some 
indication of the problems that will be coming. In recent years more 
countries have become concerned about the long-range future costs of 
their social security programs. 
3 Role of Visiting Experts 
Next I will discuss some of the most interesting specific develop-
ments in several countries with which I am familiar. Obviously, one 
article cannot describe what is happening in all countries! 
When a person travels to another country as a consultant in the 
field of social security (or, for that matter, any other field), he or 
she should not use what is done in his or her own country as an abso-
lute guide for what other countries ought to do. Instead, technical 
experts should consider what the particular situation is in a country 
as compared not only with their native land, but also with countries 
throughout the world. What operates well and is desirable in one 
country frequently may have just the opposite outcome in another 
6 
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country. There is no one perfect way of doing things; there are many 
different alternatives. The choice of which alternative to take is 
often not merely financial, actuarial, or economic, but is also depen-
dent upon the political or psychological characteristics of the coun-
try. 
4 United Kingdom 
Now let us take a tour around the world, going eastward from the 
Americas. The first country I will discuss is the United Kingdom, 
which faces a serious problem concerning equal treatment by sex. This 
problem has been especially acute since the United Kingdom joined 
the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). The U.K. has had a five 
year differential in the minimum retirement ages for men and women 
in its social security program (60 for women and 65 for men). The ben-
efits for women with similar earnings records often are higher in 
order to make up for the fact that their contribution period or service 
period is shorter. The E.E.c., however, believes that there should be 
equal treatment of men and women in all respects-social security, 
pensions, and so forth. 
The U.K. has a dilemma because private pension plans must 
have equal treatment; if they do not, legal suits can be brought in 
E.E.c. courts. On the other hand, the E.E.C. doctrine on equal treat-
ment does not control social security systems completely. At this time 
an employer in the U.K. with a private pension plan must provide 
equal treatment; if women can retire at age 60 with a certain amount 
of pension, men must have the same amount at that age. At the same 
time, however, the social security system does not pay the same ben-
efit to men as to women, especially at ages 60 to 64. The employer 
cannot bridge the gap by providing a temporary benefit to men to 
equalize treatment in the aggregate between men and women because 
it would be unfair discrimination against women; men would have 
larger benefits from the private pension plan! 
The real solution to this problem is to have the social security 
system also provide equal treatment. The U.K. government is strug-
gling with this matter. One difficulty with equalizing retirement 
ages between men and women by lowering the age for men is the 
greatly increased cost of the program. But if the age for women is 
raised, many female workers will be extremely dissatisfied, espe-
cially those now near the current retirement age. In the end, how-
ever, this equalization must be done. Probably the best way to 
equalize treatment of men and women is not suddenly, but with a 
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gradual transition. In any event, the U.K. has a difficult problem in 
this area. 
Another interesting development in the u.K. is connected to indi-
viduals opting out of the social security system. The U.K. system is 
composed of two parts: a flat benefit and an earnings-related benefit. 
For many years, employers have been able to opt out of the earnings-
related benefit portion if they provide at least equivalent benefits. 
Although this makes the system complicated, it has been working 
reasonably well. Over the past two or three years, however, changes 
in the system have allowed persons in a plan that had opted out of 
the earnings-related benefit portion to opt out of the plan individu-
ally if they provide their own retirement protection. Also, persons 
whose employers do not opt out can opt out individually. Individual 
opting-out is undesirable, because it will be difficult to prevent 
adverse selection and the resulting increased costs. At the same time, 
the principle of social solidarity is violated. 
5 Former Soviet Union 
The next country is the former Soviet Union, which has the same 
problem as the United Kingdom: unequal retirement ages for men and 
women (namely, 55 for women and 60 for men). A Russian colleague of 
mine informed me that this is a great concern. Their experts know 
that they should have equal ages by sex, but this is difficult to 
achieve from a political standpoint. With all of the other problems 
facing the former Soviet Union, however, this one is undoubtedly not 
high on the list of priorities. 
Another problem in the former Soviet Union is that pensions are 
low. For many years I attended international conferences on social 
security where Soviet delegates would proclaim that they had the 
most wonderful social security system. They asserted that it took care 
of all the needs of all their people and that it was paid for entirely 
by employing entities and by government and not at all by workers. 
The level of benefits of the social security program relative to 
earnings in the Soviet Union a few years ago was close to that in the 
United States. As in the United States, the benefits are graded, i.e., 
relatively higher for low income persons and relatively lower for 
high income persons. For example, for a worker in the United States 
with average earnings over the working lifetime, the benefit is about 
42 percent of final wages. For the low paid worker, the benefit is 55 
percent to 60 percent of final wages. For the highest paid worker (up 
to the maximum earnings considered for benefit purposes), the benefit 
is 25 percent to 27 percent of final wages. 
8 
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In the former Soviet Union, the mInImUm retirement ages are 
lower than in the U.S. Their level of total retirement income is rela-
tively low, however, because the social security benefits are the only 
source of retirement income in most cases. In contrast, many persons in 
the U.S. have private pensions in addition to Social Security bene-
fits, as well as more private savings, home ownership, and so forth. 
The total retirement-benefit level in the former Soviet Union is low, 
and its policy makers are concerned about the situation. With the 
recent horrendous inflation, the purchasing value of benefits has 
dropped sharply despite month by month ad hoc adjustments (which 
essentially merely raise the minimum pension so that virtually all 
beneficiaries receive the same amount). 
A surprising development occurred in the social security field in 
the Soviet Union in 1988. The former Soviet Union then had only one 
insurance company, Gosstrakh, which was owned by the government 
(although some individually owned companies now are being estab-
lished). Gosstrakh sells insurance policies of the standard forms that 
life insurance companies in any country sell, although it tends to spe-
cialize in short-term endowment policies of five to ten years. These 
policies are sold by agents, as in other countries. The premium rates 
are determined actuarially, so that all policyholders are paid an 
equitable amount, and the system costs the government nothing. The 
government probably even makes a profit on it. 
In 1988, Gosstrakh began writing individual deferred-annuity 
policies, under which individuals could buy a certain unit of monthly 
pension (such as ten rubles), beginning at age 60 for men and age 55 for 
women. Although these policies were sold by agents, the premiums 
were collected through payroll deduction. This was unlike their life 
insurance policies, under which agents usually came to the home to 
collect premiums. 
The basic reason for this new plan, as stated in the decree that 
established it, was that social security benefits were too low, partic-
ularly for workers at average and higher earnings levels. In this 
way, those in this economic category could provide more adequate 
retirement incomes for themselves on a voluntary basis. 
The premium rates, unlike those for the life insurance policies, 
were not established on an actuarial basis. Rather, the premium 
rates reflected a considerable government subsidy. Thus, this plan 
involved a government policy to increase individual retirement 
income, but to have individuals partially pay for it directly. 
To an actuary, it seems strange that the same premium rate was 
charged for men and women for a given amount of pension that was 
deferred for a prescribed number of years in spite of the fact that 
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women live longer. Further, the premium rate for a woman age x who 
received the benefit 30 years later (at age x + 30) was the same as 
the premium rate for a man age x + 5 who did not receive the benefit 
until age x + 35. A double action was present, which resulted in bar-
gain rates to women because of their favorable mortality and because 
of the earlier age at which they received the pension. 
The rates were graded actuarially by age at issue, however. If 
one bought a benefit of ten rubles a month at retirement age, the pre-
mium was much higher if the policy were bought a short time before 
retirement age was reached than if a longer period of deferment was 
involved. 
Considerable interest in the new voluntary-annuity program was 
expressed when it began operating in 1988. A reported 400,000 poli-
cies were sold in the first year. By 1989, when extensive liberaliza-
tions in the social security benefits were proposed by the government, 
however, interest in the voluntary annuities plummeted. Thus, most 
of the policies were allowed to lapse, and few new policies were 
written. An interesting (and amazing) development apparently came 
to an end and is unlikely to be resurrected, considering the political 
and economic upheaval in the Soviet Union in 1990 to 1991. (This 
upheaval also made existing policies virtually worthless as a result 
of inflation.) 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union into separate independent 
nations has created many problems in the social security field. 
Whether each of the nations will establish new systems, how such 
systems will be funded, how the new nations will divide the old sys-
tem and its assets, and how they will deal with persons who worked 
in different former republics are unresolved questions facing the new 
countries of the former Soviet Union. 
6 Germany 
Germany is experiencing just the opposite situation. But the reuni-
fication of Germany, essentially a merger of East Germany into West 
Germany, presents many of the same problems in the social security 
area. West Germany essentially has absorbed the East Germans into 
their social security system and will pay the extra costs involved. 
The system for the reunified Germany will be much like (if not 
entirely the same as) the previous system for West Germany. 
Nonetheless, some transitional problems will be present, particularly 
in areas where the East German program provisions were more lib-
eral. 
10 
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7 Eastern European Countries 
The Eastern European countries have problems with their social 
security programs that are similar, in some ways, to those in the 
former Soviet Union, as well as some uniquely different problems. 
Their retirement ages vary by sex and are also very low, which 
results in high contribution rates. Unlike the former Soviet Union, 
their benefit levels are high, further resulting in high contribution 
rates. Their disability experience is high, in part due to loose admin-
istration. Coverage compliance has deteriorated as the societies in 
Eastern European countries have become freer. 
Some economic planners within the Eastern European countries-
as well as visiting experts from other nations-seek to privatize, in 
whole or in part, their social security programs along the Chilean 
line (as discussed later). At the same time, they would like to turn 
over to the new system some of the assets of former nationalized 
industries and companies. From another point of view, however, 
experienced administrators of the social security programs seem to 
believe that solutions to their problems can be found within the tra-
ditional framework of social insurance. 
In any event, it seems likely that the level of benefits under some 
of the Eastern European systems will be lowered somewhat. At the 
same time, private pension plans (along traditional lines, including 
private sector investments) are expected to develop. 
8 Saudi Arabia 
Let us next go south and east to Saudi Arabia. This country has a 
traditional social insurance system, with contribution rates of 8 per-
cent from the employer and 5 percent from the employee. The pension 
is related to the individual's most recent salary. Initially there was 
a very liberal vesting provision, so that persons who worked just a 
few years and then left the country were eligible for a partial pen-
sion payable when retirement age was reached. 
Many foreign workers come to Saudi Arabia for short periods. 
These workers are not only from the United States and Europe, but 
from many other countries throughout the world, such as Korea and 
the Philippines. In many ways, this liberal treatment for foreign 
workers said, in essence, "You'll get a partial retirement pension 
when you reach retirement age, which will be sent to you in your 
home country, even though you have been out of Saudi Arabia for 
some years." 
11 
Robert J. Myers Global Social Security 
Several years ago, the law was changed. Persons who are not liv-
ing in Saudi Arabia at the time when they reach retirement age no 
longer can obtain these vested pensions. Instead, they receive only a 
refund of employee contributions without interest. This has helped 
the financing of the Saudi system greatly, because all employer con-
tributions and investment earnings on employee contributions remain 
within the system. One difficulty in the Saudi system is tracking the 
location of foreign workers over time. As with many social security 
systems, when individuals seek benefits, they must go to the system 
and ask for them. There are many persons who have worked in Saudi 
Arabia over the last 20 or 30 years who may forget that they have 
vested pensions coming from the Saudi system when they reach 
retirement age. It is unlikely that they have heard that the only 
thing that they can receive is the refund of their contributions. 
9 People's Republic of China 
Our next stop is China. For the 90 percent of its huge population 
in rural areas, no national pension system or social security program 
exists. For workers in industry, commerce, and government, however, 
legislation has required each establishment to set up a pension plan 
of a more or less standard type for some years. For example, a steel 
mill must have a pension plan for its employees. These pension plans 
usually have a retirement age of 60 for men and 55 for women-again, 
the problem of unequal treatment by sex-and they pay benefits of 
about 70 percent of final wages for a lifetime of employment. The 
plans are financed entirely by the employing establishment, com-
pletely on a pay-as-you-go (or current-cost) basis. In other words, 
there has been no funding (or even establishment of reserves) for per-
sons who currently are retired. Another problem is that individuals 
are required to be in service when they reach retirement age. Thus, if 
they move from job to job, almost all pension rights are lost. 
In the past five years, the Chinese government has been more con-
cerned about matters relating to economic development. The govern-
ment has decided that the previous employment system (under which 
once a person was hired for a job, it was a lifetime one) is not desir-
able. It now believes that there could be more productivity if there 
were freedom of movement from one type of employment to another. 
But the difficulty with this change is that pensions often would not 
be available because of the lack of vesting. 
Another economic development problem is that companies or 
establishments that have been operating for many years have a rela-
tively high pension cost because current pensions are paid with cur-
12 
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rent income. A similar establishment that has just begun operations 
has no current pension costs and, therefore, can produce at a much 
lower cost. Thus, the older establishments are at an economic disad-
vantage. 
The Chinese government is concerned about how pay-as-you-go 
financing of private pension plans affects their economic develop-
ment. As a result, government officials have been thinking about 
having a national system to equalize the cost between new and old 
establishments. Naturally, the new establishments (and the 
provinces where the establishments are mostly new ones) prefer the 
status quo because it results in lower costs for them. They do not want 
to share the higher pension costs of Shanghai or Beijing. This is cur-
rently a difficult political, as well as technical, problem in China. 
10 Japan 
Next let us turn to Japan, which currently has the lowest mortal-
ity in the world (in other words, the greatest longevity). This, in 
turn, means high social security and penSion costs. The Japanese gov-
ernment has recognized for some years this coming trend and gradu-
ally has increased the minimum retirement ages. 
Japan has two national pension systems. One provides flat bene-
fits for the entire general population: not only employees, but also 
self-employed persons (farmers, operators of small businesses, and so 
forth). The other is an earnings-related program that applies in 
manufacturing and commercial industries. In the flat-benefit plan, the 
minimum retirement age has been increased to 65 for the normal pen-
sion for both men and women, but individuals may retire as early as 
age 60 and receive a reduced pension. On the other hand, persons can 
retire later, up to age 70, and receive an increased pension. 
In the earnings-related plan, the retirement ages at one time were 
60 for men and 55 for women, but they are being increased by five 
years for women on a gradual transitional basis (reaching age 60 for 
those born after April 1, 1941), which eventually will solve the 
problem of unequal treatment by sex. The Japanese are concerned 
about the relatively low retirement ages; some persons in the gov-
ernment want to increase the age for both men and women to 65 in 
order to solve the problem of high cost that will occur as the popula-
tion ages. Although the government wants to make this change, the 
situation is difficult politically. When this change is made, it will 
be phased in gradually; at the moment, however, it has been put 
aside until some more propitious time when the government hopes 
13 
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there will be fewer complaints from both men and women about rais-
ing the retirement age. 
Another interesting feature in the Japanese system-one that is 
surprising and one that the authorities now have become aware of-
is the factors that are used to adjust benefit amounts for early and 
late retirement in the flat-benefit plan. Decreases are made because 
of early retirement and increases because of late retirement. 
Despite the technical and actuarial expertise available in Japan, 
somebody erred when the adjustment factors were established. For a 
person retiring at age 60, the reduction for not waiting until age 65 to 
receive benefits should be generally about 30 percent. In the Japanese 
plan, however, the reduction is 42 percent, a very bad deal from an 
actuarial standpoint. Thus, if persons can avoid filing for benefits at 
age 60 and wait until age 65, they are in a much better financial 
position. Also, rather surprisingly, there is no graduation in the pro-
vision. The factor depends on integral years of age; in other words, 
there is only one reduction factor applicable if retirement occurs 
between ages 60 and 61, but another smaller factor-35 percent-
applies for retirement at age 61. It would seem more reasonable if the 
reduction factors moved smoothly from age 60 to age 65, with 
monthly changes. 
The beneficiaries involved are aware of this situation; almost 
everybody takes the benefit at an exact age. The surprising thing is 
that so many persons take benefits at age 60. Some undoubtedly have 
to because they do not have other resources, but there are many oth-
ers who would not have to take benefits. Many persons are disadvan-
taged by not realizing that a bad deal exists! 
At the other end of the retirement band, if instead of taking the 
benefit at age 65, persons wait until age 70, the actuarial increase 
should be 40 percent to 50 percent. In this system, however, this dif-
ferential is 80 percent. Anybody in good health who had the advice 
of an actuary would not take the pension until age 70! In actual expe-
rience, very few persons do. 
11 Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
Next let us go to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, other-
wise known as Micronesia which has a population of about 200,000. 
This is a group of islands in the Central Pacific that the United 
States received as a trust from the United Nations after World War 
II. In 1986, the Trust Territory was divided into four parts, three of 
which are now independent nations-the Republic of Palau, the 
Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall 
14 
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Islands. The fourth part, the Northern Mariana Islands, voted to 
become part of the United States (just as is Guam, which in essence is 
the Southern Mariana Islands). 
The Trust Territory established a social security system in 1967 at 
the request of the United Nations, which held that a good trustee 
should develop a social security system for such a territory. (The 
author worked on this project, and the system was established and 
operated successfully thereafter.) 
When the Trust Territory was divided, a unique problem arose: 
how to divide a social security system equitably among different geo-
graphical regions. A subdivision was made, and each entity received 
an equitable share of the assets (and of the future liabilities, too). 
The Northern Mariana Islands system merely joined the U.S. system, 
and credit was given for all prior service as though it had been per-
formed in the continental United States. The three new independent 
countries started with the existing system, but undoubtedly they will 
modify it in the future. Many persons there think that a retirement 
age of 60 is too high and they want to lower it. These individuals 
may not realize that the long-run high costs of such a move will be 
difficult to bear. 
12 Canada 
Next we come to Canada. One small change made in 1991 greatly 
affected the underlying philosophy of its social security system. 
Canada, like the United Kingdom, has two plans. One is called Old 
Age Security, under which a flat amount is payable to every person in 
the country age 65 or older who meets certain residence and citizen-
ship requirements. The other is an earnings-related system, called 
the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan. The combination of these two plans 
produces a weighted-benefits structure, just as prevails in the U.S. 
system. With the flat benefit and an earnings-related benefit, lower 
paid persons receive relatively higher benefits than do higher paid 
ones. The combined level of benefits in Canada is about the same as 
that in the U.s. 
The small change in Canadian policy was made considering only 
budget effects and not the long-range social effects. The government 
introduced what some persons refer to as the Claw-Back. This is anal-
ogous to a lobster clawing money back! 
Under this provision, individuals with moderately high income, 
roughly C$50,000 a year or more, must return part of the flat pension. 
This provision is to be phased in over several years. After some 
years, the benefit under the Old Age Security system will not be 
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available to the highest income Canadians. The income limit at 
which this applies is only partially indexed; as time goes by, more 
persons will be affected by the provision. The system will become 
more a public assistance (or social assistance) system instead of a 
social insurance or demogrant program. This has been a significant 
change in the philosophy of the Canadian system. It is not clear 
whether the change was intentional. 
13 Chile 
The new Chilean system, which was established in 1981, 
involves privatization and individual defined-contribution accounts 
that are determined in real terms (Le., indexed for inflation). It rep-
resents one of the most interesting and important developments in 
social security in the last decade or so. Many countries around the 
world-not just North, Central, and South American countries, but 
also some European countries-are interested in this emerging pension 
system. 
Many observers do not realize that the system involves mores 
than privatized individual accounts. The government also must make 
mammoth transfer payments from general revenues to meet the cost of 
prior service credits and large minimum-benefit guarantees. Further, 
much of the investments of the private funds are in government bonds, 
which probably were issued to meet the foregoing costs-a circular 
effect! Although this large cost to the government might be accept-
able in Chile (which would have had equally high, or even larger, 
costs under its previous system), this might not be acceptable in other 
countries. 
The Chilean system is now 12 years old, and it seems to be oper-
ating well. A cautious actuary must say, "Twelve years is a short 
time in the life of any sort of pension plan." Not that any catastro-
phe is likely to occur, but its experience may not be as favorable as 
its supporters anticipate. In particular, the real interest rate earned 
by the various privatized funds may not be nearly as high over the 
long run as is expected. The purchased annuities would not be as large 
as is now anticipated. 
14 United States of America 
We come finally to the United States. Two major issues are pre-
sent in its social security program (officially known as the Old-Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance program). One is the controversy 
about the so-called retirement earnings test, under which persons who 
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are at least the normal retirement age (currently 65) but not yet age 
70 receive reduced benefits when they have earnings that exceed a 
certain limit. If earnings are sufficiently high, all benefits are lost. 
The test is not applicable at age 70 and over, and it applies on a 
more stringent basis to beneficiaries under the normal retirement age. 
When benefits are received in later years, increases are given to 
reflect the benefits that are lost, but such increases currently are 
lower than those needed to provide actuarial equivalence. In 1993, 
such persons can earn up to $10,560 a year and still receive full bene-
fits. But for every $3 of earnings above this limit $1 of benefits is 
lost. 
A delayed-retirement credit (ORC) is given to individuals who 
lose benefits in this way, either because of not claiming benefits or 
because benefits are reduced thereby. For persons who reach age 65 in 
1992 and 1993, the ORC is 4 percent per year of delay, pro-rated on a 
monthly basis. Under present law, the ORC gradually will be raised 
until it will reach 8 percent a year (which is about the actuarial 
equivalent) for persons who attain the normal retirement age in 2009 
(then age 66). In other words, a person who then does not take bene-
fits at the normal retirement age of 66 and waits until age 70 gets a 
32 percent increase. This is about the same increase that a private 
insurance company would give under similar circumstances to a person 
who buys an annuity. 
This test is unpopular with many persons. Critics say that it dis-
courages persons from working and that, therefore, it is undesirable 
because work incentives are reduced. For many years, the author was 
a strong supporter of this test, under the simple but logical principle 
that retirement pensions should not be paid to persons who are not 
retired. After long deliberation about this matter and looking closely 
at the experience, it became evident that persons who had earnings 
of anywhere from about 50 percent to 150 percent of the average wage 
(currently, about $23,000 a year) receive little in their take-home 
pay if they continue working after age 65. Of course, for highly paid 
professionals who earn $100,000 or more per year, this is a different 
matter. But persons who earn $12,000 to $35,000 a year have great 
disincentives to work because the net additional income in their 
pockets from working is so small. 
Therefore, it is clear that something should be done about this 
provision. The test should be eliminated for persons who are above 
the normal retirement age (currently 65), but under age 70, although 
they still should receive larger benefits if they continue working and 
do not collect benefits. They should receive 8 percent more per year in 
their eventual benefits under such circumstances. It is true that this 
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change would result in higher program costs, but only with respect to 
persons who attain the normal retirement age before 2008. (This is a 
low cost period for the program.) When measured over the long 
range, the average increase in cost is small (and can be met in several 
ways, none being especially painful-for example a temporary 
increase in the maximum taxable earnings base or, when changing the 
financing to a pay-as-you-go basis, not reducing the payroll-tax rates 
in the next two decades as much). 
Next consider briefly the current financial situation of the U.S. 
Social Security program. Some say that it is going bankrupt, that it 
is in terrible financial condition, etc. Many in the United States 
think so, because they have heard or read about it somewhere. It is 
difficult to correct such misinformation. The program did have severe 
financial problems in the early 1980s, but these have been solved 
reasonably well. 
At the end of 1992 the trust-fund balance was $331 billion; this is 
almost equal to one year's benefit outgo. The trust fund is building 
rapidly, some $60 billion to $70 billion a year in the next few years 
and increasingly larger amounts for the next 15 years. From the short-
range standpoint, the system is financially strong. But, as stated pre-
viously, one has to look beyond 20 years, because that is a short time 
in the life of a social insurance or pension program. Under the present 
method of financing, a large fund balance will be built over the next 
three decades according to the intermediate cost estimate in the 1993 
Trustees Report. And it will reach a level of about $5 trillion in 
about 30 years. After then, however, it will decrease rapidly. In 
another ten years, it will be exhausted. 
In the long run (after the year 2035), the system will have finan-
cial problems according to the current estimates under the intermedi-
ate assumptions. These can be solved at some time in the future, 
either by raising the contribution rates somewhat or by raising the 
normal retirement age (or both). There already has been a move in 
the latter direction. The normal retirement age slowly will increase 
under current law from the present age 65 (which has been in effect in 
the 56 years of operation of the system), beginning in 2003, to age 67 
in 2027. An increase even to age 68 would have a significant financial 
effect. 
The difficulty with the financing procedure for the U.S. system is 
that it is faulty in building a large fund and then drawing it down. 
Also-at least in this type of program and in the prevailing politi-
cal process-building a large fund is undesirable. This may seem a 
strange thing for an actuary to say! Usually, if one is the actuary for 
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a pension plan, it would seem that the more money that one has, the 
better is the situation. 
In this case, three good reasons exist why the procedure of build-
ing a large fund is undesirable. First, under the manner in which the 
federal budget is reported, the enormity of the deficit is hidden, to 
some extent, by the annual excesses of income over outgo of the trust 
funds. Second, the ready availability of these excesses for general 
purpose borrowing by the federal government could cause Congress and 
the executive branch to be less frugal than would be the case if bor-
rowing were necessary from the private marketplace. Third, the 
mammoth size of the fund could cause irresistible pressures from the 
beneficiaries to overliberalize current benefits, thereby creating 
insupportable long-range costs. 
Nonetheless, the amount of the present fund balance is needed as 
a contingency reserve in case an economic recession occurs. That bal-
ance (about one year's outgo) probably would get the system through 
any sort of business recession, even though income to the trust funds 
may be smaller than currently is projected. 
The program has two trust funds, the Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance Trust Fund and the Disability Insurance Trust Fund. These 
two funds usually are considered in combination when the financial 
status of the program is analyzed. The current estimates 
(intermediate) indicate that the combined funds will be exhausted in 
2036, with the OASI fund lasting until 2044, but the DI fund only 
until 1995. This is not a significant problem, however, because the 
allocation of the OASDI tax rate can be changed slightly-as has 
been done several times in the past-to show both funds being 
exhausted at about the same time. Such reallocation would not have 
any effect on the taxes paid by workers and employers in the aggre-
gate. 
The foregoing discussion has not related to the Medicare program, 
which consists of hospital insurance (HI) and supplementary medical 
insurance (SMI). The former is financed by payroll taxes on almost 
the same persons as OASDI covers, while the latter is financed by 
premiums on the enrolled beneficiaries and by general revenues 
(which currently bear 75 percent of the cost). The HI program is 
estimated to have financial difficulties in the next ten years, its 
trust fund being exhausted in 1999 under the intermediate estimate. 
The SMI program rates are established in the law for years through 
1995 at an apparently more than adequate level, and thereafter they 
can be adjusted by promulgations of the executive branch on the basis 
of experience. 
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Although the HI program has great financing problems over the 
long range, so too does the diverse health insurance system for the 
working population and its dependents. The solution to both sets of 
problems must be found simultaneously, perhaps by a radical change 
in the method of financing health care (which could mean the elimi-
nation of the Medicare program by the substitution of a universal sys-
tem). 
The solution to the foregoing problem of roller-coaster financing of 
the OASDI program is to change to responsible pay-as-you-go financ-
ing. Such a procedure was followed from the mid-1950s until the 1977 
amendments. For more details on this matter, see Myers (1989). 
The change to pay-as-you-go financing could be accomplished by 
lowering immediately the combined employer/employee tax rate by 1 
percent for the next ten to fifteen years and then having the rate 
slowly increase over the years. Ultimately, the rate would have to 
be about 5 percent above the present 12.4 percent rate-just as would 
be necessary under present law after the trust funds are exhausted. As 
an alternative to such higher ultimate rates, the benefit costs could 
be reduced (e.g., by increasing the normal retirement age more than is 
provided for under present law). For more details on pay-as-you-go 
financing and its advantages, see Myers (1991). 
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On Becoming a Cost Effective Company 
Robert D. Shapiro1 and Barton H. Clennon2 
Abstract 
The 1990s financial services environment requires each life company to identify its 
distinct capabilities and competitive strengths and to build its future direction from 
these features. This demands a fundamental rethinking of traditional approaches to 
planning, organization, and financial management. 
Key words and phrases: visio11, quality, competitive adva11tages 
1 Introduction 
The realities of the 1990s operating environment have become 
painfully evident to life insurance company executives. The often-con-
flicting demands for strength, capital, service, and attractive prices 
are here to stay. Future survival requires the full complement of 
financial solidity, quality service, controlled expenses, and competi-
tive prices. The increasing emphasis on full value requires that these 
factors be perceived favorably from the eyes of customers and agents 
and not merely reflect the hopes of management. 
Because most life companies currently have expense levels that 
exceed pricing assumptions and have had expense excesses for many 
years, fundamental organizational structuring is necessary. 
Whether such cost management and organizational restructuring 
initiatives destroy or enhance a company's value and long-term sound-
ness depends largely on the strength of three factors: 
1 Robert D. Shapiro, FSA, CLU is president of The Shapiro Network, Inc. which was 
formed in 1987. Mr. Shapiro has been a consultant and investment banker to the 
insurance industry since 1965. He has extensive experience in strategic management, 
mergers and acqUisitions, and financial management. 
2 Barton H. Clennon, FSA, MAAA is president of Clennon and Associates, Inc. Mr. 
Clennon was a partner in Milliman and Robertson, Inc., an international consulting 
actuarial firm. He has considerable experience in life insurance company financial 
reporting, appraisals, and mergers. His present interest is in life insurance company 
mergers ana acquisitions. 
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• Vision; 
• Fit; and 
• Commitment. 
2 Articulating the Vision 
Every successful company needs a clear vision, i.e., a picture of 
what it wants to become. Corporate vision must focus the company's 
limited capital and human resources in a manner that exploits the 
company's strengths and competitive potentials, emphasizes its com-
mitment to quality and to success, and energizes its employees. 
Vision is a "concrete description of where the company should be 
in five to ten years" (Shapiro, 1992). This definition emphasizes 
painting a picture, clear enough for all employees, agents, and com-
petitors to see, of how the company will look after the company 
implements its plans. It provides a consistent framework within 
which all employees can make critical strategic and organizational 
decisions. 
How will the vision shape a company's cost management 
approach? First, it determines where and how the company must 
compete. This determines required price levels, which, in turn, drive 
allowable expenses. To compete and meet targeted profit goals, the 
company must shape its organization and related costs to live within 
the defined allowable expenses. 
3 Fitting Company Capabilities 
Each company needs to fit its skills and capabilities with the 
requirements of its vision and related product/service commitments. 
Different companies have the potential to excel at different things. 
For example, one company may emphasize innovative product/service 
features, while another may stress financial strength and safe, pre-
dictable returns. Each point of emphasis may demand different capa-
bilities and management approaches, however, and may be valued by 
customers and agents in different ways. These differences in turn 
determine the specific level of expense that can be covered in prices. 
If the vision is underpinned by special capabilities that provide 
distinct competitive advantages, the required value-added pricing 
(and related expense allowances) can be defined and tracked. To war-
rant the value-added pricing and costing required to reimburse the 
company for maintaining special capabilities, customers must appre-
ciate these capabilities sufficiently to be willing to pay for them. 
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4 Commitment to Quality and Success 
Although most insurers would argue that they have a strong com-
mitment to quality and success, few have institutionalized this com-
mitment. For example, quality efforts and rhetoric often are reflected 
in narrowly conceived projects with at best a temporary impact (much 
like many strategic planning retreats, mission definition sessions, and 
culture enhancement workshops!). 
What does it mean to be committed to quality and success and to 
the related organizational focus needed to maximize marketing and 
service effectiveness and minimize costs? First, board level buy-in to 
the effort is essential to establish needed actions as long-term 
requirements that transcend current managerial personnel and 
employee agendas. Second, performance standards must be changed at 
all levels (Le., corporate, unit, and individual employee levels). 
New performance standards (and consistently modified performance 
appraisal and compensation practices) send loud and clear messages 
that what is important has changed! Each employee ultimately will 
change what (and how) he or she does as it becomes clear what is 
important. 
Commitment, like the definition of special capabilities, needs to 
be linked to vision. Without such linkage, there is no consistent 
framework for defining quality and managing the commitment to it. 
The result will be a shallow implementation program that will have 
limited impact and likely will disappear after a while. 
When the vision linkage is present, the focus of commitment is to 
excel in the special capabilities that drive vision achievement. No 
company can be the best there is in all areas. Each has to establish 
its basis of competition and the core of its quality efforts based on 
the capabilities that can differentiate the firm in the marketplace. 
5 Effective Expense Reduction 
The narrow, meat-ax approach of many expense reduction actions 
taken by insurers in recent years has provided only painful, short-
term fixes. Lost morale and paranoia may paralyze companies from 
doing the right things after the temporarily removed bloat returns. 
The insurance literature is filled with comparisons of ratios of 
expenses to premium bases and ratios of expenses to the number of 
policies in force and unit costs. Although interesting and occasionally 
informative, these numbers provide life companies with little direc-
tion about the appropriate level of expenses and how to reduce costs 
to this level. 
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Horror stories of 10 percent to 20 percent across-the-board expense 
cut programs abound in the insurance industry. Because these expense 
cuts are generally arbitrary (and are perceived to be arbitrary), 
employee morale typically plunges and paralysis sets in as cuts are 
implemented. Productivity drops. Soon the company needs to fix some 
things to get the growth they seek. Staff is added, often in the same 
areas where it originally was cut. Costs rise, and the same competi-
tive pressures that led to the original staff cuts reappear. A consul-
tant is hired, expense cuts again are recommended ... and the cycle 
repeats. 
Expenses cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. The framework for 
reducing expenses must encompass broader planning, financial, and 
pricing issues. The framework must be linked to the corporate vision 
to be understood and accepted by employees. Only within this 
broader framework can expenses be reduced without damaging the 
company and with an expectation that the reduced expense levels can 
be maintained. 
The framework for effective expense reduction requires that the 
insurance company first: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Establish clear, consistent profit and surplus objectives; 
Define target markets, distribution, and products/services; 
Identify future (not past) key competitors and how the company 
intends to compete against them; and 
Agree on the required level of price competitiveness and related 
sales expectations over the next four to five years. 
Once this framework is clarified, the company's allowable expenses 
can be defined and the organization can be reshaped to provide the 
required service within established expense standards. Normally a 
one to three year period is required to migrate from the existing 
expense infrastructure to a new one. The costs of organizational 
reengineering and related investments in new capabilities are key 
reasons why actual expenses will run in excess of allowable expenses 
for a period of time. 
6 An Expense Model 
Every company must balance what it spends against the price cus-
tomers/agents are willing to pay for the company's products and ser-
vices. An insurance company's expenses can be considered in this way: 
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TABLE 1 
Total Insurance Company Expenses 
The shaded areas represent expenses that must be eliminated by the 
company for expenses to cover prices. Stated another way, an insur-
ance company only can afford to spend on extra services what cus-
tomers and agents are willing to pay for such services. There are some 
costs such as regulatory compliance, of course, that may not be appre-
ciated by customers and agents but that can not be eliminated. These 
costs generally would be mandated for all insurance companies and 
hence would be reflected in expenses of a low cost insurance company. 
Although this broad analysis may seem obvious, it is difficult to 
identify and cost the specific value-added services that are provided 
by the company. Insurance companies typically analyze costs at 
department or function levels and not by process or task. Further, most 
companies continue to define what they do without substantial anal-
ysis of what customers and agents really want and need. Hence, the 
data needed to determine and eliminate the cost of unappreciated 
extra services provided by the company are not available. 
Nonetheless, each company needs to push its way through this 
exercise as best it can. While this value-added quantification and 
analysis is being developed, those existing tasks and operations that 
are ineffective or duplicative can be eliminated. Hence, the expense 
reduction process can achieve some immediate successes while the 
foundation for more fundamental requctions is being established. 
7 Refocusing the Organization 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to reach full potential in provid-
ing valued service without a clear vision of what the company wants 
to be. A coherent vision will articulate target markets, expected key 
competitors, required financial standards (e.g., price levels and 
allowable expenses), and desired operating approaches. The vision 
also will define activities that must be accomplished in order for the 
company to be successful. 
An insurance company's organizational structure must be reshaped 
to focus on these critical activities. New priorities and new employee 
by employee daily agendas must be established. Activities that are 
not consistent with the vision must be eliminated. 
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For example, let's say the vision demands that the company be 
the leader in serving the insurance needs of small employers. Assume 
further that the company historically has organized its operations in 
life, annuity, health, and group segments. The vision undoubtedly 
places great value on activities that will capture and serve small 
employers. It likely devalues other activities that fit the historical 
operation segmentation (such as stockbroker sales promotions within 
the annuity line) but that are not within the concentrated focus of 
the small employer vision. Similarly, many activities that histori-
cally were developed within one or more of the life, annuity, health, 
or group segments need to be reconceived and streamlined within the 
new vision. 
Reshaping operations to provide targeted, quality products and 
services demands clear articulation of where the company must have 
the highest quality to achieve the vision. Each current activity 
should be analyzed by asking the following questions: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Is the activity essential to the role of the unit in which it is 
being performed? Are the unit and the activity vision consistent? 
Could the frequency, scope, or precision of the activity be reduced 
without a significant negative impact on the ability to manage or 
operate? 
Could the company eliminate, simplify or move all or part of the 
activity? 
Could the company reduce the cost of performing the activity? 
Could the company improve control methods? 
Are functions and activities grouped in the most effective way, 
given the stated vision? 
Are jobs designed for efficient performance of assigned tasks? 
Who pays for the activity, e.g., existing policyholders, future 
policyholders, surplus, etc.? 
8 An Example 
Let's take a simple example. Assume we have a life insurance 
company (ABC Life) that writes only $100,000 face amount life 
insurance policies, each with an annual premium of $1,000. Assume 
further that ABC Life has 100,000 policies in force, writes 20,000 new 
policies per year, incurs noncommission expenses of $20 million per 
year, prices for noncommission expenses using $500 per policy first 
year and $50 per policy in renewal years, and has clear profit and 
surplus goals. 
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The annual expenses allowed by current prices in the current year 
amount to $15,000,000 (Le., 100,000 x $50 + 20,000 x $500). Hence, 
ABC Life's noncommission expenses are running 133 percent (Le., 
$20,000,000 + $15,000,000) of the expenses allowed for in its pricing ... 
or $5,000,000 per year of excess expenses. 
What can ABC Life do? Three of its options are: 
1. Increase prices to allow for 33 percent more in expense. For exam-
ple, the prices could be increased to allow for $668 per policy 
First year and $67 in renewal years. Issues include: 
• Will prices still be competitive enough to write 20,000 new 
policies each year? 
• Can existing policyholders be charged $67/policy? If so, will 
they continue their policies if their price is Increased? 
2. Cut 25 percent of expenses (from $20 million per year to $15 mil-
lion per year). Issues include: 
• How and where should the expenses be cut? 
• Can servicing and support activities be maintained at a high 
enough level to keep customers and agents happy (and persis-
tent)? 
3. Sell more business. If ABC Life can get to where it writes 27,000 
policies a year and has 135,000 policies in force, its current pric-
ing expense allowance would provide over $20 million per year 
(133,000 x $50 + 27,000 x $500). 
How should ABC Life proceed? Many companies make a judgment 
to take one (or a combination) of these options, relying more on hope 
than solid action plans that customers will continue to buy, expenses 
can be cut, and/or more sales can be developed. The demands of 
today's complex marketplace will require proactive, well-planned 
actions even in companies that have a track record of success. 
History tells us that hope rarely brings success. During the 1980s 
the majority of life companies had general expenses that were in 
excess of those allowed in their pricing. Many of these companies 
embarked on one or more plans to bring expenses in line with allow-
ables, yet most of these plans failed to meet expectations. The main 
reason for failure was that extrapolated growth and/ or cost reduction 
projections. were not realistic in an environment characterized by 
intense competition, increasing capital pressure, and proliferating 
regulatory and administrative demands. 
Given the above options, the place for ABC Life to begin is at 
the intersection of ABC Life corporate potential with the opportuni-
ties and realities of the expected future financial services market-
place. Where can or should ABC Life compete? Who will its com-
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petitors be? What price levels will be required in this market? How 
much money will these required prices allow ABC Life to spend? To 
answer this last question, ABC Life must make a judgment about the 
anticipated relationship between price (and related expense allow-
abIes) and sales levels to determine specific price and sales objec-
tives. 
Once the target price and sales levels are established, the allow-
able expenses are determined. Let's hypothesize that ABC Life's 
analysis determines that: 
• Its vision requires it to keep its prices at current levels. Hence, 
current expense allowances need to be maintained; 
• By refocusing its marketing and product approaches to be consis-
tent with its vision, it can write 25,000 new policies per year 
(with inforce stabilizing at 125,000 policies per year in five 
years); and 
• Current expenses would be reduced from $20,000,000 per year to 
$16,100,000 per year if the organization were reshaped to elimi-
nate inefficiencies and support modified operations more effec-
tively. It will take three years to reshape the organization, 
however. 
A (simplified) five year quantification of ABC Life's new future 
expectations might look like this: 
TABLE 2 
ABC Life's Five Year Future Expectations 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Excess of Actual 
Expected Over Allowable 
Policies Allowable Actual Expenses 
Year New Inforce Expenses Expenses' (4) - (3) 
1 25,000 105,000 $17,750,000 $19,200,000 $1,450,000 
2 25,000 110,000 18,000,000 18,400,000 400,000 
3 25,000 115,000 18,250,000 17,600,000 to,ooOl 4 25,000 120,000 18,500,000 18,100,000 400,000 
5 25,000 125,000 18,750,000 18,600,000 150,000) 
'A simplified approximation reflecting potential basic cost reductions, re-engineering costs, and 
inflation. 
ABC Life expects to bring its expenses in line with prices and 
sales within three years. Current inflation expectations will create 
another expense deficiency after five years, however, unless some-
thing else is adjusted. ABC Life may have to wait a year or two to 
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reexamine the results of its restructuring and changes in the competi-
tive environment for additional ideas. 
9 Conclusion 
The 1990s require that each life company look deep into its corpo-
rate soul to find its distinct key to future success. Shallow pricing and 
sales gimmicks will not work and can undermine or destroy a company 
quickly. 
Few companies can afford to dissipate value (which is equivalent 
to capital). Unless a direction can be sculpted that is anchored in a 
company's special capabilities and aligned with the realities of the 
competitive marketplace, the company runs an unacceptable risk of 
self destruction. For most companies, a fundamental rethinking and an 
approach to planning, organization, and financial management simi-
lar to that described in this article are necessary for long-term finan-
cial health and viability. 
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The Process of Pension Forecasting 
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Abstract 
This paper explains the process of pension forecasting. It discusses the common 
purposes and uses of pension forecasts, the major steps involved, and the principal lim-
itations of these forecasts. 
Some insights into each stage of the forecasting process are provided. Among the 
stages discussed are: the background research to be performed; the selection of scenario 
assumptions; shortcuts used in the actual performance of the forecast; review of the 
forecast results; and communication of the forecast findings. 
Key words and phrases: projection, simulation, stochastic modeling, scenario 
1 Introduction 
Funding retirement obligations has become a significant part of 
corporate financing. It is not unusual for a plan providing rich retire-
ment benefits with indexation or one with substantial unfunded past 
service liability to require an annual contribution in excess of 15 per-
cent of payroll. The unfunded liabilities of some companies' pension 
programs are equal to a sizable portion of their net worth. Union 
negotiation settlements hinge more and more on pension agreements. 
As a result, many companies include a pension forecast1 in their regu-
lar financial planning process. 
The responsibility for providing such a pension forecast typically 
is delegated to the actuary. Most actuaries are familiar with the 
* Michael Sze is a Fellow of both the Society of Actuaries and the Canadian Institute 
of Actuaries. He received his Ph.D. degree in mathematics from the Ohio State 
University and currently is a partner of Hewitt Associates. He is the chair of the 
Society of Actuaries Retirement Systems Research Committee, as well as a member of 
the Canadian Institute of Actuaries Investment Practice Committee. While the author 
takes full responsibilitY' for any errors in this article, he would like to acknowledge, 
with gratitude, the valuable comments provided by Ms. Rita Lawlor, Ms. Milena 
Francia, Ms. Megan Duke, and Mrs. Elsie Sze in the preparation of this article, as well 
as many helpful suggestions by the referees. 
1 The terms projection and forecast are used interchangeably in this paper and in the 
pension actuarial literature in general. 
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basic mathematics involved in a pension forecast because of their 
training and education. Many inexperienced actuaries, however, are 
not familiar with the actual process of a pension forecast. In fact, 
some pension valuation actuaries actually have difficulties making 
forecasts, primarily due to the fact that they do not fully recognize 
the difference in emphasis between an actuarial valuation and a 
forecast. The former focuses on the present; its aim is to provide an 
accurate assessment of the funded status and cost of a pension plan 
under the current legal and accounting environments. The latter is 
directed toward the future trend of pension costs under varying eco-
nomic or demographic scenarios. 
The consequence of not understanding the forecasting process fully 
can be costly. At best, the actuary may have difficulty explaining 
the cause and effect of some economic variables. At worst, faulty 
assumptions or logic can lead to erroneous conclusions with detrimen-
tal effects to the company. Because there are many variables 
involved in the process, there is a real danger that errors often are 
not detected until the damage has been done. 
The purpose of this paper is to share some of my experiences in 
pension forecasting, to provide some insights regarding the process, 
and to point out some possible pitfalls. Because of the complex nature 
of a pension forecast, it is impossible to cover every possible situa-
tion. This article, however, can be used to assist in more diligent 
planning of each forecast; it is not a cookbook to be followed in every 
step of the process. Readers are assumed to be familiar with the 
basic techniques and mathematics of the projection process.2 
This article is organized into six sections, each of which is 
briefly described below. 
• Preparation for a Forecast: This section discusses the major con-
siderations and background research that must be performed 
before embarking on the forecast. Most problems confronted in 
pension projection originate from insufficient preparation; 
• Choice of Scenario Assumptions: This section covers some basic 
considerations underlying the choice of scenario assumptions. 
These assumptions represent management's best guess of future 
economic events. Sucl,. assumptions control the projected results 
and must reflect the principal objective of the projection; 
• Performing the Forecast: This section discusses the choice of the 
projection method. The purpose and needs of the sponsor deter-
mine the scope of the forecast; 
2 Readers interested in the details of the pension forecasting process may refer to 
Lorisz (1993), Sze (1997), or Schnitzer (1977). 
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Review of Forecast Results: This section proposes a criterion for 
making such a judgment and provides some -hints on the review 
process. It sometimes requires a lot of experience and intuition to 
Judge whether forecast results are reasonable; 
Communication of Forecast Findings: Forecasting is as much an 
educational process as a technical process. Forecast findings are of 
no use unless they are understood. This section provides some 
insights on the communication of the projection results; and 
Other Considerations: This section compares the forecasting and 
actuarial valuation processes and outlines some limitations of 
forecasting. 
2 Preparation for a Forecast 
The importance of preparation cannot be overemphasized. Even 
the most experienced actuary must have on hand a detailed prepara-
tion of what he or she plans to accomplish with the forecast. A 
detailed preparation should consider: (1) the purpose of the forecast; 
(2) the sponsor, the industry, and the economic environment; (3) the 
demographics of the population; (4) the pension plan, the valuation 
methods, and the actuarial assumptions; and (5) past plan experience 
and the funded status of the plan. 
2.1 Purpose of the Forecast 
Unlike funding and expensing valuations which are required by 
governmental regulations, there are no legal or accounting rules 
requiring pension projections. The request to perform a pension projec-
tion study usually originates from plan sponsors who need answers to 
specific questions concerning their pension plans. Before the actuary 
begins the study, it is important that he or she knows what those 
questions are and the reasons for the questions. Knowing the purpose 
of the forecast will lead to a better understanding of the sponsor's 
funding and expensing expectations and the sponsor's risk tolerance. 
An integral part of the forecast is the testing of the achievability of 
the sponsor's objectives under legal, accounting, and economic con-
straints. Understanding the sponsor's expectations and risk tolerance 
also will provide guidance on the choice of scenario assumptions, the 
scope of the study, and the best way to communicate the forecast's 
findings. 
The emphasis of a forecast depends a great deal on its purpose. A 
forecast that is part of the regular corporate financial planning pro-
cess may have as its goal one of the following: (1) to determine the 
stability of pension contributions and expenses; (2) to devise funding 
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and investment strategies that will minimize unexpected fluctuations 
in contributions and expenses; or (3) to devise an asset/liability 
matching strategy to minimize undesirable deterioration in the 
funded status of the plan. 
A few examples may illustrate some of the considerations 
involved: 
• Downsizing: In a downsizing operation, the forecast should 
anticipate significant aging of the group, the possibility of an 
employer-initiated early retirement program, and a decrease in 
population size. The chance of plan terminations typically cannot 
be ruled out. There is a need to monitor the risk of having to fund 
the entire plan deficiency over a short period of time. The alter-
natives that should be considered are amortization and bond 
immunization.3 In one such study, a sponsor had to consider the 
impact of the timing of plan termination after a downsizing pro-
cess. Figure 1 shows the funding impact of plan termination in 
different years, assuming that plan termination deficiency is 
amortized over five years. It further demonstrates that the fund-
ing pattern is practically the same (except the incidence of pay-
ments), irrespective of the timing of the plan termination deci-
sion. The actuary in this case was instructed to monitor interest 
rates for the sl?onsor. An annuity contract was placed at an oppor-
tune time whIch allowed the sponsor to save millions of dollars 
on the plan termination cost; 
• Changing Employment Pattern: As a result of the demographic 
pattern of aging shown in the United States and Canada, many 
retail companies have experienced a significant shift in hiring 
patterns. Companies often want to know the impact of such demo-
graphic changes on future pension costs. In such a study, the 
emphasis must be to balance the need for adequate retirement 
benefits for the employees with the need for staole pension con-
tributions and expense for the employer. The alternatives that 
should be considered are plan design changes (such as a change 
from a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan) and 
funding basis changes (such as changes in retirement age and 
turnover assumptions). The scenario assumptions used must reflect 
age and sex distributions of new employees as well as more real-
istic pay and termination patterns for these employees. 
In the early 1980s, a major department store expected that 
new hires would be substantially older and would include a 
larger percentage of females. Many of the new hires would be the 
secondary wage earner of the family and might net be as career-
aggressive as were previous employees. A forecast study was 
commissioned to study the pension cost impact of these 
demographic changes as well as to suggest alternative plan 
designs. The plan had a sizable funding surp1us, so the contribu-
3 Readers interested in the theory and application of bond immunization should see 
Redington (1952), Tilley (1980), and Bader (1983). 
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ion pattern was not a major concern. The cost considerations were 
directed to the trend of pension expense as a percentage of pay-
roll. The study analyzed the net cost increase after taking into 
account the offsetting impact of aging, a more moderate rate of 
salary increases, and a higher turnover rate. The expense increase 
was moderate and was considered to be manageable by the plan 
sponsor. The defined contribution alternative, while helpful in 
stabilizing pension cost, was considered to be too drastic and was 
deemed to provide unsatisfactory retirement income for employ-
ees. In the end, no major plan design changes were made. There 
were, however, some changes in actuarial valuation assumptions 
to reflect more realistic expectations of salary progression and 
turnover pattern; 
Financial Planning to Stabilize Pension Expenses: Financial 
Accounting Standard No. 87 requires that the discount rate used 
to determine pension liabilities and service cost must be based on 
the current market interest rate. Plan sponsors feel vulnerable to 
unpredictable shifts in economic situations, especially given the 
volatility of market interest rates in recent years. Also, the fluc-
tuating Investment returns of pension funds add to the uncertainty 
of the pension cost. A forecasting study may be ordered to deter-
mine a stable projected pension expense trend. The alternatives 
considered tYEically include asset/liability matching. Numerous 
other articles have covered asset/liability matching and immu-
nization.4 
Many forecasts have been prompted by investment advisors. 
The actuary is asked to provide the liability and cash flow 
trends of the pension fund. A forecast is performed to test invest-
ment policies against the deterministic liability: trend in order to 
find the investment mix that best protects the surplus of the 
plan. These forecasts often result in a recommendation for a 
higher investment concentration in bonds. 
This approach to projection misses the interplay between 
assets and liabilities. A detailed stochastic projection involving 
both assets and liabilities (usually referred to as asset/liability 
modeling) will tend to produce substantially different results. For 
example, an inflationary environment will impact both wage 
increases and investment returns simultaneously. Only an 
asset/liability modeling process will be able to capture the corre-
lated events between assets and liabilities; see Beekman (1980), 
Redington (1952), and Tilley (1980); and 
Postretirement Medical Benefits Forecast: Many companies are 
interested in investigating the immediate and continuing impact 
of FAS 106 rules. These rules require companies to book liabilities 
and expenses for postretirement medical and other benefits. 
Because of the scarCity of background information, many attempts 
4 A discussion of asset/liability matching and immunization is beyond the scope of 
this article. For more information on this topic, see Beekman (1980), Tilley (1980), and 
Redington (1952). For more on immunization and how it may help to stabilize pension 
cost, see Daskais and LeSueur (1983) and Sze (1993). 
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to forecast the impact of FAS 106 have been performed that treat 
the postretirement medical benefit pay'ments as a stream of esca-
lating annuity payments during the life of the beneficiaries, with 
the escalation reflecting medical inflation. The present value of 
these payments usually is determined by using expected invest-
ment returns and the mortality and termination decrements used 
in pension valuations. Other considerations usually include alter-
native expensing bases and benefit designs.s 
There are two potential flaws to forecasts performed in the 
manner described in the last paragraph. First, the pattern of 
postretirement medical benefit payments is different from that of 
an escalating annuity. A major portion of medical expenses are 
incurred during the last few years of a person's life; see Riley and 
Lubitz (1989).6 Second, the present value calculations in many 
FAS 106 projections are based on mortality and termination rates 
used in pension valuations. Mortality rates used in a pension val-
uation often overstate actual experience, while termination rates 
typically understate actual experience. Such discrepancies may 
have a significant impact on the liability and service costs calcu-
lated.7 
Aside from the flaws in many FAS 106 studies, the forecast 
results still may present valuable information to plan sponsors. 
After the initial shock of the drastic cost impact of providing 
these benefits, many plan sponsors would explore other plan 
design alternatives such as requiring employee contributions, 
establishing maximum benefit limits, or replacing welfare bene-
fits by additional pension benefits. 
Advance funaing of this obligation may be considered. 
Funding alternatives often investigated include funding through 
the pension plan based on Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 
401(h) or establishing a separate trust under IRC Section 501(c)9. 
Under some restrictive conditions, IRC Section 401(h) allows 
funding of such postretirement health benefits in a pension plan. 
IRC Section 501(c)9 allows prefunding of welfare benefits under 
limited conditions; see Hess, Becker, and Snyder (1991) and Kra 
and Resse (1992). Expensing alternatives include immediate 
recognition of past service liability or amortizing this liability 
over the expected future service of the employees. 
The above examples illustrate the need for the forecast to reflect 
the purpose of study. It is important to note that because each project 
is initiated to address a specific problem, the actuary should provide 
S For more on funding postretirement medical benefits, see Roccas, Sobel, and Ullman 
(1990) and Veach, Cotter, and Meyers (1992). 
6 Further research is needed to determine the actual pattern of payments and the 
impact of the proper cost attribution. Studies in these areas are currently being 
unaertaken by the Society of Actuaries. 
7 See Vaughn (1992) for more on realistic termination experience. 
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not only an explanation of the cause and effect of the issue in ques-
tion, but also alternatives for solving the problem. It is this last 
requirement that makes a forecasting study more challenging to the 
actuary and valuable to the sponsor than a regular funding or expens-
ing valuation. 
2.2 Sponsor, Industry, and Economic Environment 
Forecasting studies never are performed in a vacuum. They are 
performed in the context of other economic events. A trend of escalat-
ing pension costs may be tolerable for a utility company. The rates 
that a utility company charges its consumers typically are fixed on a 
cost-pIus-margin basis. Thus, any increase in operating cost is passed 
to the consumers. On the other hand, the same cost trend may be 
detrimental to a manufacturing company undergoing severe down-
sizing in a recessionary economic environment. In such an economic 
climate, the revenue is limited by price competition. Severe down-
sizing, however, typically entails sizable escalation in pension cost. 
Before beginning a projection study of a pension plan, it is impor-
tant to understand the financial strength of the plan sponsor, as well 
as the significance of the pension cost in the operating budget of the 
company. A company with ample resources may be able to tolerate 
more fluctuation in the pension cost, so the funding time horizon may 
be longer. Thus, the goal may be to achieve the most favorable long-
term financial results, even if it means taking more risks in the 
interim. On the other hand, for a company with limited resources or 
whose pension cost is a significant portion of its total budget, care 
must be taken to ensure acceptability at each forecast year. An unex-
pectedly high cost at any point may be unacceptable to the company, 
requiring immediate management attention, which often results in 
funding and/ or investment changes. The constraints for such a forecast 
are much tighter, and results for each forecast year must be examined 
carefully. 
It is important to understand the business of the plan sponsor. 
This often dictates the hiring, promotion, and termination patterns of 
the company. Knowledge of the industry in which the plan sponsor 
operates provides insights into the growth or retrenchment pattern of 
the overall employee population, as well as the volatility of such a 
pattern. Such knowledge determines the choice of demographic sce-
nario assumptions. 
Many forecasts are commissioned when the sponsor has a problem 
that needs addressing. Often these forecasts are performed in times of 
economic downturn. The future economic outlook is critical is assessing 
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a plan sponsor's tolerance for cost fluctuations. For a plan sponsor 
with a severe cash flow constraint, it is of paramount importance 
that the forecast addresses both the current economic outlook and the 
consequence of further economic downturn. 
2.3 Demographics of the Population 
The demographics of the employee population determine not only 
the current year's cost of the pension plan, they also dictate the 
future retirement and termination patterns of the plan. Where the 
cash flow forecast is critical, a careful study of the demographics of 
the current employee population is vital. Furthermore, a less mature 
employee population does not have as much pending pension obliga-
tion as a more mature population and may have greater tolerance for 
economic fluctuations. A careful study of the population demo-
graphics provides much insight into the trend of the future costs of 
the plan. 
2.4 Pension Plan Valuation Methods and Actuarial 
Assumptions 
The impact of economic factors on the future pension cost depends 
on the plan's valuation methods and actuarial assumptions. Thus, it 
is important to review these valuation bases before embarking on the 
forecasting process. For example, the company's contribution, 
expressed as a percentage of salary for a defined contribution plan, is 
insensitive to salary changes. The pension cost of a final average 
salary defined benefit plan, however, is affected greatly by salary 
experience, especially if the pension plan benefit is integrated with 
Social Security. The pension cost of a career average salary defined 
benefit plan is less volatile with respect to salary experience. 
Pension costs under aggregate cost methods are typically less sen-
sitive to the effect of aging populations than are pension costs under 
individual cost methods.8 The entry age cost method (among individ-
ual cost methods) tends to provide a more stable cost pattern with 
respect to an aging population than does the unit credit cost method. 
Unit credit normal cost represents the present value of benefits earned 
during the valuation year. As the population ages, the normal cost 
escalates. Entry age normal cost represents the average of such nor-
8 For a detailed analysis of pension costs methods, see the texts by Anderson (1990) 
and Berin (1989). 
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mal costs over the career of the participant. It is more stable relative 
to the aging process of the population. 
A more aggressive actuarial valuation interest assumption antici-
pates higher investment returns and thus provides less opportunity 
for asset gains. A higher valuation salary scale assumption antici-
pates higher cost increases due to pay increases and, therefore, pro-
vides greater opportunity for pay gains. 
2.5 Past Experience and Funded Status of the Pension 
Plan 
Some economic variables are difficult to predict because their 
behavior is independent of the past. Many pension plan variables 
(such as turnover and promotion patterns), however, are not indepen-
dent of past experience and can be projected with a certain degree of 
accuracy. A study of past experience of these variables thus provides 
valuable information for the future. Overall, ignoring past experience 
in a forecast study is likely to lead to worthless results. 
Temporary investment and other experience setbacks may be tol-
erable for plans that have huge funding surpluses. The experience 
impact on a plan's funding requirement can be drastic for plans that 
are only marginally over funded; therefore, pension forecasts must rec-
ognize the funded status in the selection of scenario assumptions. 
3 Choice of Scenario Assumptions 
Because scenario assumptions control the occurrence of certain key 
economic events that may impact future pension cost, the proper 
choice of assumptions is vital to the usefulness of the forecast. These 
assumptions must echo the purpose of the study, recognize both the 
plan's and the sponsor's characteristics, and reflect past experience 6f 
the plan. 
The choice of scenario assumptions must be a joint effort between 
the actuary and the plan sponsor. The plan sponsor's input is critical 
because scenario assumptions should reflect management's best esti-
mate of future economic events. Furthermore, the sponsor has the best 
understanding of the needs of the company, the financial risks that it 
can tolerate, and the company's objectives. The sponsor may not have 
analyzed past experience as carefully as the actuary, however, and 
may not have ready access to economic and investment data or have 
as much understanding of the implications of the choice of some 
assumptions as does the actuary. Furthermore, the bias of the plan 
sponsor, whether intentional or not, may prejudice the objectivity of 
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the analysis. Thus, it is the responsibility of the actuary to provide 
guidance on the cause and effect of the choices. Where there are 
doubts about some selected scenario assumptions, alternative assump-
tions should be tested. 
During the process of choosing scenario assumptions, an often 
asked question is: "What is the valuation assumption?" Such a ques-
tion usually reflects a lack of understanding of the basic purpose of 
these two types of assumptions. It is the actuary's responsibility to 
explain the difference between forecast scenario assumptions and actu-
arial valuation assumptions.9 Actuarial valuation assumptions typi-
cally contain a margin of conservation that should be removed in the 
choice of scenario assumptions for forecasting. For instance, the com-
monly used valuation mortality table (e.g., 1983 Group Annuity 
Mortality Table) provides mortality rates that are 10 percent lower 
than the underlying experience obtained by mortality studies of the 
population over the same period; see Committee on Annuities (1983 
and 1987). Similarly, typical withdrawal tables provide turnover 
rates that are lower than actual experience; see Vaughn (1992). 
These subtle differences often are not explained clearly to the plan 
sponsor. As a result, valuation turnover assumptions often are chosen 
by default to be the scenario assumptions. For pension pllms where 
the death benefit is comparable to the projected retirement benefit, 
using a valuation mortality assumption for the scenario mortality 
rate may not distort future pension cost greatly. Where death bene-
fits are payable in a lump sum, the cash flow pattern will be under-
stated if the actual number of deaths exceeds the expected number of 
deaths. The distortions introduced by conservative turnover assump-
tions, however, may be even more significant, as the turnover rate is 
typically much higher than the mortality rate. 
The set of scenario assumptions should include the following 
groups of assumptions: demographic, economic, and simulation 
assumptions. This article will not provide a detailed explanation of 
each scenario assumption. (Interested readers should see Sze (1987) 
for details.) We will provide, however, a few critical comments on 
some of them. 
3.1 Demographic Assumptions 
Demographic assumptions are used to project future employee 
populations. Such assumptions include the mortality, disability, ter-
9 See Lorisz (1993) and Sze (1987) for more detailed discussions. 
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mination and retirement patterns and the number and distribution of 
new entrants with respect to sex, age, and pay. 
Usually mortality and disability scenario assumptions are only 
age specific. The termination assumption, however, should vary by 
age and duration and should show a higher turnover pattern during 
the earlier years of the employees' careers. The retirement pattern 
should be distributed over the eligible retirement ages. Although the 
number of new entrants may differ from year to year, the distribution 
by sex, age, and pay usually is assumed to be the same during the 
projection period; see Jackson, Haley, and Wendt (1989) and Sze 
(1987). 
For a small pension plan, a significant demographic change 
would produce a major impact on the trend of pension costs. The 
assumption of such demographic changes usually is specified by the 
sponsor. 
3.2 Economic Assumptions 
Economic assumptions are used to project and determine the assets 
and liabilities of the plan during the forecast period. These assump-
tions include: an inflation rate; real or nominal investment rate of 
return; a salary increase; flat dollar benefit rate increases; and gov-
ernment benefit increases. 
Actuaries traditionally assume that the real investment returns 
and the real rate of salary increases are constant throughout the fore-
cast period. Thus, nominal returns on assets and projected pay 
increases only fluctuate with inflation. In addition, investment 
returns and salary increases always move in the same direction. 
Salary losses consequently are compensated by investment gains and 
vice versa. In the end, the projected pension cost is more stable than 
may be expected. In reality, nominal investment returns often are cor-
related negatively with inflation. (See Table 1.) In times of high 
inflation, real salary increases may be close to zero. Under such cir-
cumstances, pay losses resulting from high inflation rates may be cou-
pled with substantial investment losses. It would be imprudent for 
actuaries to ignore this worst case scenario. 
3.3 Simulation Assumptions 
Simulation assumptions are needed to perform stochastic 
asset/liability simulations. They typically include the economic 
assumptions discussed above; the real rate of return and the standard 
deviation for each asset class; the real salary and real benefit 
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increases and their standard deviations; and the correlation between 
each pair of variables, as well as the correlation of each variable 
with inflation. 
Many of these assumptions, especially the correlation factors, 
often are chosen arbitrarily, mainly because both the actuary and the 
plan sponsor may not have a good feel for the significance of these 
assumptions. Improper choice of assumptions, however, may distort 
and invalidate forecast results. Actuaries who wish to develop their 
expertise in asset/liability simulations are advised to test alterna-
tive assumptions to build their intuition in this area. 
The following is a correlation matrix of inflation and the real 
returns of some common asset classes in the United States from 1926 to 
1988: 
CPI 
T-Bill 
LTBond 
S&P500 
Sources: 
TABLE 1 
Inflation and Real Returns, 1926 to 1988 
Correlation Matrix 
CPI T-Bill LTBonds 
1.00 -0.72 -0.55 
-0.72 1.00 0.57 
-0.55 0.57 1.00 
-0.24 0.14 0.22 
S&P500 
-0.24 
0.14 
0.22 
1.00 
Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor 
Three Month U.S. Treasury Bill Yield 
1926-1941 Homer Sydney. A History of Interest Rates: 2,000 B. C. to Present, Table 
51, Part II 
1942-1976 Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, and 1977 
Business Statistics 
1977-1983 Standard & Poor's Statistical Service: Current Statistics, Interest Rates, 
p.4 
1984 on Federal ReseNe Bulletin, Table 1.35, Interest Rates, Line 18 
Long-Term U.S. Government Bond Return 
1926-1941 Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914-1941, Table 128, p. 468, The 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 1943 
1942-1953 Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1941-1970, Table 12.12, p. 720. The 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 1976 
1954-1977 20 Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yield Percent, Average of Daily 
Figures, Federal ReseNe Bulletin, Table 1.35, Interest Rates 
1978-1985 Selected Interest Rates, pp. 10-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
1986 on 30 Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yield Percent, Average of Daily 
Figures, Federal ReseNe Bulletin, Table 1.35, Interest Rates 
Standard & Poor's Composite Return 
Standard & Poor's Statistics Service: Security Price Index Record 
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4 Performing the Forecast 
A critical decision in performing a forecast study is the choice of 
forecasting method.10 The reader is assumed to be familiar with the 
mechanics of the following common forecasting methods: 
• The simplified forecast (also called the back of the envelop 
approach:) ; 
• The seriatim forecast; 
• The forecast based on group data; and 
• The stochastic asset/liability simulation. 
Instead of reviewing the details of each method, we will provide 
some hints on the choice of the method. 
Over the years I found that almost three quarters of all projec-
tions may be performed using the simplified approach. The simpli-
fied approach is quick and easy to do and provides reasonable results 
that reflect the intuition of the actuary. Because of repeated itera-
tions involved in this process, however, inherent estimation errors 
escalate geometrically. For instance, a 5 percent overestimation of 
liability each year will compound to over a 60 percent error in ten 
years. These projection results are typically not reliable after the 
first five to ten years, depending on the experience of the actuary. 
Furthermore, the method does not capture the impact of demographic 
changes readily. Nor is it capable of ascertaining the subtle effect of 
the application of individual benefit limits. Finally, because this 
approach is based on the intuition of the actuary, the results must be 
reviewed carefully by an experienced actuary. The real danger lies in 
the fact that an inexperienced actuary may produce misleading 
results without realizing the mistake. 
Where detailed results are required, a seriatim or group data 
forecast is recommended. Because a detailed seriatim forecast is 
costly, some data grouping usually is deemed necessary. Grouping into 
age/service/pay cells typically is satisfactory. Highly paid employ-
ees and employees close to retirement should be identified sepa-
rately, however. The termination/retirement patterns for these 
groups of employees must be handled separately because of their 
potential impact on pension cost and cash flow of the plan. 
10 It is not the intention of this article to provide a detailed explanation of the 
various projection methods or the background mathematics. Interested readers are 
encouraged to study Schnitzer (1977); Jackson, Haley, and Wendt (1989); Lorisz (1993); 
and Sze (1987). 
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Asset/liability simulation is used mostly in the process of estab-
lishing an investment policy. This type of simulation is very good for 
analyzing the risk factors involved in a funding or expensing policy. 
Through numerous asset/liability simulations, one can test a policy 
under different economic situations. Based on the simulated outcome, 
the sponsor better may understand the down side of the policy deci-
sion. A major difficulty in this type of forecast, though, is in estab-
lishing the input assumptions. The actuary should try different sets 
of input assumptions to gain insight into the effects of the different 
choices. Another difficulty with these forecasts is the volume of out-
put information generated. The actuary should study the outcome 
generated carefully and distill these results to the bare essentials 
before attempting to provide meaningful communication. 
5 Review of Forecast Results 
The review is the most important technical step of the forecast-
ing process. As mentioned above, the voluminous output generated by 
this process requires that the actuary diligently sort the results to 
make sure they make sense and that they address the questions 
asked. 
An important criterion to bear in mind in the review process is 
simplicity. 
Something must have been wrong if there are no simple 
explanations for the forecast results. Probably some impor-
tant factors have been overlooked or have been included 
improperly in the forecast. 
A useful tool to check for reasonableness is to perform a projection of 
pension liabilities and cost using a simplified projection performed 
under the same scenario assumptions. 
A careful review of the simplified projection's results typically 
will reveal details that have been overlooked or some alternative 
perspective that warrants further considerations. The full projection 
then must be revised to reflect these requirements. This cycle of fore-
cast, review, and refinement usually is repeated several times until 
the actuary is satisfied that all results make sense and the different 
perspectives have been analyzed. 
To date, there is no completely objective criterion for judging the 
validity of the forecast results. The following are some helpful hints 
on checking the internal consistency of forecast results: 
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Under each funding or expensing basis, the ratio between any pair 
of the following items is usually rather stable: valuation pay-
roll, normal cost, present value of future compensation, and pre-
sent value of future normal cost. There is a slightly less stable 
relationship between each pair of the following items: active 
accrued liability, active accrued benefit value, ana active vested 
benefit value; 
The relationship between the normal cost and the accrued liabil-
ity usually shows a stable trend, reflecting gradual increases or 
decreases in the average age and service of the group; 
For a mature population, the ratio of the inactive accrued liabil-
ity to the active accrued liability is usually quite stable. On the 
other hand, for an immature population, tnat ratio tends to 
increase over the projection period; 
When comparing results under different funding or expensing 
bases, note the following relationships: 
• The ratios of corresponding items under the different bases 
should remain stable; 
• Normal cost increases are more sensitive to the aging pattern 
of the population under the unit credit cost metnoa than 
under tFte entry age normal cost method; and 
• For a final average pay plan, the increases in the accrued 
benefit value reflect the total pay increase while the 
increase in the accrued liability only reflects the actual pay 
increase in excess of the salary scale assumption. 
6 Communication of Forecast Findings 
From the plan sponsor's perspective, communicating the finding 
may be the most critical step of the entire process. The actuary must 
be careful not to confuse the sponsor with the endless stream of num-
bers from a forecast report. It is important for the actuary to under-
stand forecast results through the review process and essential that 
he or she be able to share this understanding with the client. 
The actuary may believe at the end of a project that the conclu-
sions of the study are self evident. But the forecast findings become 
obvious to the actuary only as a result of weeks of work and self-edu-
cation. The final challenge is to educate the audience in the course of 
a one or two hour meeting. 
A useful suggestion is to stay focused on the initial questions 
asked. Even though millions of numbers are produced, only those rel-
evant to the purpose of the projection should be presented. The fewer 
the details shown, the more the concept will be absorbed by the lis-
tener. 
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Many actuaries experienced in pension forecasting have told sto-
ries of how they were trapped years after a forecast into explaining 
why their forecast results differed from actual valuation results. It is 
easy to blame the sponsor's ignorance of the estimations involved in 
the forecast process. Knowing the limited precision of the results, 
however, we question why such details ever were communicated in 
the first place. Were the actuaries unaware of the imprecision 
involved? Were the actuaries trying to attribute too much exactness 
to the process? 
In spite of the high volume of output data, the principal purpose 
of the forecast is to analyze trends under various scenarios. Both the 
trends and the comparisons are easiest to visualize through the use of 
graphs. Forecasters should experiment with different ways to graphi-
cally present their results. 
7 Other Considerations 
Although both pension actuarial valuations and forecasts are 
based on the same mathematical principles, the uses of their calcula-
tions are quite different. The purpose of an actuarial valuation is to 
establish the funding and expensing requirements for the year. It is 
performed under regulatory or accounting rules. The basis of an actu-
arial valuation tends to be conservative. The results provided often 
are considered to be exact. On the other hand, the purpose of a pen-
sion forecast is to test the future cost impact of some expected or pro-
posed changes. The emphasis is on the future trend of the cost. The 
important result is the cost comparison under different scenarios. This 
difference in the basic purpose of the two process is reflected in sev-
eral factors: 
• Assumptions: Valuation assumptions have margins of conserva-
tion. Forecast scenario assumptions tend to be realistic; 
• Results: Valuation results often are used to derive exact funding 
and expensing requirements. Forecast results should be shown as 
estimates; 
• Time Horizon: Valuation results are only applicable to the cur-
rent year. Forecast results may cover ten or more years; 
• Alternatives: Valuations provide pension cost under specific sets 
of conditions. Pension forecasting usually is performed to compare 
pension costs under several alternatives. The goal is to choose the 
alternative that best reflects the objectives of the sponsor; 
• Variation: Because of the extended outlook and additional alter-
natives considered in a forecast, there tend to be more variations 
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in this process. The forecast is certainly more challenging and 
more interesting (to me, at least) than a valuation; 
Estimates: Forecasting has its limitations. It is important for 
actuaries not only to understand these limitations, but to commu-
nicate them clearly to the plan sponsor. Because of the many 
shortcuts that the actuary takes in the process, forecast results 
are estimates. Each individual item (e.g., liabilities, benefit 
payments, assets, etc.) may differ greatly from that produced by 
a subsequent valuation. Because of the compensating effect of var-
ious actuarial items, however, the aggre~ate results obtained 
may still be reliable. Furthermore, compansons of the trends of 
pension cost under different alternatives may be valid even when 
each alternative set of results is slightly off; 
Scenario Assumptions: The forecast results directly reflect the 
scenario assumptions. Because there is no certainty in the input 
scenario assumptions, the outcome of a forecast has a sizable 
margin of error. Forecast results should be presented as a range of 
possible outcomes. The results of a stochastic simulation, espe-
cially, should be presented in a probabilistic manner. Cost pat-
terns should be presented probabilistically, i.e., they should 
communicate boHi the expected cost trend and the confidence 
level for such a cost trend through the forecast period; and 
Forecast Report: Because forecast results may vary by the pro-
cess used, a forecast report should state clearly the methodoIogy 
and assumptions, the data approximation, and other estimations 
employed. It is not necessary, and is often misleading, to provide 
detailed results for each forecast year. On the other hand, it is 
useful for the report to include an executive summary section that 
addresses the questions asked and provides concise conclusions of 
the study. Graphs should be used where appropriate to summa-
rize cost trends and provide visual comparison of the alterna-
tives. 
In conclusion, forecasting is still more of an art than a science. 
Actuaries should not be uncomfortable about the estimations involved 
in the process. Even with all its limitations, however, forecasting is 
still one of the best tools available to help sponsors make financial 
decisions concerning their pension plans. Corporate executives need to 
make financial projections regularly, and they may find pension fore-
cast results to be far more reliable than many of the other estimates 
used in corporate planning. Readers are encouraged to pursue the sub-
ject further. 
In the end, forecasts are typically very exciting projects. Forecast 
findings usually receive much greater attention than do regular actu-
arial valuation results. 
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Cost-Based Pricing of Individual Automobile Risk 
Transfer: Car-Mile Exposure Unit Analysis 
Patrick Butler* 
Abstract 
Every mile traveled by a car transfers risk to its insurer. This paper posits that 
the product of a cents-per-mile rate based on class experience and the miles recorded on 
the car's odometer appropriately earns prepaid premium while the car is driven. 
Operation of a practical car-mile system is described briefly. To test the competing 
idea that driver-record pricing responds to known large differences in risk transfer, a 
model used to validate claim free discounts is reexamined with the car-mile as the 
measure of individ ual cost. Driver-record pricing is found to inflate car-year price-to-
cost differences. Consequences of accident rate variability for a car-mile system are 
reviewed. The per mile cost of individual risk transfer is a class property because of 
the random nature of accidents. Driver-record pricing attempted on a per mile basis 
would amplify differences within classes. 
Key words and phrases: Per mile insurance, accident rate, risk classification, driver record 
model, merit rating 
1 Introduction 
Cost-based pricing of individual risk is a key ratemaking princi-
ple promulgated by the Casualty Actuarial Society (CAS). The prin-
ciple states that "A rate provides for the costs associated with an 
individual risk transfer;" see CAS (1993). The question for automo-
bile insurance is how the cost of individual driving risk should be 
measured. When a car is not being driven, its owner has no risk to 
transfer for driving coverage (for all losses as a direct consequence of 
the car's being driven) so the cost to its insurer is zero. Every mile a 
car is driven adds to its risk of accident; the total cost of risk transfer 
increases mile by mile. Both conditions point to adoption of the car-
mile (as opposed to the car-year that currently is used) as the unit of 
* Patrick Butler holds a Ph.D. in geochemistry from Harvard University. The author 
is currently director of the National Organization for Women's insurance project and 
formerly was a National Aeronautics and Space Administration research scientist, 
principal investigator, and the Curator of Lunar Samples. He has published papers on 
geochemistry, lunar science, and automobile insurance pricing. 
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risk transfer, that is, the exposure unit. Conversion of class rates from 
dollars per car-year to cents per car-mile for driving coverages would 
be required by a one sentence amendment to rate regulatory law pro-
posed in several states. 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the car-mile 
exposure unit is essential to cost-based pricing of individual risk 
transfer. The effect of driver-record pricing on individuals is ana-
lyzed with the car-mile unit as the objective measure of cost. 
2 Car-Mile Exposure Unit 
The entire entry on the exposure unit in the CAS statement of 
ratemaking principles is: "The determination of an appropriate unit 
or premium basis is essential. It is desirable that the exposure unit 
vary with the hazard and be practical and verifiable." The cur-
rently accepted assessment of the car-mile exposure unit for automo-
bile insurance seems to have been established by Dorweiler (1929). 
Regarding the variation-with-hazard requirement, Dorweiler states: 
"The mileage exposure medium is superior to the car-year medium in 
yielding an exposure that varies with the hazard, as it responds 
more to the actual usage of the car." Note that Dorweiler's phrase 
"responds more" obscures the fact that the car-year does not respond 
to actual use of the car. In addition, suspension of coverage during 
periods of no use requires administrative intervention. Dorweiler fur-
ther states that "[t]he devices and records necessary for the introduc-
tion of [the car-mile] medium make it impractical under present 
conditions," and that while the car-year "measures the exposure 
prospectively, the [car-mile] require[s] a final adjustment which 
would be determined retrospectively." 
Despite Dorweiler's assessment of superiority of the car-mile 
exposure unit over the car-year unit in a fundamental characteristic 
and his qualified judgment concerning its practicality, no substantive 
actuarial reassessment has been published. Bouska (1989) updates 
Dorweiler's paper and notes without comment that conversion to the 
car-mile unit has been advocated by the National Organization for 
Women. In a discussion of Bouska's paper, Diamantoukos (1991) 
observes only that the car-mile exposure unit is "perhrps a theoreti-
cally superior one in some respects" to the car-year unit. 
The National Organization for Women completed a 1992 study1 
for Pennsylvania legislators on operation of a car-mile system which 
1 National Organization for Women. Operation of an Alldited-Mile/Year Automobile 
Insurance System Under Pennsylvania Law. Washington, DC: NOW, 1992, reprinted in 
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suggests that such a system would follow the odometer-limit and non-
tampering conditions used in mechanical breakdown insurance poli-
cies, but otherwise would not differ much from current practice. The 
study follows transactions involving an example car, including a 
midyear sale, for four policy years. Premium payment in advance 
would be required to keep insurance protection in force. The premium 
for driving coverage at car-mile rates is prepaid in mile amounts and 
at times chosen by the car owner. Administrative expense and a pre-
mium for nondriving coverages are based on yearly rates and are pre-
paid at each policy-year renewal. Premium would be earned by the 
car's insurer by the day for non driving coverages, as is currently done 
for all coverages, and by the mile recorded on the odometer for driv-
ing coverages. The car's insurance ID card displays the odometer-mile 
and date limits at which protection lapses pending further premium 
prepayment. 
Policy renewal under this plan would be conditional on taking 
the car to a garage designated by the company for an annual odome-
ter audit. The odometer would be inspected and read, and tamper-
evident seals would be applied at the initial audit. Theft of insur-
ance protection is controlled because tampering with the odometer-
already a federal crime-automatically voids the policy. Driving 
with the cable unhooked does not steal insurance protection, because 
tampering usually would be detected after an accident, and tampering 
voids protection. The cents per car-mile rate would depend on cover-
age and the car's classification as appropriate by territory, use, 
driver, and other categories. 
3 Driver-Record Pricing 
Advertisements such as those promIsmg "good rates for good 
drivers" lead consumers to believe that accidents can be avoided and 
that the important condition in individual risk of accident is how a 
car is driven, not how it much it is driven. This belief is encouraged 
through the use of merit ratings by automobile insurers to raise or 
lower individual prices at policy renewal time. 
The actuarial literature has neglected to examine the effect of 
driver-record pricing on individual price-to-cost ratios where the 
claim rate average for the class is taken as the price and defined 
individual claim rates are taken as the costs of hypothetical indi-
viduals composing the class. Recent studies of driver records have 
The Casualty Actuarial Society Forum (Summer 1993): 307-338. This study is available 
from NOW, 1000 16th Street, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20036. 
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focused on general questions of variation in individual risk without 
reference to pricing or cost. For example, Mahler (1991) examines the 
state accident records of drivers for variation in individual risk over 
time (14 years), but does not discuss how the information could be 
applied to pricing automobile risk transfer. An earlier actuarial 
study done for insurance regulators, however, provides information on 
individual price-to-cost effects. 
A widely circulated 1979 report on risk classification by insurance 
company actuaries on the industry Advisory Committee to the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners contains a section on 
driver-record pricing. The report describes the issue of pricing indi-
vidual risk transfer: "Many accidents are the result of chance. The 
problem becomes-how can insurers identify the 'bad' drivers from 
the 'good' drivers who were unlucky?" The impossibility of solving 
this problem through driver records, although downplayed in the 
report, is illustrated with a compound Poisson model composed of 
specified numbers of drivers defined to have uniform high and low 
annual rates of accident involvement. 
In a subsequent study of driver-record pricing, Butler and Butler 
(1989) analyze the high and low accident rate model in terms of the 
car-mile exposure unit. They value the price-to-cost ratio for individ-
ual cars in terms of cents per mile and conclude that pricing based on 
accident, claim, or traffic violation records greatly increases the 
existing overpricing for unlucky owners of cars driven less than the 
annual average for their risk class. 
Continuing justification for driver-record pricing, however, relies 
on the fact that cars whose drivers have had recent accidents (or 
traffic convictions) average more accidents in a subsequent year than 
do cars identically classified whose drivers have not had a recent 
accident. A simplified explanation for this fact-in terms of a uni-
form claim rate per mile-is presented below through reinterpreta':.. 
tion of a classic model for a claim free discount plan. Assumption of a 
cents-per-mile cost for all cars of the model provides a base for ana-
lyzing the price-to-cost effects of driver-record pricing on individual 
cars. This article also considers the variation in claim rates per mile 
and its consequences for classification and driver-record pricing under 
a car-mile system in place of the assumed uniform claim rate per 
mile. 
4 Bailey & Simon Model for Claim-Record Experience 
The CAS paper "An Actuarial Note on the Credibility of 
Experience of a Single Private Passenger Car," by Bailey and Simon 
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(1959) is the chief reference on the CAS examination syllabus which 
shows and models the application of driver-record pricing to insur-
ance for individual cars. Familiarity with its method of calculating 
Poisson models is required for questions on the CAS exam on advanced 
ratemaking; see Murdza (1992). 
Bailey and Simon examine the Canadian liability claims experi-
ence of about 4 million insured car-years. The claim rate of the undi-
vided class for each of five classes defined by car use and driver type 
is compared with the rates calculated for four subclasses created by 
sorting the records according to how many full years have elapsed 
since the last claim was incurred by the car's drivers. 
The relative effects of sorting cars by the prior claim records of 
their drivers are similar for all five classes and are not affected sig-
nificantly by a correction for territorial class differences. The experi-
ence for the largest Canadian class, Class 1, is shown in Table 1. The 
recalculated rate relative to the claim rate for the undivided class 
was 9 percent lower for the three year claim free subclass and 
progressively higher with decreasing time since the last prior claim. 
TABLE 1 
1957-1959 Canadian Automobile Claim Data by Prior Claim Records· 
Class 1 
Pleasure-No Male Operator Under 25 
Number of 
Claims Incurred 
Car-Years 
Insured 
Claims Per 
Car-Year 
Class 
(undivided) 
288,019 
3,325,714 
0.087 
3+ 
217,151 
2,757,520 
0.079 
Years Since Last Prior Claim 
2 1 
13,792 19,346 
130,706 163,544 
0.105 0.118 
* Source: Bailey and Simon (1959); claim rate calculated 
o 
37,730 
273,944 
0.138 
As part of their examination of the statistical justification for 
claim free discounts, Bailey and Simon structure a model that repro-
duces the decrease in the claim rate observed in the Canadian data. 
The model comprises cars with three annual amounts of risk transfer 
representing a fourfold range in annual claim rates: 100,000 cars with 
a uniform risk transfer rate of 0.05 claims per car-year (Amount I); 
100,000 cars with a uniform rate of 0.10 claims per car-year (Amount 
II); and 50,000 cars with a uniform rate of 0.20 claims per car-year 
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(Amount III). The average claim rate of the model class is 0.10 
claims per car-year. Bailey and Simon calculate the number of cars 
that would be claim free with a Poisson distribution after three 
years and combine them into a claim free subclass for each of the 
defined risk transfer rates. They calculate that the average claim 
rate for the new mix of the three defined rates would be 8 percent 
less than the class average. A subclass reduction in claim rates 
requires an offsetting claim-rate increase, however, to maintain the 
overall class average. 
Because the present study concerns how all cars are affected indi-
vidually by the pricing of risk transfer, the Bailey and Simon model 
calculations are extended here to include the subclasses with more 
recent prior claims. The results are compared with the Canadian 
experience in Figure 1. (Table 2 shows the calculated distribution of 
cars with the three defined risk transfer rates among the four claim-
record subclasses.) 
The extended model reproduces the general features of the 
Canadian claim data. (Bailey and Simon point out that further 
adjustment of model parameters would achieve more detailed agree-
ment of the model with the Canadian data. For the present purposes, 
however, such adjustment would add to complexity but not to under-
standing.) If claim rates are taken as a measure of relative insurance 
prices: 
• The price level for the claim free majority: of cars decreases 
below the rate that the undivided class would pay; and 
• This relatively small decrease is balanced by sharp price 
increases for the minority subclasses with recent claims. 
The Bailey and Simon model, by reproducing empirical claim 
record insurance experience, shows the large variation in individual 
risk transfer that exists within automobile insurance price classes. 
Individuals in the same class are charged different prices for the 
same amount of risk transfer. The Amount I cars (0.05 claims per car-
year) are charged four pure premiums and Amount II cars (0.10 claims 
per car-year) are charged two pure premiums for the same amount of 
risk transfer that costs the Amount III cars (0.20 claims per car-year) 
only one year's pure premium. 
5 Risk Transfer and Miles Driven 
Bailey and Simon (1960) consider reasons for the large variation 
in annual risk transfer within single price classes as indicated by the 
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Figure 1-Claim Rates of Prior-Claim Subclasses 
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Canadian claim record experience and posited in the Bailey and 
Simon 1959 model for the experience. They note that driver-record 
and class plans are "quite ineffective in separating the better risks 
from the poorer risks," and conclude that: 
[W]e have reached the point where we may state that the still 
unanalyzed cause (or causes) of variation among individual risks: 
(1) has a wide dispersion, (2) varies significantly from year to 
year for an individual risk, and (3) is measured only to a limited 
extent by the class plan and the merit rating plan. Annual 
mileage, which has long been felt to be an important measure of 
hazara, fits all these requirements better than any other single 
cause. 
The first characteristic-dispersion of cars by annual miles 
driven-is corroborated by the U. S. Department of Transportation's 
nationwide personal transportation surveys. In 1977 one in five house-
hold cars was driven less than 3,000 miles, and one in ten was driven 
more than 20,000 miles; see Butler, Butler, and Williams (1988, p. 
376). 
The second characteristic-significant individual year-to-year 
variation in miles driven-is one that can be measured only by the 
car's odometer. Nevertheless, Bailey and Simon do not note a need 
for the car-mile exposure measure, but seem to view mileage as a 
lump sum class definition from which experienced car-year cost aver-
ages are used prospectively to set base price multipliers. 
The third characteristic implies that variation in risk transfer 
amounts among individual cars resulting from differences in miles 
driven can be measured by class and driver-record plans. Modern class 
plans continue to show narrow distributions of cars by base price mul-
tiplier, in contrast to the range in miles driven; see Butler, Butler, 
and Williams (1988). 
6 Bailey & Simon Model With Uniform Claim Rate Per Mile 
Within-class variation in individual amounts of risk transfer per 
year can be seen as variation in the product of a rate variable and an 
exposure variable for each car; that is, variation in the product of a 
hypothetical average claim rate per mile for a car over the course of 
a year and the number of miles the car is driven. The current practice 
of charging annual rates for risk transfer implicitly assumes that the 
two variables cannot be resolved. In a car-mile system, however, the 
value of the exposure variable is recorded by each car's odometer. 
The following analysis of the Bailey and Simon model assumes that 
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all of the model cars share the same average risk-transfer rate, 
0.00001 claims per mile. (The effect of presumed within-class differ-
ences in individual average claim rates per mile is considered later.) 
The model differences in annual risk transfer amount, therefore, are 
measured by the exposure variable. 
The adopted claim rate per mile defines the miles per year 
driven for the model's three risk amounts. For Amount I cars, 0.05 
claims per year means 5,000 miles exposure per year; for Amount II 
cars, 0.10 claims per year means 10,000 miles exposure per year; and 
for Amount III cars, 0.20 claims per year means 20,000 miles exposure 
per year. The total risk transferred at the end of 20,000 miles 
traveled is the same for all cars. 
TABLE 2 
Model Distribution of Mile-Amount Cars by Claim-Record Subclass 
Amount Years Since Last Claim 
of Risk MileslYear Class 
Transfer (Each Car) (Undivided) 3+' 2 0 
Number of Cars 
I 5,000 100,000 86,071 4,413 4,639 4,877 
II 10,000 100,000 74,082 7,791 8,611 9,516 
III 20,000 50,000 27,441 6,075 7,421 9,063 
Total cars 250,000 187,594 18,279 20,671 23,456 
Avg. Miles per Car-Year 10,000 9,169 12,118 12,468 12,824 
Avg. Claims per Car-Year at 0.1000 0.0917 0.1218 0.1247 0.1282 
0.00001 Claims per Car-Mile 
, Number of cars in subclass from Bailey and Simon (1959) 
Bailey and Simon use their model to examine the mix of risks in 
the claim free subclass. The present study extends the analysis to 
obtain distributions of cars transferring the three risk amounts in the 
other three claim-record subclasses, as shown in Table 2. (As only the 
most recent claim is recognized by the plan, the claim-record distribu-
tion of the cars is calculated working back in time with a declining 
balance of claim free cars eligible to have a claim that counts. For 
example, of the 100,000 Amount I cars eligible in the 0 year, 4,877 
have claims by the Poisson distribution at a 0.05 rate. The claim free 
balance of 95,123 cars similarly is reduced in past year 1 and so on for 
three years.) The miles-per-car-year average for each subclass is 
determined by the mix of Amount I, II, and III cars. 
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Although the number of cars transferring each risk amount (I, II, 
and III) increases with claim recency (from 2 to 1 to 0 years since the 
last claim), the number of highest mile cars (20,000 miles) increases 
most rapidly. Therefore, the average miles driven is highest (12,824 
miles) in the most recent claim subclass (0 years). The average of the 
claim free subclass (3+ years) concurrently decreases from the class 
average of 10,000 miles to 9,169 miles. 
7 Accidents as Random Sampling 
If it is assumed that each class has uniform average claim rates 
per mile, automobile accidents in the Bailey and Simon model can be 
envisioned as a random sampling of the class population on the road. 
Accidents can sample only what is exposed. (Bias in the accident 
sampling of real car-mile class populations that results from differ-
ences in the average driving conditions encountered by individual cars 
is examined later in the paper.) Cars driven many miles and cars 
driven few miles are included in the random accident sample of the 
car-miles driven by the cars in the class. Because cars driven more 
than the class average put more miles on the road, they are overrep-
resented in the accident sample. Cars driven less than average are 
underrepresented in this sample relative to their proportion in the 
class. The average miles per car of the recent claim subclasses are 
increased through this random sampling process. The preferential 
selection of cars driven more miles into the recent claim subclasses 
also concurrently lowers (slightly) the average miles per car of the 
large remaining population of cars without accidents. Because of 
their greater average number of miles of exposure, therefore, the 
recent claim subclasses average more claims in a subsequent year than 
does the claim free subclass. All of the recent claim subclasses, how-
ever, also contain cars driven less than the class average. 
8 Price-to-Cost Accuracy for Individual Risk Transfer 
The miles-driven interpretation of the Bailey and Simon model 
provides a cost measure in car-miles for the three individual amounts 
of risk transferred. A price-to-cost relationship can be established for 
the three risk transfer amounts (I, II, and III) in the undivided class 
and in each of the four driver-record subclasses, a total of 15 relation-
ships applied to the 15 groupings of cars in Table 2. (An equivalent 
15 price-to-cost ratios would result from dividing the model's average 
claim rates per year at the five class and subclass prices by the three 
defined annual claim rates at the individual costs. Without being 
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referenced to an objective standard such as odometer miles for measur-
ing individual cost, however, the ratios would be without practical 
significance. ) 
To picture the price-to-cost transfer comparisons, assume a class-
average cost of $10,000 per claim. This claim cost (severity) multi-
plied by the assumed model rate of 0.00001 claims per mile produces 
a cost of 10 cents per mile pure premium for the class. Because the 
average amount driven per year for the class is 10,000 miles, the 10 
cents-per-mile cost makes the class cost (pure premium) $1,000 per car-
year. 
Despite the range in miles driven, it is assumed that all of the 
cars stay in the same dollars-per-year class (as the Bailey and Simon 
model implicitly assumes). This would have been the case for the 
Canadian experience under the class plans of the time and is true now 
for a large number of cars. Current discounts for estimated future 
mileage less than 7,500 or 8,000 miles in some company class plans 
are not used or have been discontinued by other automobile insurers as 
intrinsically lacking in objectivity. (Because the discount difference 
between 5,000 and 20,000 estimated future miles is usually about 15 
percent, the adjustment would not affect the results of the analysis 
Significantly.) 
Without claim-record pricing, all individuals pay the $1,000 per 
year pure premium for the class, the same premium that Amount II 
cars would pay at 10 cents a mile. At a $1,000 annual rate, however, 
the 20,000 mile Amount III cars pay 5 cents a mile, while the 5,000 
mile Amount I cars pay 20 cents a mile, as shown by Figure 2. 
When the model class is subdivided on the basis of claim records, 
the proportions of cars at the three mile amounts are changed in the 
four subclasses created. These new mile averages multiplied by the 
assumed rate of 0.00001 claims per mile produce four new pure premi-
ums for the claim-record subclasses: $917 for the claim free subclass 
and $1,212, $1,247, and $1,282 for the progressively more recent 
claims subclasses. These four annual premiums divided by the three 
mile amounts in each subclass produce the 12 new prices per mile for 
the model cars shown in Figure 2. The effects on the cars at the three 
mile amounts are different. 
The effect of claim-record pricing on the risk transfer Amount II 
cars, which are individually driven 10,000 miles per year, is most 
telling. Without subclassification, all Amount II cars pay 10 cents a 
mile for insurance. With subclassification, most of them receive a 1 
cent reduction in the cost per mile. Some cars in the class which have 
had a recent claim, however, pay 2 cents to 3 cents more per mile 
(Figure 2). Claim-record subclassification transforms pricing that is 
61 
si ifi
Patrick Butler Cost-Based Pricing of Auto Risk Transfer 
cost-based by definition for all Amount II individual cars to pricing 
that is not accurate for any cars. 
It could be argued that improved price-to-cost accuracy is needed 
most for the model car risk transfer amounts that differ most from 
the class average. Without claim-record subclassification, the cars at 
the 5,000 mile amount pay 20 cents a mile, 10 cents a mile more than 
the class average price. In the claim free subclass such cars receive a 
2 cent per mile reduction in price. This reduction, however, is much 
smaller than the 4 cents to 5 cents a mile below the class average 
price that the cars at Amount III (20,000 miles) pay regardless of 
their claim-record subclass. Furthermore, provision of this 2-cents-per-
mile downward adjustment for the cars at Amount I is gained at great 
cost to the Amount I cars with recent claims. For these individuals, 
the 20-cent-a-mile amount they pay without claim-recency pricing is 
increased 4 cents to 6 cents a mile in the recent claims subclasses. This 
increase equals the entire per mile price paid by the cars at Amount 
III regardless of their claim-record subclass. The only negative effect 
for Amount III cars of pricing on claim record is that some lose a 
small part of their per mile subsidy (Figure 2). 
Statistically, a decrease in the average cost per mile paid by 
Amount I cars from 20 cents to 19.3 cents coupled with an increase in 
the average cost per mile paid by Amount III cars from 5 cents to 5.3 
cents is evidenced in a 6 percent decrease in variance of price-to-cost 
ratios from the three ratios of the undivided class to the twelve 
ratios of the driver-record subclasses. The reduced variance, however, 
should not mask the disparate cost of the improved statistics on 
individuals that is evident in Figure 2. Driver-record pricing 
increases the range in price-to-cost ratios paid by individuals in the 
same class 40 percent, from a spread of 15 cents a mile before driver-
record pricing to 21 cents a mile between the lowest value for Amount 
III cars and the highest for Amount I cars. Operating at random on 
individuals, the so-called improvement increases the underpricing of 
risk transfer for some cars already underpriced and the overpricing of 
risk transfer for some cars already overpriced. 
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Figure 2 
Effect of Model Annual Premiums on Car-Mile Prices 
Class Premium $1000/Car-Year 
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If the pricing unit were converted from car-year to car-mile so 
that all of the car-owners in the model class paid the same 10 cents 
per mile rate, however, each owner would pay only for the on-the-
road protection the car consumed, while total premium received by 
insurers would remain the same. A car driven the model class aver-
age of 10,000 miles would experience no change in the $1,000 premium 
with insurance charged at car-mile rates, provided its mile amount 
did not change. A car driven 4,780 miles would pay $478, while a car 
driven 21,240 miles would pay $2,124. 
9 Variation In Claim Rates Per Mile 
The large differences in the type of risk environment that cars 
can encounter are indicated by comparing statistics for accident sever-
ities and per mile accident rates between interstate highways and 
city streets or between day and night driving on the same road. For 
example, the injury rates per million vehicle-miles of travel ranged 
from 0.36 on rural interstates to 3.0 on local urban roads in 1991; see 
Federal Highway Administration (1992). In principle, therefore, the 
diverse individual mixtures of car use and driving environment make 
it inevitable that changes in class definition would result in different 
claim costs per mile for new classes. 
Accident rates per vehicle mile depend not only on traffic engi-
neering classification of accidents experienced under roadway or other 
relevant conditions during some time period, but also on determina-
tion of the number of vehicle-miles of exposure to risk that produced 
the classified accidents. The same relationship holds for automobile 
insurance. Only if car-miles of exposure are determined can the num-
ber and cost of claims incurred within a certain time period by a cer-
tain class of cars provide any quantitative information on the 
expected risk transfer cost of each mile that cars in the class will 
travel in a subsequent rating period. 
As an example of the effect of classifiable per mile differences 
within a business-use class of cars with adult drivers, assume two 
types of car use by sales representatives. With reference to the gov-
ernment injury rates given above, assume that one type of use covers 
the whole state and averages 0.25 claims per million car-miles 
(statewide cars), while the other covers only a metropolitan area 
and averages one claim per million car-miles (metro cars). Any lower 
average cost per claim by the metro cars resulting from lower speed 
urban accidents would narrow the effect on the claim cost per mile of 
the 4:1 claim-rate difference. Separately classifying the statewide 
and metro cars, provided there were enough car-miles of each usage 
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type for statistical reliability, would show the differences in car-
mile cost. 
10 Accidents as Biased Random Sampling 
The analogy used above for viewing accidents as a process of sam-
pling car-miles on the road can be extended to presumed variations 
within classes in per mile accident rates. To the extent that cars are 
not classified by driver age and experience according to the known 
per mile differences in accident involvement for these categories, the 
accident random sampling of class car-mile populations would be 
biased toward the cars driven by inexperienced drivers and by 
drivers near the beginning and end of the driver age range. Further, 
owing to differences in driving conditions by time and place, the 
accident random sample of car-miles would be biased to the cars used 
more under conditions of higher risk per mile. The accident samples, 
however, also will contain cars used on average under conditions of 
lower risk per mile. For example, with a Poisson distribution of 
claims at the rates given for the hypothetical business use cars, 18 
percent of the metro cars will incur claims in 200,000 miles of driving, 
but so will 4.9 percent of the statewide cars. 
11 Driver-Record Pricing on a Car-Mile Basis 
Like the current driver-record pricing on a car-year basis, driver-
record pricing under a car-mile exposure unit system would have an 
apparent justification in cost. The inevitable bias in an accident sam-
ple assures that the subclass of cars defined as incurring a claim in 
the most-recent-miles-traveled interval-within the most recent 
50,000 miles, for example-will average more accidents per mile in a 
following miles-traveled interval than the class average. Applying a 
recent claim surcharge to the cents-per-mile class price, however, 
would constitute a deliberate, random, and unjustifiable increase in 
what is paid per mile by the recent claim cars with lower than 
average claim rates compared to what they would pay if they were 
classified separately. Furthermore, the higher per mile charges for 
the recent claim cars with significantly higher than average claim 
rates per mile still would be less than what they would pay if they 
were classified separately. 
Because both the claim free and recent claim subclasses of a class 
are mixtures of cars with above average and below average claim 
rates per mile, any action to separate them must be through class 
redefinition applied to the whole class. 
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12 Conclusion 
CAS introduces its ratemaking principles with the specification 
that "[rlatemaking is prospective because the property and casualty 
insurance rate must be developed prior to the transfer of risk." In a 
car-mile system, evaluation of the cost per mile to be used in a 
prospective class rate can be done only on the basis of claim experi-
ence for a group of cars referenced to the group's total measured car-
miles of exposure that produced the claims. 
What cannot be known prospectively, because it is controlled by 
individual car owners, is the amount of risk that will be transferred 
through operation of each car. Although risk transfer is paid in 
advance at a class rate per mile, protection is not consumed (premium 
is not earned by the insurer) until the risk is transferred, mile after 
mile, by driving. Conversely, premiums charged at car-year rates 
invert this cost-based relationship by charging less per mile for each 
mile of protection consumed, a contradiction of cost-based pricing. The 
assumption that this contradiction is unavoidable on practical 
grounds is not neutral. It favors all owners of cars driven more miles 
per year than the average for their class. 
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Discussion of Patrick Butler's 
"Cost-Based Pricing of Individual Automobile Risk 
Transfer: Car-Mile Exposure Unit Analysis" 
Ruy A. Cardoso* 
Aside from its hyperacademic title, Patrick Butler's paper on 
mileage and merit rating of automobile insurance policies provides a 
nice twist to an old model and a reasonably compelling theoretical 
argument for the use of mileage as a rating variable. Yet one basic 
real world truth runs counter to Dr. Butler's view: automobile insur-
ance companies generally do not use mileage as a rating variable, 
except in the broadest of categories. This is despite the fact that 
Dorweiler's justification for the use of mileage has been around for 
more than 60 years. 
Because it generally is conceded that classification schemes have 
become more refined over time in response to competition, why 
haven't insurers already gone down the path to which Dr. Butler 
points? I can suppose two reasons: (1) competition doesn't really work; 
or (2) competition does work and the competitive market finds the 
use of mileage to be wanting in some respect. In my opinion, the sec-
ond reason is more likely to be true. 
Assuming this second reason is correct, then either the demand for 
or the supply of mileage rating is too low for it to be used more than 
it is. On the demand side, it is possible that insurance company cus-
tomers don't like the notion of having their odometers inspected or of 
adding an uncertain level of premiums to their already complicated 
lives; after all, the purpose of insurance is to replace uncertain losses 
with certain, not uncertain, premiums. On the supply side, the costs 
of administering a system such as that proposed by Dr. Butler simply 
* Ruy Cardoso, FCA5, MAAA, currently is vice president and chief actuary of the 
Automobile Insurers Bureau of Massachusetts where he represents the Massachusetts 
automobile insurance industry in regulatory hearings concerning insurance rates. Mr. 
Cardoso previously has heId consulting and insurance company positions whose 
primary focus was the analysis of casualty insurance loss reserves. He graduated from 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1983 with an 5.B. in management science. 
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may outweigh the benefits; I am unaware of any administrative cost 
studies that would illuminate the answer to this particular question. 
Beyond pointing out this basic conflict between theory and prac-
tice, I would like to make the following observations on Dr. Butler's 
analysis: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
While there is likely to be at least some correlation between 
variation in mileage and variation in claim frequency within a 
class, the Butler analysis essentially assumes a perfect correla-
tion, disregarding the legion of unmeasurable factors that could 
account for as much variation as does mileage; Dr. Butler's numer-
ical results should be tempered considerably, therefore, before 
being used in the real world; 
Dr. Butler is clearly in the right when he notes that the per mile 
expected risk transfer cost only can be determined if real car-
mnes of exposure are determined. Any study based on mileage 
data reported by either insurers or insureds is subject to question. 
In the former case, this may be due to insurer indifference in 
reporting correct statistical data when no premium effect is 
involved. In the latter case, this may be due to insureds' incen-
tive to cheat. Here in Massachusetts, where I currently am 
employed, we have found that nearly 30% of policies have esti-
mated future annual mileage of zero recorded; on the other hand, 
nearly 50% of policies have estimated future annual mileage of 
magnitudes too high to qualify for any rate discount, making it 
like1y that these estimates are unaffected by cheating; 
Again, here in Massachusetts, we have found some evidence of a 
relationship between annual mileage estimates (which are based 
on questionable data, as explained above) and merit rating classi-
fication under the merit rating scheme used here; in particular, 
the higher rated (worse) drivers do tend to have higher mileage 
estimates, in keeping with Dr. Butler's thesis; and 
Finally, Dr. Butler's point (in his section 11) that "Applying a 
recent claim surcharge to the cents-per-mile class price, however, 
would constitute a deliberate, random, and unjustifiable increase" 
seems to argue for the complete elimination of merit rating, 
which the paper does not justify. As anyone who has listened to 
a radio talk show can attest, at least some part of the driving 
public demands merit rating as a way of punishing those per-
ceived as offenders (unless, of course, the caner is one of those on 
the receiving end of a surcharge, in which case he or she would 
look on Dr. Butler's article quite favorably). Talk show callers 
aside, the potential relationship between merit rating classifica-
tion and other unmeasured vanables (aside from mileage) cannot 
be dismissed based solely on this article, nor can the virtually-
impossible-to-measure deterrence effects of a merit rating scheme. 
In summary, Dr. Butler's article, while not quite supportive of all 
of his conclusions, does make plain the problem of random incidence. 
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The principle that "cars driven more than class-average miles are 
over represented in the accident sample" is one that I expect many 
practicing actuaries frequently forget. I recall an analogous phe-
nomenon from an undergraduate probability class; if one surveys sub-
way riders at random and asks how many days per month they ride 
the subway, the average answer will be too high an estimate of the 
population mean because the survey-taker more likely will encounter 
persons who are frequently on the subway. Of course, if we all rode 
the subway every day, the incidence problem would go away, as 
would much of the need for cars and the corresponding mileage and 
merit rating issues. If Dr. Butler is not starting his own insurance 
company soon, perhaps he can devote some time to the advocacy of 
better public transportation systems, thereby reducing the problem he 
has illustrated so nicely. 
Richard G. WolI* 
Ruy A. Cardoso 
Auto Insurers Bureau of MA 
Seventh Floor 
101 Arch Street 
Boston, MA 02110 
The purpose of this paper, according to Patrick Butler, is to 
"demonstrate that the car-mile exposure unit is essential to cost-
based pricing of individual risk transfer." On the basis of his demon-
stration, Dr. Butler advocates changing the exposure basis for private 
passenger automobile insurance from a car-year basis to a per mile 
basis. Current auto insurance prices are based on a contract that runs 
for a fixed period of time, usually a half year. He argues that the 
basis for the insurance contract for most coverages should be changed 
to miles driven. 
Dr. Butler's demonstration consists of creating a simplified model 
where there are three types of insurance customers. The first type: of 
customer drives 5,000 miles per year. The second drives 10,000 miles 
per year, and the third drives 20,000 miles per year. He assumes 
that the risk process for each customer is Poisson with a frequency of 
* Richard G. Woll is research actuary for the Allstate Research and Planning Center 
at Menlo Park, California. He is a Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society, a 
member of the American Academy of Actuaries and a member of the Risk Theory 
Seminar of the American Risk and Insurance Association (ARIA). His work in 
connection with the implementation of a new auto classification plan in California 
included analysis of insurance results by miles driven. 
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one accident per 100,000 miles. For illustrative purposes, he assumes 
that each claim costs $10,000. He then uses this information to gen-
erate the dollars of loss experienced by each customer. This allows 
him to evaluate the effect of what he calls claim record pricing. This 
means establishing prices on the basis of prior claim records. He con-
cludes that claim record pricing does not match prices to costs as well 
as charging on the basis of miles driven. He also concludes from this 
that "the car-mile exposure unit is essential to cost-based pricing of 
individual risk transfer." 
Insurance companies currently recognize differences in miles 
driven by the use of class factors. Or. Butler argues, however, that: 
Modern class plans continue to show very narrow distributions 
of cars by base price multiplier in contrast to the range in the 
miles driven (Butler, Butler, and Williams, 1988). 
Basing insurance prices on the number of miles driven makes intuitive 
sense. It is obvious that the difference in rates between two drivers, 
other things being equal, should be proportional to the difference in 
the miles they drive. The cost of insuring different auto customers, 
however, depends not only on how much they drive, but on other fac-
tors such as how well they drive, where they drive, and what kind of 
car they drive. 
In addition, the relationship between the number of miles a cus-
tomers drives and insurance claims is complex. Or. Butler seems to 
assume that customers who drive more than other customers have 
proportionately more losses. That is, he expects a customer who 
drives 10,000 miles to have twice the losses of a customer who drives 
5,000 miles. Allstate's data, however, present a more complicated 
picture. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the number of POl 
claims per mile and the number of miles driven annually by a cus'-
tomer. It uses information about the 1991 PO claim experience of 
Allstate customers in California.2 
Figure 1 shows the number of PO claims per mile going from 3.5 
claims per 100,000 miles for persons who drive about 1,000 miles per 
year down to 0.3 claims per 100,000 miles for persons driving 30,000 
miles or more. This is in sharp contrast to the constant number of 
1 PD (property damage liability) claim frequency is used because it generally has been 
found to be the best indicator of underlying accident frequency. 
2 Because of the passage of Proposition 103 in California which mandated the use of 
mileage in rating automobile policies, Allstate sent questionnaires to all its customers 
to get mileage data. Allstate already had collected mileage information on its 
customers, but the questionnaire helped to confirm the information. 
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claims per 100,000 miles assumed in Dr. Butler's analysis. This results 
in customers who drive about 1,000 miles per year having a claim 
frequency of 3.5 claims per year per 100 insured cars while those who 
drive over 30,000 miles have a claim frequency of about 8.0-a rela-
tionship of 2.25 to one, rather than the 30+ to one under Dr. Butler's 
assumptions. 
When we turn our attention to other risk factors, we find that 
mileage is a relatively unimportant source of difference between cus-
tomers compared to territory and years of driving experience. 
Figure 1 
PO Claims per Mile by Annual Mileage 
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The effectiveness of any auto insurance risk assessment system 
depends on the extent to which it matches insurance prices to insur-
ance costs. Dr. Butler has demonstrated that the use of mileage as an 
exposure base in a theoretical world, where all differences in loss 
experience come from differences in the number of miles driven, is 
more effective than the use of claim record pricing. He has not 
demonstrated anything with respect to actual insurance experience. 
The effectiveness of automobile insurance risk assessments systems 
was discussed extensively many years ago. A study by the Stanford 
Research Institute (SRI) in 1976 entitled The Role of Risk 
Classifications in Property and Casualty Insurance: A Study of the Risk 
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Assessment Process developed a means for evaluating risk assessment 
systems by measuring the variance of expected losses of the partitions 
each system produces.3 
The most efficient risk assessment system is the one that divides 
insurance customers into groups ,with the largest variance in expected 
losses. We also can evaluate the relative importance of various risk 
classification factors by measuring the percentage of the total vari-
ance each factor explains. 
Dr. Butler seems to argue that the primary contributor to the 
variance of expected losses in the real world is the difference in the 
number of miles that each customer drives. There is no evidence pre-
sented by Dr. Butler, or by anyone else, to show that this is the case. 
The major case made for mileage in the paper is the repeated obser-
vation that insurance risk is transferred, mile after mile, by driving. 
Using the SRI approach, the Allstate Research and Planning 
Center recently conducted a study of risk classification factors in 
California. The study covered most of the factors customarily used by 
most companies with the exception of vehicle characteristics. 
Allstate has collected data on the mileage driven by each customer 
since 1981, so the study was able to include mileage. Mileage, years 
licensed, and territory explained over 90 percent of the variance of 
the classification data included in the study for liability coverages 
(bodily injury liability, property damage liability, medical pay-
ments, and uninsured motorists). Over 55 percent of the total vari-
ance, however, was explained by territorial differences. Years 
licensed explained almost 23 percent of the variance, and mileage 
explained about 14 percent. 
The picture was somewhat different for collision coverage. 
Territory, mileage, and years licensed again explained over 90 per-
cent of the variance, but mileage explained over 33 percent of the 
total variance, years licensed explained about 30 percent, and terri-
tory explained about 26 percent. 
3 The SRI report states "First, we define a measure of efficiency. Our probabilistic 
model for actual losses separates the random element of actual losses from the 
predictable element, the expected loss, that is, claim likelihood and expected claim 
severity. A perfectly efficient risk assessment process would be one that estimates 
exactly individuals' expected losses. A process with zero efficiency would not resolve 
any of the initial expected loss uncertainty. A process with intermediate efficiency 
will be characterized by the average fraction of the initial expected loss uncertainty It 
resolves" (emphasis added). 
The report continues that: "We find it convenient to use variance to measure 
uncertainty because of [its) additive property ... In words, the expected loss variance in 
an entire population is equal to the sum of the average expected loss variance within 
each class and of the variance of the rates (average expected losses) among classes" 
(SRI, Supplement, p. 200). 
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Insurance customers with less than one year of experience have 
the highest losses per car. Losses per car decline each subsequent 
year. Thus, persons with more years of driving experience have 
improved loss experience. This, in turn, suggests that an important 
element in the transfer of insurance risk is how the customer drives. 
Territory rates, of course, depend on where insurance customers drive. 
The Allstate study indicates clearly that how much its customers 
drive is only part of the overall variance of systematic risk. It is 
more important than the other two factors for collision insurance, but 
still accounts for only about one third of the total variance. It plays 
even a smaller role in liability insurance, the major part of auto 
insurance costs. 
Thus, we do not believe that Dr. Butler has been able "to demon-
strate that the car-mile exposure unit is essential to cost-based pric-
ing of individual risk transfer." 
Author's Reply to Discussion 
Richard G. Wall 
Allstate Insurance Co. 
Allstate R & P Center 
321 Middlefield Road 
Menlo Park CA 94025-9765 
The discussions by Messrs. Ruy A. Cardoso and Richard G. Woll 
question different points in the paper and raise other important 
issues concerning automobile insurance exposure units that are outside 
the immediate scope of the paper. Responding to these questions not 
only calls for expanded consideration of points discussed in the paper, 
but also requires examination of further consequences of conversion to 
the car-mile exposure unit and of retaining the car-year unit. The 
efforts of Mr. Cardoso and Mr. Woll in providing this opportunity 
and challenge are appreciated greatly. 
Reply to Discussion By Ruy A. Cardoso 
Mr. Cardoso's major argument against conversion to the car-mile 
exposure unit can be paraphrased as follows: if the car-mile were 
judged superior to the car-year by Dorweiler in 1929 and has not been 
adopted or even studied since then (over 60 years), then the car-mile 
unit must have some unidentified fatal flaw. Specific flaws suggested 
by Mr. Cardoso are (1) the technical failure of future mileage as a 
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classification variable, (2) the irrelevancy of exposure measurement 
because competition prevents overpricing, and (3) customer resistance 
to odometer auditing. Upon examining these suggested flaws, how-
ever, one finds evidence that the true fatal flaw that has prevented 
the use of the car-mile unit is seen only from the perspective of auto-
mobile insurers. Adoption of the car-mile unit as an objective stan-
dard for measuring transfer of on-the-road risk would curtail price 
competition severely for larger-premium consumers with broad insur-
ance needs. It also would end the subsidy for this competition cur-
rently paid by consumers transferring less than class average risk per 
car-year. 
Mr. Cardoso's criticism of mileage as a flawed classification 
variable-Le., usable only in broadest categories, insurer indifference 
to integrity of data, incentive to cheat-agrees with company rate 
hearing testimony previously published; see Butler, Butler, and 
Williams (1988, p. 388). The problem with this critique is that it 
misses the point: the subject discussed by the current paper, as well as 
by the 1929 Dorweiler study, is not classification variables but exposure 
units. It is necessary, therefore, to clarify the difference between 
variables chosen to define price classes and the price unit chosen as 
the unit of purchase to which prices refer. 
Gasoline purchase provides a ready analogy to distinguish classi-
fication variables from the price unit. Gasoline usually is available 
in twelve different price classes. The pricing variables that distin-
guish these classes are three octane levels, self service or full service, 
and cash or credit payment; thus, 3 x 2 x 2 = 12 prices. Yet the gaso-
line gallon is the unit of purchase common to all of the price classes. 
In auto insurance, price classes are defined by variables such as terri-
tory, driver characteristics, and use of car. Distinct from such class 
definition variables is the price unit; currently the car-year, but 
which would be the car-mile after conversion to the car-mile exposure 
unit. Although classification variables and the price unit have dis-
tinct functions, the choices of which to use for assessing the cost of 
risk transfer are influenced strongly by auto insurance price competi-
tion. 
In suggesting that competition currently prevents insurance over-
pricing of cars driven less than average, Mr. Cardoso apparently is 
taking the well-known fact that competition lowers auto insurance 
prices for marketing targets and extrapolating it to the public rela-
tions dictum that competition precludes overpricing. There is plenti-
ful evidence, however, that insurers' price competition for customers 
with more risk to insure has, as its complementary effect, the over-
pricing of customers with less risk to insure (what Bailey (1960) calls 
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"skimming the cream"). This effect was described in 1911 by the 
New York State Legislature's Merritt Committee Report (p. 41) in its 
examination of the need for regulation of fire insurance pricing: 
In a state of open competition the rates adjust themselves not 
to the hazards but largely to the strength of the insured so 
that the man of influence, whose patronage is desired, will 
get his insurance too cheaply, as against the small man who 
is not in a position to drive a sharp bargain. That is, compe-
tition results in discrimination. 
Automobile rate hearing records contain admissions that costs are 
shifted from higher mileage customers to lower mileage customers 
and from men to women in response to price competition; see Butler, 
Butler, and Williams (1988, p. 405). For example, in 1982 State Farm 
testified to the Pennsylvania Insurance Department that in order to 
keep the price down for its higher mileage customers, the company 
keeps its low mileage discount to about half the size it should be. 
State Farm stated: 
We're already very competitive on the [lower mileage] class, 
and we're generally tight on a competitive standpoint on [the 
higher mileage] class, and if we widen the differential, 
we're going to hurt ourselves very substantially on the 
[higher mileage] class of business. 
Later in the hearing the State Farm actuary explained: 
We like to follow the statistics where we can. The rating 
law talks about rates which are not excessive, inadequate or 
unfairly discriminatory, but your rating [law] also talks about 
doing nothing to prohibit competition in the marketplace, 
and as a matter of fact, we simpfy can't-we just can't always 
follow the statistical indications. 
Auto insurers not only keep price differences between risk classes 
smaller than cost differences to compete for members of the more 
costly class, but also merge higher and lower risk classes or do not 
divide classes where such groups are distinguishable. In the latter 
case, for example, competition for adult men's business explains why 
nearly all cars in the adult driver classes are unisex-rated despite 
government mileage statistics, backed by accident involvement data, 
that show that men's average risk per year is about twice women's 
average risk per year. The same accident involvement data are said 
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to require sex-divided prices for youth classes. Rate-hearing testi-
mony also shows that men's prices may be lowered contrary to expe-
rienced cost to allow agents to establish good relations with young 
men who are desirable as future sales targets. 
Just as competition works to flatten rather than sharpen class dif-
ferences, resistance to any real measure of exposure differences within 
classes also expresses competitive concern for the "man of influence" 
at the expense of the "small man." The capacity for miles of driving 
is dependent on income level, which generally determines the ability 
to buy gasoline and own reliable cars. Because the car-year price unit 
is the status quo for insurance, the result of choosing this price unit as 
opposed to one that responds to individual cost can be examined by 
analogous conversion of the price unit for gasoline from the gallon to 
the car-year. That is, what would the consequences be for customers if 
gasoline were sold like auto insurance? 
With gasoline sold by the car-year, everybody with cars in the 
same class would pay a dollars per car-year price based on the cost 
per car of supplying gasoline for that class in previous years and 
adjusted for expected change in gasoline cost and, as currently done 
for auto insurance, any trend toward increased or decreased driving. 
Payment in advance for a car-year's worth of gasoline would allow 
customers to draw gasoline as needed from the class pool. Sale of 
gasoline by the car-year, however, would lead to problems analogous 
to the affordability breakdown that occurs in areas where the car-
year price of auto insurance is high. 
With gasoline prices set to cover the anticipated car-year aver-
age cost of each class, above average users of gasoline would experi-
ence a decrease in their gasoline expense paid by an increase in gaso-
line expense for below average users. Once accustomed to the benefits 
of unmetered gasoline, the above average user would object to any 
expense and accountability that using meters on gasoline pumps would 
entail, as Mr. Cardoso observed would occur with the use of odome-
ters to earn insurance premiums. If the increase in annual gasoline cost 
per car were to force some below average users to give up cars, how-
ever, class average gallons per car-year would rise. A rise in average 
consumption would raise the cost of gasoline per car-year and would 
force still more below average users to give up their cars, causing the 
gasoline cost per car-year to rise even more. This death spiral effect 
that results when prices are not tied to a unit of individual consump-
tion first would become apparent where the annual prices are high-
est, as is happening currently with auto insurance in some urban 
areas. 
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Surcharging the yearly gasoline bill of every tenth customer in a 
class so that the other nine can receive a customer retention discount 
would be analogous to the randomness of auto insurance merit rating. 
(Although Mr. Cardoso defends merit rating as having possible deter-
rence effects, customer retention is an obvious purpose. If discounts for 
claim free years were really risk-related, eligibility would transfer 
between companies. Customers generally are puzzled to discover that 
it does not.) With gasoline sold by the gallon instead of the car-year, 
however, the classification variables that set prices are certain, 
objective, obviously related to a cost that can be evaluated by cus-
tomers, and not easily manipulated to price discriminate between cus-
tomers. From the auto insurers' viewpoint, the real fatal flaw in car-
mile pricing is that it would inhibit cost shifting within classes by 
making the cost of individual risk transfer as understandable and 
controllable as the gasoline cost of automobile operation. 
The public demand for driver-record pricing voiced on call-in 
radio talk shows to which Mr. Cardoso refers is a political response 
based on the only information available to consumers. Charged by 
the car-year, auto insurance is experienced as a flat tax on car owner-
ship at prices based on group characteristics. By appearing to take 
the individual into account, driver-record pricing competes, as the 
paper notes, with the idea of making the car-mile the price unit for 
individual risk transfer. 
Reply to Discussion By Richard G. Woll 
Two sentences early in Mr. Woll's discussion transform what pur-
ports to be a critique of the paper's subject-the car-mile as the price 
unit for individual risk transfer-into a critique of a topic that the 
paper does not address-the problematic estimated future mileage 
discount classes with the car-year as the price unit. (These discounts 
are used by some insurers, but were rejected as inherently unenforce-
able by other insurers after several decades' use; see Butler, Butler, 
and Williams (1988, p. 388». "It is obvious," Mr. Woll states, "that 
the difference in rates between any two drivers, other things being 
equal, should be proportional to the difference in the miles they 
drive. The cost of insuring different auto customers, however, depends 
not only on how much they drive but on other factors such as how well 
they drive, where they drive, and what kind of car they drive." 
While the qualifying phrase "other things being equal" in the 
first sentence could refer to the purpose of classifications such as 
those cited in the second sentence, the word "however" in the second 
sentence suggests a rebuttal of the first. Together they seem to imply 
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that the amount driven is not a measurement but a factor, i.e. a clas-
sification variable arguably related to risk, as are driver experience, 
garaging territory, and car type. For the remainder of the discussion, 
Mr. Woll criticizes the car-mile exposure unit as if it were a mileage 
classification variable (which it is not) to be compared with other 
car-year classification variables as has been done in his research at 
Allstate. 
The basic premise of the paper is that the car-mile must work in 
conjunction with risk classification as the exposure unit to measure 
the cost of individual risk transfer. The abstract states that odometer 
miles multiply "a cents-per-mile rate based on class experience" and 
that the "per mile cost of individual risk transfer is a class prop-
erty." The essential relationship of individual exposure measurement 
to risk classification is emphasized in every section. It is from this 
perspective that the main issues raised by Mr. Woll will be 
addressed. These issues are within-class proportionality of cost to 
miles driven; observed decreasing claim rates per mile with increas-
ing annual mileage; and car-mile costs by territory classification. 
The question of proportionality of cost to miles driven is raised 
by Mr. Woll's observation that Dr. Butler "expects a customer who 
drives 10,000 miles to have twice the losses of a customer who drives 
5,000 miles." This correctly represents how the car-mile unit works if 
the cars driven different distances are classified identically (and 
have the same coverage). 
The proportionality assumed by the current car-year system, 
ostensibly for administrative convenience, is that within-class cost is 
proportional to the time period the car is insured in units of car-
years. This assumption produces widely divergent per mile costs for 
cars identically classified. Table 1 illustrates this using Mr. Woll's 
5,000 and 10,000 miles per car-year example. The cars driven the two 
distances per year are garaged in the same territory and are classi-
fied identically by driver (adult unisex) and use (pleasure with lim-
ited commuting to work). The premium and per mile costs of 10,000 
miles of coverage driven at 5,000 miles per car-year under two 
arrangements are compared with the cost of driving 10,000 miles in 
one car-year. Three different premiums are paid for 10,000 car-miles 
of exposure. 
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TABLE 1 
Within-Class Variation in Cost of 10,000 Miles Coverage 
Territorial Discount- Premium Cost per 
Base Adjusted Paid for Mile 
How 10,000 Miles Price per Class 10,000 for 
are Driven Car-Year' Discount" Multiplier Car-Miles Owner 
1 Car in 2 Years $500 Mileage 1.00 $1000 10.0t 
2 Cars in 1 Year $500 Mileage 0.85 $850 B.5t 
Multicar 
1 Car in 1 Year $500 None 1.15 $575 5.Bt 
, Assumed value 
" Deductions from the class multiplier: -0.15 for estimated future mileage less than 7500 miles; 
-0.15 for two or more cars on policy. From the Pennsylvania manual of State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance, effective 5/15/92 
Table 1 shows that factors not directly related to risk, such as 
number of cars in a household and how intensively they are used 
within time periods, determine large differences in what is charged 
per mile of exposure to risk of loss for cars in the same territory and 
driver risk class. 
The requirement endorsed by Mr. Woll that the number of price 
units should be proportional to expected losses, other risk factors 
being equal, leads to the absurd conclusion that insurers currently 
expect a customer who drives 10,000 miles over two years or in two 
cars in one year to have approximately twice the losses as a customer 
driving one car the same distance in one year. 
Mr. Woll raises the issue of decreasing claims per mile with 
increasing annual mileage by presenting Allstate study data in his 
Figure 1. By raising this relationship as an objection to the car-mile 
as a price unit, Mr. Woll implies that the same cents-per-mile price 
would be applied to all cars and therefore would overcharge the 
owners of cars driven more intensively in a year relative to owners of 
cars driven much less in a year. This objection, however, ignores the 
fact that cents-per-mile prices would depend on each car's risk classi-
fication. 
As in prior studies with similar results, the results shown in Mr. 
Woll's Figure 1 are obtained with data that either are unclassified 
or are classified only by driver sex; see Butler, Butler, and Williams 
(1988, p. 266). As a consequence, drivers at the extremes of the age 
range, who have considerably higher than average accident rates per 
mile and also average much less driving, would be over represented 
at lower mileages without classification by driver age. (The paper 
points out that car-miles of exposure randomly sampled by accidents 
would be biased toward the cars of such driver groups.) Concurrently, 
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the higher mileage data would be biased to cars used predominantly 
on limited access highways with lower accident rates per mile. As 
Mr. Woll points out, it is not just miles driven that determine risk 
transfer cost, but territory, driver, and use of car, all of which require 
risk classification for evaluation. Conversion of class prices from dol-
lars-per-year to cents-per-mile demonstrates this essential relation-
ship. 
Table 2 compares the conversions of two existing car-use classes to 
cents-per-mile prices. All that is necessary for the conversion is an 
average mileage value for the class. At averages assumed for the two 
classes, the difference in the cents-per-mile class prices shown in the 
table approximate the threefold decrease in per mile claim rates 
with the fivefold increase in intensity of car use from 5,000 miles to 
25,000 miles per year shown by the Allstate data in Mr. Woll's 
Figure 1. 
TABLE 2 
Car-Mile Prices For Two Use Classes 
Territory Car- Average Calculated 
Car-Year Year Miles per Price per 
Class Base Price* Multiplier** Price Car-Year* Car-Mile 
Pleasure $500 .95 $475 5,000 9.5t 
Business $500 1.40 $700 25,000 2.8t 
* Assumed values 
** Adult unisex driver class. Multipliers from the California manual of State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance, effective 1/15/91 
What determines per-mile risk for a car is not the number of 
miles it is driven within an arbitrary time period (one year), but the 
average conditions under which the driving is done. Although inten-
sity of car use may correlate with driver age and car use, classifica-
tion is essential to determine the cost of insurance coverage per car-
mile for any set of driving conditions. The car-mile unit for measuring 
the cost of risk transfer is also essential to meaningful territorial 
classifica tion. 
As though the car-mile were a classification variable, Mr. Woll 
states that "[W]e find that mileage is a relativel} unimportant 
source of difference between customers compared to territory." An 
example shows, however, that classification by territory depends on 
the car-mile exposure unit-as distinct from mileage classification-
to have meaning for individual risk transfer. Table 3 shows the 
dollars per car-year prices for a high priced territory and a low 
priced territory in California for cars in the same driver and use 
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class. The ratio of high to low prices per car-year is 4.4, presumably 
representing the greater traffic density in Los Angeles and other 
differences in conditions and costs. The cents-per-mile costs for car 
owners also is shown in both territories at three mileage amounts. 
TABLE 3 
Car-Mile Costs by Territory and Miles Driven 
Car-Year 
Price for Car-Mile Cost to Owner by 
California High Annual Miles Car is Driven in Year 
Territory Mileage* 3,000** 12,000 20,000 
13 Northern Counties $265 7.6ft 2.U 1.3ft 
Los Angeles City $1172 33.7ft 9.8ft 5.9ft 
* State Farm manual effective 1-15-91. Minimum coverage, adult unisex driver and car use pro-
file from California Insurance Dept.'s 1990 Auto Premium Survey 
** Discount for estimated future mileage less than 7,500 miles applied 
If it is assumed that the average exposure for the class in both 
territories in Table 3 is 12,000 miles per car-year, conversion to the 
car-mile unit means that all of the northern counties cars would be 
paying 2.2 cents a mile and all of the Los Angeles cars in the class 
would be paying nearly 10 cents a mile, thus preserving the differ-
ence in territorial risk transfer costs. 
In contrast to the differences between territories in cents-per-mile 
costs at class average mileages, the northern counties owners of cars 
driven 3,000 miles in a year pay more than seven cents a mile while 
owners of Los Angeles cars driven 20,000 miles in a year pay less than 
six cents a mile. The meaning of difference in risk by territory is lost 
if more is paid per mile for individual cars in territories with low 
traffic densities than is paid per mile for individual cars in territo-
ries with the highest traffic densities. 
Mr. Woll devotes a considerable portion of his critique to dis-
cussing his study of statistical measures for comparing classifications 
of car-year data, citing evaluation methods developed by the 
Stanford Research Institute (SRI). Although the SRI study (1976) did 
not evaluate the car-mile unit as an alternative to the car-year unit, 
a major finding from its empirical study of nine years of individual 
driver accident records establishes strong limitations on the ability 
of classification by year to distinguish the cost of individual driving 
risk. The study corroborates that the most powerful class separation 
is driver sex, with men's average accident likelihood per year about 
twice the women's average. Despite this large class difference, how-
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ever, the distributions of individual accident likelihoods per year for 
men and women completely overlapped, with 13% of women having 
likelihoods greater than men's average and 28% of men having like-
lihoods less than women's average. These overlapping distributions 
and averages show characteristics that are similar to the distribu-
tions of men's and women's annual mileages in relation to the approx-
imately 2:1 difference in their average miles driven. Eleven percent 
of women exceed men's average mileage, and 24% of men drive less 
than women's average mileage; see Butler, Butler, and Williams 
(1988, p. 396). Individual miles of driving cannot be predicted from 
experienced class averages, by driver sex, or in any other way. (See 
the paper for the characteristics of individual mileage listed by 
Bailey and Simon.) The miles that individual cars are driven, how-
ever, are recorded on their odometers as the measure of individual 
risk transferred. The expected cents-per-mile cost of risk transfer 
depends on statistically reliable actual class experience. 
Mr. Woll's discussion of the car-mile price unit as if it were a 
classification variable has provided an opportunity to show why the 
car-mile exposure unit is essential to meaningful classification for 
individual risk transfer. Dollars-per-year prices for example risk 
classes that purport to distinguish differences in risk by territory, 
driver, and car use show large individual variability in cents-per-car-
mile costs for reasons not directly related to risk. Therefore, not only 
is the car-mile exposure unit essential for cost-based pricing of indi-
vidual risk transfer, but its use is essential in order for risk classifi-
cation variables (factors) to have meaning for individual risk. 
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A New Approach to Modeling Excess Mortality 
Peter D. England1 and Steven Haberman2 
Abstract 
This paper describes a complete framework for the statistical modeling of excess 
mortality, with particular reference to the experience of insured, impaired lives. The 
principal measure of excess mortality considered is the standardized mortality ratio. 
The modeling approach, based on the theory of generalized linear models, allows us to 
build models containing several explanatory variables. The statistical significance of 
these variables can be tested, and the effect of interactions between the variables can 
be assessed rigorously. The paper uses data drawn from the extensive, continuing inves-
tigation into the mortality of insured, impaired lives conducted by the Prudential 
Assurance Company (UK). The methodology has close connections with the traditional 
actuarial approach to the measurement of excess mortality and can be regarded as a 
generalization of this traditional approach. 
Key words and phrases: impaired lives, generalized linear models, multiplicative hazard 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In 1947, the Prudential Assurance Company decided to institute 
an inquiry into the mortality experience of medically impaired, 
insured lives. The investigation was designed to be both medical and 
actuarial. The data were drawn from holders of life insurance poli-
cies effected since July 1947 in the ordinary branch of the Prudential 
Assurance Company. Policies were included if the life insured exhib-
ited one of a long list of impairments. Lives exhibiting two or more 
1 Peter D. England obtained his Bachelors degree in Actuarial Science in 1988 and then 
stayed at City University, London, to assist in the research activities of the 
Department of Actuarial Science and Statistics. In 1993 he completed his Ph.D. in 
statistical modeling of excess mortality. He current is working for Commercial Union 
pic and specializes in non-life insurance. 
2 Steven Haberman is Professor of Actuarial Science and head of the Department of 
Actuarial Science and Statistics at City University. He received a degree in 
mathematics from Cambridge University. He joined the Prudential Assurance Company 
as an actuarial trainee and then City University as a lecturer, qualifying as an FIA in 
1975. He has published widely in actuarial and related fields. His current research 
interests include mortality, morbidity, premium rating, and pension funding. 
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major impairments were excluded from the investigation, where an 
impairment was regarded as major if it would warrant a surcharge in 
its own right. 
It was not considered practical to extend the scope of the investi-
gation to include every impairment encountered in the course of 
underwriting. For impairments that occur comparatively infrequently, 
sufficient data would not have accumulated to provide useful results. 
Accordingly, the rarer conditions generally have been excluded. At 
the outset it was not possible to foretell the quantity of data that 
would be forthcoming, however, and certain groups were included 
where experience has shown that the data have proved insufficient. 
Since 1961, several authors have reported results based on the 
Prudential impaired lives data set.3 A comparison of the diverse 
reports is informative and provides insight into the changes in excess 
mortality over the 40 years that the investigation has been 
operative. It is worth considering the difference in the scope of the 
studies and the approach adopted by the various authors (Table 1). 
TABLE 1 
Previous Studies Based on the Prudential Impaired Lives Data Set 
Author 
Clarke 
Preston & Clarke 
Clarke 
Leighton 
Papaconstantinou 
Renshaw 
Haberman and Renshaw 
Publication Date 
1961 
1966 
1979 
1987 
1988 
1988 
1990 
Calendar Years of Study 
1947 to 1958 (Allimpairmentsl 
1947 to 1963 (All Impairments 
1964 to 1973 (All Impairments) 
1974 to 1983 (All Impairments) 
1947 to 1981 (All Impairments) 
1947 to 1981 (Hypertension) 
1947 to 1981 (Peptic Ulcer) 
The studies by Clarke (1961), Preston and Clarke (1966), Clark~ 
(1979), and Leighton (1987) form a series in which the authors use 
the same approach in their analyses. Traditional methods were used 
to produce standard actual! expected (A/E) ratios only. The differ-
ences between the reports lies in the exposure-to-risk periods consid-
ered (Table 1) and in the control experiences used in the calculation 
of expected deaths. These authors briefly comment on the excess mor-
tality of female lives where there are sufficient data to provide use-
ful results. 
3 The Prudential data set is not freely available. Readers interested in obtaining this 
data set should direct inquiries to Prudential Assurance, Holborn Bars, London, "ECIN 
2NH, England. 
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Papaconstantinou (1988) uses the entire data set (as available at 
the time) in his analysis and uses conventional exposure-to-risk the-
ory in the calculation of mortality rates. He uses the data available 
to provide a comprehensive set of excess mortality measures including 
not only the familiar AlE ratios, however, but also excess death 
rates and measures based on cumulative mortality. He considers all 
impairments (male and female combined) for which there are more 
than 100 entrants. 
The Prudential impaired lives data set first was used in the sta-
tistical modeling of excess mortality by Renshaw (1988) who adopts 
the multiplicative hazards approach. Renshaw (1988) and 
Haberman and Renshaw (1990) use the same data as 
Papaconstantinou (Le., data for 1947 to 1981) and provide results for 
two impairments, hypertension and peptic ulcer (male lives only), 
respectively. 
1.2 Summary 
This paper concerns the measurement of excess mortality experi-
enced by impaired, insured lives. The approach adopted here is to 
use a multiplicative hazards model for the force of mortality. This is 
similar to that used by Renshaw, but additionally includes data for 
the period 1982 to 1987. The methodology is described and illustrated 
with examples drawn from the Prudential impaired lives data set. It 
must be mentioned that this approach has been applied systemati-
cally to all of the major impairment groups in the Prudential study, 
and the full results are given in England (1993). 
The methodology used in this paper can be applied to any inves-
tigation of excess mortality if the data requirements can be satisfied. 
Such investigations would include studies based on the experience of 
a single company or comprising the pooled experience across a number 
of companies. An example of such an investigation is the Medical 
Impairment Study 1983 of the Society of Actuaries and Association of 
Life Insurance Medical Directors. We feel that, given the power and 
versatility of the methodology, its potential should be recognized 
outside the United Kingdom (where it has been applied so far). 
Given their ready access to fast personal computers, workstations, 
and mainframe computers, we feel that this method will be of inter-
est to North American actuaries. 
The results of this study support and supplement the results pub-
lished in earlier investigations. The results relating to the subsidiary 
impairment codes are new-this information has been ignored in ear-
lier investigations based on the Prudential data set. These latest 
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analyses identify some anomalous results emerging from the earlier 
studies, in particular some of the indices given by Papaconstantinou 
(1988). 
1.3 A Note of Caution 
When comparing results of the various studies, differences in the 
mortality ratios obtained may be due to combinations of the follow-
ing four factors: 
• The Period Under Study; 
• The Control Experience Used in the Calculation of Expected 
Deaths: It should be noted that when expected deaths are low, a 
small difference in the value of expected deaths may change the 
value of the mortality ratio significantly, as expected deaths 
appear in the denominator; 
• The Method Used in the Calculation of Expected Deaths: 
Using traditional methods, expected deaths are given by an 
expression of the form Eq* (or L Eq*) i.e., the exposure to risk 
multiplied by the standard mortality rate. Using the multiplica-
tive hazards approach, expected deaths (ej) are given by a dif-
ferent expression based on the aggregate integrated standard force 
of mortality. Differences may arise in the values of expected 
deaths given by these methods. When expected deaths are low, 
these differences may cause a significant change in the value of a 
mortality ratio, as expected deaths appear in the denominator; 
and 
• Errors: Despite the efforts taken to eliminate any source of error, 
it is possible that errors occur that affect the results obtained, 
especially in a study the scale of an impaired lives investiga-
tion. Errors may be due to incorrect recording of data, mistakes in 
data manipulation, programming mistakes, incorrect calculation's 
using results, and typographical errors in reports. Major errors 
usually are immediately noticeable; minor errors, however, may 
pass undetected. 
2 The Data Set 
The 1947 Prudential impaired lives study uses a coding scheme 
for impairments devised by the company's principal medical officer 
at the time, T.W. Preston. The impairments considered are divided 
into nine broad categories (e.g., circulatory impairments, respiratory 
disorders), each subdivided into its constituent impairments. Since 
1947, some impairments that originally were included have been 
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dropped and some impairments that were not have been added. A 
few impairments have had their associated codings changed. By the 
end of 1987, data were available on over 650,000 policies effected on 
impaired lives (where the impairment was present at the outset). 
Those involved in planning the study showed considerable fore-
sight and adopted a classification of impairments that was criticized 
in its day for being too detailed. To this criticism the powerful 
riposte was made that "once the data have been tabulated, groups 
can always be combined but they can never be further subdivided." It 
is only now, with sufficient data and statistical software packages, 
that full advantage of the detailed classification can be made. 
For each policy in the investigation, the following information 
was recorded: policy number, impairment code (plus subsidiary code), 
date of entry (year and month), age at entry (next birthday), date of 
exit (year and month), age at exit (next birthday), curtate duration 
at exit, mode of exit (still in force, withdrawal, death), cause of 
death, joint life marker, and sex. 
Information that would be of interest, but which is not available, 
concerns the terms of acceptance (accepted as standard, reducing debt 
etc.), duration since onset of impairment, sum insured, type of policy, 
experience of lives declined for insurance, and smoking status. 
3 Statistical Methodology 
3.1 Traditional Methods 
The traditional actuarial approach to the measurement of mor-
tality is based on the comparison of actual and expected deaths. The 
history of this process has been investigated by Keiding (1987).4 This 
approach also has been applied to the measurement of excess mortal-
ity associated with an extra risk in the comparison of actual and 
expected deaths for a group of policyholders exhibiting the particu-
lar risk under consideration. Examples of possible types of risk are 
medical impairments, occupational hazards, hazardous pursuits, geo-
graphical location of residence, and ethnic origin. Combinations of 
the above risks may be of interest (e.g., the effect of a particular dis-
ease within different ethnic communities). 
Using exposure-to-risk theory, the expected numbers of deaths are 
calculated using a set of suitable standard mortality rates, controlling 
4 One of the earliest descriptions of the method is attributable to William Dale, an 
English actuary living in the 18th century who was investigating the adequacy of 
contemporary annuity rates. 
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as closely as possible for factors such as sex and age (and possibly 
other characteristics). Let dt, qt, Et be the observed number of deaths, 
the observed mortality rate, and the initial exposure-to-risk, respec-
tively, for the group under consideration for the interval of follow-up 
for curtate duration t (i.e., [t, t+l)) where t is an integer (say, mea-
sured in years). Note that dt and qt are random variables. Let q't be 
the standard mortality rate and define d't, to be the expected number 
of deaths, i.e., d't = Et q't. 
The interval mortality ratio for the interval of follow-up [t, t+l) 
is denoted by kt, and is given by: 
Clearly, if kt > I, the mortality rate in the study group (for curtate 
duration t) is higher than the standard rate. If kt < I, the mortality 
rate in the study group is lower than the standard rate. 
When the numbers of deaths (or expected deaths) are low, neigh-
boring intervals of follow-up sometimes may be grouped together to 
give: 
where neighboring intervals are grouped over an n year period. Thus, 
nko is the ratio of deaths observed in an n year period and deaths 
expected over the same period. 
The properties of this ratio have been described in detail by 
Haberman (1988). For example, it is straightforward to show that 
the index /J ko may be regarded as a weighted average of the kt over 
the first n years of observation with weights Wt equal to the number 
of deaths expected on the basis of the standard population mortality 
rates at duration t. The index clearly does not treat all the kt terms 
equally; it places most weight or emphasis on those k t at the dura-
tions where the Wt are highest. This may not be unreasonable; these 
durations are likely to be those where the underlying data are 
largest. Any resulting indices are subject to the least statistical vari-
ability and, hence, are most reliable in statistical terms. The quanti-
ties kt and nko commonly are known as the AlE ratios; see Clarke 
(1979). 
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This conventional approach (based on AlE ratios) does not pro-
vide any guidance on how we decide which factors or combinations 
thereof have a significant bearing on excess mortality, nor how we 
should construct the best possible model representing excess mortality. 
For such refinements, we need a more statistically sound structure. 
3.2 The Multiplicative Hazards/Generalized Linear Model 
Approach 
3.2.1 Introducing the Multiplicative Hazards Model 
Following the notation used in the literature on survival analysis 
(induding Elandt-Johnson and Johnson, 1980; London, 1988), we let the 
random variable T denote the lifetime of a living organism or an 
inanimate object (e.g., a light bulb). The instantaneous failure rate at 
time point t is A(t) and is called the hazard rate or intensity rate. 
Strictly, 
A ) _ lim Prob(t < T < t+L1t IT> t) 
(t - L1t~O+ L1t 
where this limit is assumed to exist. Hence, the probability of fail-
ure in (t, t + At) given survival to time t is approximately equal to 
A(t) At, for very small .At. 
Now consider the hazard rate of a study group with certain 
characteristics (z) and denote this hazard rate by A(t,Z). Note that z 
is a vector of information on the characteristics of the study group. If 
the important characteristics are age, sex, weight, height, and 
impairment, for example, then the vector z may be as follows: z = (50 
years, male, 250 pounds, 5'10", hypertension). 
The multiplicative hazards model is said to hold when A(t,Z) can 
be factored as 
A(t,Z) = A *(t) x 8z (1) 
where A *(t) is some known standard hazard rate, independent of z, 
and the proportionality factor 8z (independent of t) measures the 
effect of the characteristic z on the study group's hazard rate rela-
tive to the known standard hazard rate A *(t). If 8z > 1, the failure 
rate in the study group is greater than the standard failure rate, and 
if 8z < 1, the failure rate in the study group is less than the standard 
failure rate. 
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In the field of actuarial science, failure is (typically) death, 
time of failure is age at death, and the hazard rate is called the 
force of mortality. Thus, equation (1) can be rewritten by replacing the 
symbol for the hazard rate (A,) by the standard symbol for the force 
of mortality (/1) and rearranged to give: 
In this context the (}z's can be viewed as instantaneous mortality 
ratios. These ratios can be compared with the interval mortality 
ratio, ki' which is a ratio of annual mortality rates. 
Cox (1972) proposes writing the proportionality parameter {} as 
an exponential function of the vector of covariates z with unknown 
regression parameters f3 such that: 
(2) 
giving 
pTZ 
/1(t,z) = /1*(t) e . (3) 
This representation of the mortality ratio {}z is a mathematical con-
struct. It uses only those factors that are considered to influence the 
mortality ratio to a significant extent. These factors may be qualita-
tive, such as severity of disease, or quantitative, such as age at entry 
or level of blood pressure. Both f3 and z, however, must be real-valued 
vectors. To accomplish this, nominal and ordinal characteristics are 
usually coded using real numbers. 
Equation (1) is called the multiplicative hazards model or the log-
linear model because the linear combination of factors acts multiplica-
tively on the mortality ratio. This equation provides a specific case 
of a more general model: 
where h is a function to be specified. Detailed experiments with dif-
ferent choices for h have shown that the exponential function pro-
vides the most satisfactory choice in terms of the goodness of fit, its 
simplicity, and its implicit avoidance of negative values for {}. 
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3.2.2 Estimating the Parameters f3 
Consider a study consisting of N mutually independent individu-
als. For the ith individual, i = 1, 2, ... ,N, let the entry and exit 
times from the study be denoted by 'ri and ti, respectively. Let Zi be 
the vector of characteristics associated with i, and let the indicator 
variable, ~i, denote the mode of exit, i.e., ~i = 1 if the ith person died 
in the study and ~i = 0 otherwise. This results in the following like-
lihood function: 
where: 
t 
S(t,z) = exp[ - J l1(s,z) ds] 
is the survival function. The log likelihood function may be written 
as: 
N 
log L = k (~i log l1(ti,Zi) + log S(ti,Zi) - log S( 'ri,Zi) ) 
1=1 
N ( t
j
) = ~ ~i log l1(ti,Zi) -111(u,Zi) du . (4) 
Substituting Cox's multiplicative hazard function (represented by 
equation (3» into equation (4) gives the following result: 
N ( IJTz. tj ) 
log L(f3) = constant + ~ ~i WZi - e '111*(U) du (5) 
where we identify specifically the dependence of log L on the 
unknown regression parameters, 13. 
For convenience, the individuals in the study are grouped into M 
cohorts, denoted by j (j = 1, 2, ... ,M), which represent particular 
combinations of the characteristics under consideration-for example, 
age at entry, policy duration, and severity of the impairment. 
Renshaw (1988) shows that, in this case, the log likelihood function 
may be written as: 
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where: 
c 
Nj = 
tjk = 
'Cjk 
dj 
= 
e' J 
a constant independent of f3; 
M 
number of individuals in cohort j so that N = l N·; 
J=1 J 
(6) 
age at which individual k from cohort j was last observed; 
age at which individual k from cohort j entered the study; 
number of deaths observed in cohort j; 
the aggregate integrated force of mortality, 
N· t 
ej ="Y. r f.l*(u) duo 
k=1 Tjk 
(7) 
In the appendix, it is proved that ej is an unbiased estimate 
of the expected number of deaths from cohort j given stan-
dard rates had applied. The interpretation of ej is discussed 
in the appendix; and 
mj is given by: 
(8) 
so that 
(9) 
Note that equation (6) has the same form as the log likelihood for 
independent Poisson random variables dj with respective means mj' 
given by equation (8). 
The vector of parameters f3 can be estimated by maximizing the 
log likelihood function. This has been performed using the software 
package GUM, which relies on the presence of a generalized linear 
model. The above description can be recast in the form of a general-
ized linear model, as discussed by Dobson (1989). 
Equation (9) is used as the estimation equation in the GUM pack-
age. The term {3TZj is called the linear predictor in generalized linear 
model terminology. The log (ej) term is called an offset and is consid-
ered as an extra term in the linear predictor with a coefficient of 1. 
GUM calculates the parameter estimates using maximum likelihood 
techniques. 
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3.3 Practical Implementation 
To establish a connection between the factors e
pTZj 
and traditional 
actuarial mortality ratios, recall equation (8) (rewritten in the form): 
(lO) 
Following the methods used in the appendix, it easily can be proved 
that mj is an unbiased estimate of E[djl. It thus seems reasonable to 
replace f3, mj' and ej by [3, dj' and dj, respectively, where dj is the 
expected number of deaths in cohort j had standard mortality rates 
applied. This gives 
~TZ' _ !!i _ Actual Deaths 
e ] - d j - Expected Deaths ' (11) 
which is identical to the traditional actuarial AlE mortality ratio. 
In practice, the application of this statistically-based methodol-
ogy is straight forward. For a mortality study involving N partici-
pants, the first step is to partition the sample into homogeneous 
cohorts (indexed by the suffix j), ensuring that there are sufficient 
data in each cohort to make the construction of mortality ratios 
meaningful. For each individual, the information needed for the sta-
tistical calculations is age at entry (r), age at exit (t), and mode of 
exit. The second step is to use this information to calculate the 
observed number of deaths (dj) and the expected number of deaths (ej) 
for each cohort. The third step is to· develop the coding scheme used 
to identify the covariate structure to be modeled. It should be 
emphasized that the covariates must be expressed as real-valued 
variables. The fourth step is to enter the values of dj and ej and the 
covariate structure into a statistical modeling software package, such 
as GUM, for model fitting and the calculation of the parameter . /\ 
estimates, p. 
Using GUM, various models may be fitted from the null model 
(no covariates) to more complex models involving interaction terms, 
giving different parametric representations for the mortality factor. 
Statistical analysis of the significance of covariates and their possi-
ble interactions is based on a goodness-of-fit statistic called the 
deviance. (GUM automatically provides the deviance when fitting 
models). The deviance is based on the likelihood ratio principle 
rather than on the (possibly more familiar) Pearson goodness-of-fit 
statistic. It is essential that inferences should be based on differences 
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between model deviances, as their absolute values are conditional on 
the total number of covariates under simultaneous investigation. The 
differences in model deviances are assumed to follow the X2 distribu-
tion with the appropriate degrees of freedom (an approximate 
result). This can be used to assess the significance of factors included 
in (or excluded from) the model. Furthermore, residual plots may be 
used as an informal diagnostic tool to highlight the source of unex-
pected effects. 
If a model provides a good fit, the histogram of deviance residu-
als should be approximately bell-shaped (Le., approximately nor-
mal). Also, a scatter plot of deviance residuals against linear predic-
tor should show a corridor of values. 
Any other patterns would be indicative of a lack of fit. In such a 
case, a transformation of the data may be necessary, or account may 
need to be taken of factors other than those included in the current 
model. Outliers also would be detected by plotting residuals and 
would be identified as isolated points on these plots far from the 
remaining residuals. 
This methodology is similar to that used in cohort studies in epi-
demiology, which are concerned with the follow-up of large popula-
tion groups over many years (for example, to ascertain the effects of 
environmental exposures on the outbreak of illness). A full description 
is given by Breslow (1985). One of the main differences between the 
two approaches is that in this paper we are modeling the relative 
mortality experience, whereas in epidemiological studies the mortal-
ity rate itself often is modeled. 
3.4 Basis for Expected Deaths-The Standard Experience 
Used 
Choosing a suitable control experience for the calculation of 
expected deaths is a difficult task. The ensuing discussions of papers 
presented to the Institute of Actuaries concerning the mortality of 
impaired lives indicate that criticism often rests with the choice of 
the control experience. 
One of the principal problems is with the length of the investi-
gation, presently 41 years. In his analysis, Papaconstantinou (1988) 
modifies the A67-70 (2) select table using linear relationships pro-
posed by the Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau5 to produce a 
5 The A67-70 (2) select table is a standard life table with a two year select period 
based on data (male endowment and whole life policyholders) collected by the 
Institute and Faculty of Actuaries Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau (CMIB) 
from contributing insurance companies (Joint Mortality Investigation Committee, 1974). 
The CMIB is a permanent research organization established by the Institute and 
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different set of mortality rates for each quadrennium between 1949 
and 1978. By a process of interpolation and extrapolation, he pro-
duces a different set of rates for male lives for each year of entry 
1947 to 1981. For female lives, he uses the rates thus produced with a 
four year age deduction. Renshaw (1988), in his turn, feels that the 
method adopted by Papaconstantinou is unnecessarily detailed and 
condenses Papaconstantinou's rates into five year intervals commenc-
ing with 1947 to 1951 and ending in 1977 to 1981. 
In the analysis covered by this report, it was decided to use the 
A67-70 (2) select table unmodified for all years of entry for male 
lives. The period used in forming this table (1967 to 1970) is roughly 
mid-way through the period for which the Prudential data are 
available (1947 to 1987). The expected deaths calculated for the ear-
lier part of the study will tend to be understated (resulting in an 
overstatement of the excess mortality). Similarly, the expected 
deaths calculated for the later part of the study will tend to be over-
stated (resulting in an understatement of the excess mortality). A 
comparison of Renshaw's results, in respect to hypertension, with the 
results included in this report, however, reveals that the differences 
in the standard forces of mortality used, on the whole, make little 
difference to derived measures of excess mortality. 
Nevertheless, the basis for expected deaths used here is not 
ideal. A more satisfactory approach would be to obtain the 
Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau's data for whole life and 
endowment insurances (for standard lives), grouping into suitable time 
intervals (e.g., four or five years), and graduating to form a smooth 
set of mortality rates for each time interval. 
The use of a fixed control experience does not mean that time 
trends are being ignored. Any significant trends would be identified 
through the presence of calendar year of death as one of the covari-
ates in the vector z. 
4 Illustrating the Methodology 
To illustrate the methodology and highlight some of the advan-
tages of the multiplicative hazards/generalized linear model 
approach, a summary of the results from preliminary analyses of two 
impairment groups (impairment of coronary arteries and hyperten-
sion) will be considered (male lives only). 
First, consider the data set. Of the data available for each poli-
cyholder, the information needed is medical impairment (including 
Faculty of Actuaries to collect and analyze mortality and morbidity statistics and 
prepare standard tables. The continuous collection of such data began in 1924. 
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further subclassification), date of entry, age next birthday at entry, 
date of exit, mode of exit (withdrawal, death), and sex. Medical 
impairment and sex provide the necessary information for breaking 
the sample into reasonably homogeneous cohorts. The age on next 
birthday at entry provides the necessary values 'rjk. Date of entry, 
age next birthday at entry, and date of exit together provide the 
values of tjk needed for the calculation of ej (using equation (7)). The 
values of dj depend on the mode of exit. 
4.1 Impairment of Coronary Arteries 
The initial selection and sorting of data were carried out using 
the SPSSx statistical software package. For both male lives and 
female lives separately, a subset of the full data set was created 
that includes only those lives identified as suffering from impair-
ment of coronary arteries. This category includes thrombosis, occlu-
sion, ischaemia, infarction, and angina. 
• 
• 
• 
The data are partitioned according to: 
Age at Entry: taking four levels 
(1) 16 to 39 (3) 50 to 59 
(2) 40 to 49 (4) 60 to 79; 
Policy Duration: taking three levels 
(1) 0 to 2 years (2) 2 to 5 years (3) 5 to 8 years; and 
Whether Complications are Present (complications defined as 
subsequent chest pain on exertion): taking two levels 
(1) Without complications (2) With complications. 
This gives a total of 24 cohorts (4x2x3). For each of these cohorts, 
the number of deaths observed (dj) and expected deaths (ej) are calcu-
lated (using Fortran 77 programs specially written for this purpose). 
Age at entry and policy duration are taken as discrete variables. 
It would be possible to use age and duration in continuous form and 
represent their effect on excess mortality through the use of an ap-
propriate (regression) model. In the results reported here, this 
approach is not adopted. 
Once the data are partitioned according to the covariate classifi-
cation chosen and the number of deaths observed ana expected (the 
aggregate integrated standard force of mortality) are calculated for 
each cross-classified cohort, the data are suitable for feeding into the 
GUM software package for model fitting and statistical analysis. 
Here equation (9) is used as the estimating equation. The method of 
model fitting adopted is forward stepwise, i.e., start with the sim-
plest model (the null model) and include parameters one by one. 
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4.1.1 The Null Model 
The null model has the simplest form of structure in which the 
linear predictor is represented by a single parameter, i.e., 
fJTz = b. 
This is equivalent to combining age at entry, duration, and complica-
tion groups to give an overall mortality ratio equivalent to 
Total Deaths in Study Group 
Total Expected Deaths 
which is an estimate of the mortality ratio associated with impair-
ments of the coronary arteries as a whole. 
Fitting this model with GUM gives a parameter estimate 
& = 0.9076. 
1\ 
From equation (11), the mortality ratio is given by elJTzi, giving 
eO.9076 = 2.48. 
Thus, the overall mortality ratio for life insurance policyholders 
with impairments of the coronary arteries at entry is 248% (i.e., 
extra mortality of +148%). 
4.1.2 Main Effects Models 
More information can be obtained by fitting models that allow for 
inclusion of the principal factors believed to influence excess mortal-
ity (Le., age at entry, duration, complications). These factors are 
called main effects to distinguish them from the interaction terms 
that relate to interdependence between factors. In this section, we 
shall consider models that include these main effects, fitted sepa-
rately. 
4.1.2.1 Age at Entry 
Recall that only the age at entry data are partitioned into four 
levels. We denote the parameter values associated with the level of 
age at entry as ai. Therefore, the parametric representation of the 
linear predictor for the ith cohort is: 
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i = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
Fitting the age at entry main effects model in GUM gives the fol-
lowing parameter estimates: 
B = 2.912, /\ a 1 = 0, ~2 = 1.236, /\ a3 = -1.679, /\ a4 = -2.471 
(For technical reasons, the first parameter estimate for any factor 
included in a model is assigned the value zero). 
Calculating iJTzi for each i gives: 
Age at Entry 
16 to 39 
40 to 49 
50 to 59 
60 to 79 
MR% 
1839 
534 
343 
155 
These results indicate that proposers for life insurance under 40 
year of age suffering from impairments of the coronary arteries consti-
tute a substantial extra risk. Excess mortality decreases as age at 
entry increases. Lew and Gajewski (1990), in their review of excess 
mortality experience, note that for most medical impairments, rela-
tive mortality is highest at ages under 40 and decreases with 
advances in age to relatively low mortality indices at ages 60 and 
over. 
4.1.2.2 Policy Duration 
Recall that the policy duration data are partitioned into three 
levels. We denote the parameter values associated with the jfh level 
of policy duration as oj- Therefore, the parametric representation of 
the linear predictor for the jfh cohort is: 
j = 1, 2, 3 
Fitting the policy duration main effects model in GUM gives the 
following parameter estimates: 
B = 1.205, ~1 = 0, ~2 = -0.4727, ~3 = -0.4073 
resulting in the following mortality ratios: 
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Duration 
o to 2 
2 to 5 
5 to 8 
MR% 
334 
208 
222 
Vol. 1, No.1, 1993 
These results show that the mortality ratio in the first two years 
after entry is higher than subsequently. Such results also are not 
unexpected. Lew and Gajewski (1990) also comment that indices of 
excess mortality tend to decrease with increasing policy duration. 
4.1.2.3 Complications 
Similarly, we denote the parameter values associated with the 
kth level of the presence of complications as n. Therefore, the para-
metric representation of the linear predictor is: 
k = 1, 2. 
Fitting the complications main effects model in GUM gives the 
following parameter estimates: 
t = 0.7893, /I. Yl = 0, Y2 = 0.2771 
resulting in the following mortality ratios: 
Without Complications 
With Complications 
MR% 
220 
290 
As expected, there is a higher risk associated with the presence of 
complications. 
4.1.3 Significance of Main Effects 
The results according to the main effects fitted separately could 
have been obtained using the traditional actuarial methods, based on 
AlE ratios. One of the advantages of the modeling approach used in 
this paper, however, is that it is now possible to assess the statisti-
cal significance of the main effects. That is, it is possible to answer 
such questions as "Is age at entry a significant rating factor?" and 
"What about the presence or absence of complications?" These ques-
tions are answered with recourse to the model deviances. The null 
model is a simpler model than the main effects models, and it can be 
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shown that the difference in deviances between the null model and 
the main effect models approximately follows a X2 distribution; see 
Dobson (1989). 
Using the deviances provided by GUM when fitting the particu-
lar models, a deviance table for the main effects models may be pro-
duced as in Table 2 below. The differences in model deviances are 
referred to the appropriate X2 distribution to assess the significance 
of the main effects. 
Notation 
The null model is denoted by H 0, the age at entry model by A, 
the policy duration model by D, and the complications model by C. 
TABLE 2 
Impairment of Coronary Arteries: Significance of Main Effects 
Degrees of ---Differences---
Model Deviance Freedom Deviance Degrees of Freedom Tail Area 
HO 
A 
D 
C 
116.56 
33.75 
102.27 
110.95 
23 
a:> 
21 
22 
82.81 
14.29 
5.61 
3 
2 
1 
<.05% 
.75% 
1.75% 
Analysis of the differences in model deviances indicates that all 
three main effects are highly statistically significant (tail area less 
than 5% in all cases). 
4.1.4 More Complex Models 
Because all three main effects are significant, we may be inter-
ested in more complex models, looking at age at entry and policy 
duration combined or including all three factors. We also may be 
interested in the effect of interdependence of rating factors, assessed 
by the inclusion of interaction terms. 
4.1.4.1 Main Effects Fitted Together, No Interaction 
Because all three rating factors are statistically significant, they 
will need to be included together in a model in order to assess, as 
accurately as possible, the rating required for a given combination of 
factor levels. The simplest type of model structure accounting for all 
three rating factors is fitted by including the main effects without 
interaction terms. The GUM notation for this model is A+D+C. The 
parametric representation of the linear predictor for cell (i, j, k) 
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where i represents age at entry, j represents policy duration, and k 
represents presence of complications, is given by: 
The associated mortality ratios are found by exponentiating the 
linear predictor, thus: 
ef3TZjik = exp(b + ai + Oi + Yk) 
that is, the effects are multiplicative. 
The mortality ratio of 18.39 for the age at entry group 16 to 39 
was based on only nine deaths. Therefore, it was decided to combine 
ages at entry 16 to 39 and 40 to 49 when considering more complex 
models, resulting in only three levels for the age at entry factor (i = 
1, 2, 3). 
The parameter estimates obtained by fitting model A+D+C are as 
follows: 
The mortality ratios calculated for each combination of i, j, and k are 
shown in Table 3. A direct result of using the multiplicative model, 
without interaction terms, is that there is an underlying pattern in 
the mortality ratios in Table 3. Close inspection reveals that: 
• Entries for "with complications" are 1.4 times larger than entries 
for "without complications"; 
• Entries in the second row are 0.66 times entries in the first row, 
and entries in the third row are 0.72 times entries in the first 
row; and 
• Entries in the second column are 0.57 times entries in the first col-
umn, and entries in the third column are 0.26 times entries in the 
first column. 
There is no conflict between the results shown here and the 
results for the main effects models (Le., figures are of the same order 
and changes are in the same direction). The advantage is that more 
information is conveyed using simple mathematical relationships. 
Furthermore, the 18 entries in the tables of mortality ratios are 
derived from just six parameter estimates. 
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TABLE 3 
Impairment of Coronary Arteries: Mortality Ratios, Model A+D+C 
(Multiplicative Structure) 
Without Complications 
Duration 
Ot02 
2t05 
5t08 
With Complications 
Duration 
Ot02 
2t05 
5t08 
16 to 49 
675 
446 
486 
161049 
945 
624 
680 
MR(%) 
Age at Entry 
501059 60 to 79 
385 176 
254 116 
'ZT7 126 
MR (%) 
Age at Entry 
50 to 59 601079 
539 246 
356 162 
388 177 
Whereas results for the main effects models fitted separately can 
be reproduced using traditional methods, the above results, based on 
the main effects fitted together, cannot be so reproduced. 
4.1.4.2 Interaction Terms 
The significance of interdependence between rating factors can be 
assessed by fitting models including interaction terms. In GUM nota-
tion, a model includes interaction terms if an asterisk (*) appears 
between the symbols for model factors. For example, A *C+D repre-
sents a model including all three factors and the interaction between 
age at entry and the presence or absence of complications. In this 
example (concerning impairment of coronary arteries), the models 
that need to be investigated are: 
• A *C+D with parametric representation 
{JTzijk = b + ai + Oi + Yk + (aY)ik; 
• C*D+A with parametric representation 
{JTzijk = b + ai + 0i + Yk + (OY)jk; 
• A *D+C with parametric representation 
{JTzijk = b + ai + 0i + Yk + (a8)ij-
These models can be fitted in GUM and the difference in deviances 
between model A+D+C and these models referred to the appropriate 
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x2 distribution to assess the statistical significance of the interaction 
terms, as shown in Table 4. 
Model 
A+D+C 
A*C+D 
C*D+A 
A*D+C 
TABLE 4 
Impairment of Coronary Arteries: Significance of Interaction Terms 
Degrees of 
Deviance Freedom 
23.647 
21.718 
21.973 
20.050 
18 
16 
16 
14 
--~Differences---
Deviances Degrees of Freedom 
1.93 
1.67 
3.60 
2 
2 
4 
Tail 
Area 
35% 
45% 
47% 
The results indicate that none of the first order interaction terms 
is statistically significant. 
The only other model that can be fitted is model A *D*C, the 
saturated model. This model reproduces the crude mortality ratios for 
each combination of i, j, and k and will have a deviance of zero 
because it gives a perfect fit, but no model simplification. The satu-
rated model is the only other model that can be obtained from tradi-
tional actuarial methods, but it is unnecessarily complex because 
interaction terms are not statistically significant. This leaves the 
model A+D+C as the optimal model in that it is parsimonious and 
conveys the salient features of the data available. An examination 
of the associated residual plots supports this conclusion. (These plots 
are not shown here). 
4.2 Hypertension 
4.2.1 Classification 
It is customary to classify hypertension as primary (essential), 
constituting the vast majority, or secondary to a long list of diseases 
(some pathological process). In the Prudential study, the hyperten-
sion group refers to primary hypertension only. 
As Singer and Levinson (1976) point out, "blood pressure may be 
considered elevated only in terms of some normal standard." The New 
York Heart Association (1955) proposes that "Any blood pressure 
combination up to and including 139/89 (139 mm Hg systolic and 89 
mm Hg diastolic) is regarded as normotensive. Any combination 
including a systolic pressure of 160 and up, or a diastolic pressure of 
95 and up, or both, is classified as definitely hypertensive. Any com-
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bination below 160/95 is classified as borderline hypertensive pro-
vided it is not within the normotensive limit." 
Singer and Levinson (1976) and Brackenridge (1985) report that 
the above definition "has been widely accepted," and both use it in 
their analyses. Furthermore, it generally is accepted that blood pres-
sure rises gradually as age increases, and increased levels in older 
age groups still may be compatible with average mortality. Also, 
significant differences in mortality with blood pressure level are 
observed in the normal or normotensive range. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The data were partitioned according to: 
Age at Entry: taking four levels as defined earlier; 
Policy Duration: taking six levels 
(1) 0 to 2 years (3) 5 to 10 years (5) 15 to 20 years 
(2) 2 to 5 years (4) 10 to 15 years (6) Over 20 years; 
Family History: takin~ two levels 
(1) Good family hIstory of cardiovascular disease 
(2) Poor family history of cardiovascular disease; 
Blood Pressure: taking nine levels, classified simultaneously 
according to diastolic blood pressure taking three levels 
(1) Under 95 mm mercury 
(2) 95 to 105 mm mercury 
(3) Over 105 mm mercury and 
systolic blood pressure taking three levels 
(1) Under 150 mm mercury 
(2) 150 to 165 mm mercury 
(3) Over 165 mm mercury; 
Weight Levels: taking two levels 
(1) Within 20% of standard weight 
(2) More than 20% above standard weight; and 
Calendar Year of Entry: taking eight levels 
(1) 1947 to 1951 (5) 1967 to 1971 
(2) 1952 to 1956 (6) 1972 to 1976 
(3) 1957 to 1961 (7) 1977 to 1981 
(4) 1962 to 1966 (8) 1982 to 1986. 
4.2.2 Results for Male Lives: Null and Main Effects Models 
Taken as a group, the overall mortality ratio for male hyperten-
sive is found to be 154% (based on 3,548 deaths). 
We now will consider the main effects fitted separately. 
4.2.2.1 Age at Entry (Factor A) 
The estimated mortality ratios are: 
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Age at Entry 
16 to 39 
40 to 49 
50 to 59 
60 to 79 
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MR% 
177 (450) 
210 (1029) 
139 (1127) 
126 (942) 
The underlying numbers of observed deaths (dj) are shown in 
parentheses. 
Excess mortality is higher for ages at entry below age 50, as 
would be expected. A surprising feature here, however, is the rise in 
excess mortality (from +77% to +110%) for the age at entry group 40 
to 49 compared with age at entry 16 to 39. 
4.2.2.2 Policy Duration (Factor D) 
The estimated mortality ratios are: 
Policy Duration 
o to 2 years 
2 to 5 years 
5 to 10 years 
10 to 15 years 
15 to 20 years 
over 20 years 
MR% 
155 (279) 
135 (584) 
164 (1120) 
175 (765) 
155 (443) 
128 (357) 
Excess mortality falls after the first two years duration then 
rises steadily to a peak at 15 years duration, after which excess mor-
tality falls again. 
4.2.2.3 Family History (Factor H) 
Good 
Poor 
MR% 
148 (2645) 
177 (903) 
These results dearly show a rise in excess mortality associated with 
a family history of cardiovascular disease. 
4.2.2.4 Blood Pressure (Factor B) 
The estimated mortality ratios are: 
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Systolic Pressure 
(mmHg) 
<150 
150 to 165 
>165 
Diastolic Pressure (mm Hg) 
< 95 95 to 105 
133 
(1237) 
159 
(202) 
166 
(833) 
185 
(293) 
145 
(591) 
>105 
180 
(132) 
257 
(260) 
As expected, the mortality ratios increase with increasing blood 
pressure (from top left to bottom right). The pressure levels shown 
here are consistent with the definitions of hypertension as given ear-
lier. None of the associated mortality ratios are below 125%; there-
fore we clearly are dealing with blood pressure levels outside the 
normal (or normotensive) range. 
4.2.2.5 Weight Levels (Factor W) 
The estimated ratios are: 
Standard ± 19% 
Standard + 20% or over 
MR% 
153 (2914) 
162 (634) 
Although there is a slight increase in extra mortality associated 
with overweight, this increase is not as large as might have been 
expected. 
4.2.2.6 Calendar Year of Entry (Factor Y) 
The estimated mortality ratios are: 
Calendar Year of Entry 
1947 to 1951 
1952 to 1956 
1957 to 1961 
1962 to 1966 
1967 to 1971 
1972 to 1976 
1977 to 1981 
1982 to 1986 
MR% 
157 (694) 
154 (842) 
156 (655) 
170 (639) 
186 (274) 
157 (167) 
105 (205) 
104 (72) 
The mortality ratios for calendar years of entry 1947 to 1961 are 
surprisingly stable (approximately 155%). Beyond 1961, the mortal-
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ity ratios rise, reaching a peak for calendar years of entry 1967 to 
1971. Beyond 1971, the mortality ratios fall until there is almost no 
excess mortality. These trends are difficult to interpret and may 
reflect changes in underwriting standards within the Prudential 
Assurance Company. Also, it would be problematic to extrapolate 
this pattern of ratios beyond 1982 to 1986. 
4.2.2.7 Significance of Main Effects 
Referring differences in model deviances (Table 5) to the appro-
priate X2 distribution reveals that all the main effects are highly 
significant with the exception of weight, which is nonsignificant 
(although there is some evidence of a higher mortality ratio with 
higher weight levels). Consequently, the weight factor is dropped 
from subsequent model fitting. 
This result that overweight in conjunction with hypertension does 
not add significantly to the excess mortality risk may be a surprise, 
but such a feature has been noted by earlier investigators; see Clarke 
(1961), Preston and Clarke (1966), Clarke (1979), and Leighton (1987). 
This may be explained by considering that the effect of an individ-
ual with hypertension also being overweight may have been allowed 
for in their elevated levels of blood pressure. 
Model 
HO 
A 
B 
D 
H 
W 
Y 
Deviance 
3615.7 
3464.7 
3509.6 
3575.3 
3594.5 
3614.0 
3553.2 
TABLE 5 
Hypertension: Significance of Main Effects 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
3808 
3805 
3802 
3803 
3607 
3607 
3601 
---IDifferences---
Deviance Degrees of Freedom 
151.0 
106.1 
40.4 
21.2 
1.7 
62.5 
3 
6 
5 
1 
1 
7 
Tail Area 
.05% 
.05% 
.05% 
.05% 
20% 
.05% 
More complicated models (other than main effects fitted sepa-
rately) may be fitted and the significance of interaction terms 
assessed. The results from the more important of these models will be 
reported. In presenting the results, it is useful to think in terms of a 
parametric representation of the GUM models. 
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Factor 
A Age at Entry 
B Blood Pressure at Entry 
Y Calendar Year of Entry 
D Policy Duration 
F Family History 
Excess Mortality 
Parameter 
ai i = I, ... ,4 
11: j j = I, ... ,7 
Yk k = I, ... ,8 
0/ 1 = I, ... ,6 
Pm m = 1,2 
An additional parameter, b, is involved. similar to the constant coef-
ficient in conventional linear regression. 
4.2.3 Main Effects Fitted Together, No Interaction 
The GUM notation for this model is A+B+Y+D+H, with paramet-
ric representation of the mortality ratio given by: 
ef3Tz ijklm = exp(b + ai + 1I:j + J1c + 0/ + Pm) 
and, as noted before, the effects are multiplicative. 
A 
exp(b) = 1.95 
Age at Entry 
A 
exp(ai) 
Pressure 
A 
exp(lr j) 
Systolic Pressure 
(mm Hg) 
Calendar Year of Entry 
A 47-51 
exp(Yk) 1.00 
Duration 
A 0-2 
exp(.5 I) 1.00 
Family History 
A 
eXP(Pm) 
TABLE 6 
Hypertension: Parameter Estimates for the 
Main Effects Model With No Interactions 
16-39 
1.00 
<150-
150 -165 
>165 
52-56 
0.98 
2-5 
0.90 
Good 
1.00 
57-61 
0.94 
40-49 
1.09 
62-66 
0.94 
5-10 
1.01 
Poor 
1.20 
110 
50-59 
0.70 
60-79 
0.65 
Diastolic Pressure (mm Hg) 
<95 95-105 >105 
f-0.96 ~ 
1.00 1.18 1.22 
1.35 1.47 1.95 
67-71 72-76 n-81 82-86 
0.99 0.81 0.60 0.63 
10-15 15-20 >20 
0.96 0.80 0.72 
Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 1, No.1, 1993 
This model caters for all five (significant) factors simultaneously. 
The parameter estimates resulting from fitting this model are shown 
in Table 6. Mortality ratios then may be deduced from Table 6 by 
forming the product of relevant entries (and multiplying by 100 to 
express the ratio as a percentage). 
Consider a hypothetical example; A man took out a whole life 
policy in 1977 at age 45. Upon medical examination his blood pres-
sure was recorded as 155/100. From the proposal form it was found 
that his family history of cardiovascular disease could be classified 
as good. The policy now has been in existence for ten years, and an 
estimate of the excess mortality associated with this risk is required 
for the remainder of the policy. 
Policy Duration Mortality Ratio Excess Mortality 
10 to 15 years 1.95 x 1.09 x 1.18 x 0.60 x 1.00 x 0.96 = 1.44 +44% 
15 to 20 years 1.95 x 1.09 x 1.18 x 0.60 x 1.00 x 0.80 = 1.20 +20% 
> 20 years 1.95 x 1.09 x 1.18 x 0.60 x 1.00 x 0.72 = 1.08 +8% 
4.2.3.1 Residual Plots 
If a model provides a good fit, a histogram of deviance residuals 
should be approximately bell-shaped (Le., approximately normal). 
Also, a scatter plot of deviance residuals against linear predictor 
should show a corridor of values. Any other patterns would be indica-
tive of lack of fit. (These plots are not shown.) 
4.2.4 First Order Interactions 
Models including first order interaction terms have been fitted 
and their deviances analyzed to assess the significance of the first 
order interaction terms. The results are not given here, but are 
reported in detail in England (1993). The results indicate that the 
interaction between blood pressure and policy duration is statistically 
highly significant. 
5 Extensions and Further Applications 
The resulting approach can be extended to incorporate different 
choices for the function hO appearing in the relationship: 
Oz = h(fJTz). 
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Two other choices have been explored in detail by England 
(1993). 
ADDITIVE 
POWER 
The additive model is essentially the basis underlying the numerical 
rating system, which is widely-used for the risk evaluation of 
impaired insured lives as part of the underwriting process. The mor-
tality ratio is represented by a series of parameter estimates (which 
may be positive or negative) that are summed. The estimates are 
analogous to the debits and credits used in the numerical rating sys-
tem. Interdependence of the rating factors may be accommodated by 
including interaction terms in the definition of z. 
The power model represents a family of models because the 
parameter y may take any real value. When y = I, the additive 
model is obtained, whereas in the limit as y ~ 0, the multiplicative 
model is obtained; see McCullagh and NeIder (1989). For values of y 
between 0 and I, the power model may be regarded as being interme-
diate between the additive and multiplicative cases. The value of y 
giving the optimum fit, however, may lie outside the range (0,1). 
This modeling approach can be extended with the inclusion of 
approximate confidence intervals for the mortality ratios. Given the 
form of the mortality ratio 
in the more general case, this procedure is not completely straightfor-
ward. England (1993) provides further details. 
The approach of generalized linear modeling has been used more 
widely than modeling excess mortality. In particular, in the field of 
graduation these techniques have been used to deal with the: 
• Graduation of mortality rates (Renshaw, 1991); 
• Graduation in the presence of duplicate policies (Renshaw, 1992); 
• Graduation of select mortality rates (Currie and Waters, 1991); 
and 
• Graduation of transition intensities in a multiple state model 
(Renshaw and Haberman, 1992). 
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These techniques could be used for the graduation of mortality rates 
where it is intended to use a modification of a given standard life 
table. 
6 Conclusions 
This article attempts to highlight the benefits and power of the 
multiplicative hazards/generalized linear model approach. The 
principal advantages of this approach over traditional methods are: 
• 
• 
It enables comprehensive statistical analysis, including signifi-
cance testing, model building, and residual analysis; and 
It allows the effect on excess mortality experience of complex 
interactions between the covariates to be assessed. 
The approach described in this article provides a more dynamic 
method of constructing and testing models than the traditional 
approach. The current approach allows an assessment to be made of 
the relationship between individual factors and their interactions 
and their impact on excess mortality. The models of this paper do not 
require extensive assumptions and, with the aid of modern statistical 
software packages such as GUM, can be implemented easily. As we 
have noted, these models can be seen to be a direct generalization of 
traditional actuarial mortality ratios. 
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Appendix-The Aggregate Integrated Standard Force of 
Mortality 
Recall the definition of ej given in equation (7), i.e., 
(7) 
We will now show that ej can be interpreted as the expected number 
of deaths in cohort j had standard mortality rates applied. This 
interpretation can be justified because the expected value of ej is 
equal to the expected number of deaths had standard mortality rates 
applied. This is proved briefly by Berry (1983). A more complete 
proof is shown below. 
Consider a complete follow-up study, i.e., one where there are no 
withdrawals or losses. This assumption is being made to simplify the 
presentation. For cohort j, let us assume that individual k (k = 1, 2, 
... , Nj): 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Enters the study at time 0 (so 'rjk = 0). This can be done by a sim-
ple change of origin; 
Has a maximum follow-up time of Tjlo 
Exits the study at time T/ic (which is tjk in equation (7)); and 
Has an indicator random variable Ijk' where Ijk = 0 if individual 
k leaves the study alive (T}ic > Tjk) and Ijk = 1 1f individual k dies 
during the study (T/ic ::; Tjk). 
The probability distribution function for T/ic is f*(t) (assuming that 
standard mortality applies) and F*(t) is its cumulative distribution 
function. The force of mortality is J1*(t) where 
* f*(t) 
J1 (t) = 1 - F*(t) (AI) 
Let 
Tl 
ejk = J J1*(t) dt. 
Clearly ejk is a random variable because T/ic is a random variable. To 
calculate the expected value of ejkt it is necessary to consider the 
possibility of death before Tjk or after Tjk. This leads to: 
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The first part of equation (AI) relates to the contribution to the 
expected value made by the possibility of death occurring at time s, 
integrated over all possible values of s from 0 to Tjk. The second part 
is the contribution made by the possibility of survival to time Tjk' 
the maximum follow-up time. 
Integrating the first component of equation (AI) by parts gives: 
[ 
S ]Tlk Tjk 
E[ejk] = F*(s)J f..l*(t) dt 0 - J F*(s) J1*(s) ds 
Tlk Tlk Tlk 
= F*(Tjk)J J1*(t) dt + J f..l*(s) [1 - F*(s)] ds - F*(Tjk)J f..l*(t) dt 
Tjk 
= J f..l*(s)[l - F*(s)] ds 
(A3) 
The right side of equation (A3) follows from equation (AI). Next 
we will prove that E[ejk] = E[Ijkl. The contribution that individual k 
makes to the number of deaths is 0 if the individual survives to Tjk 
(with probability 1 - F*(Tjk)), and it is I if the individual dies 
before Tjk (with probability F*(Tjk))' Hence, 
E[Ijk] = 0 x Prob(survival to Tjk) + 1 x Prob(death before Tjk) 
= 0 x (1 - F*(Tjk)) + 1 x F*(Tjk) = F*(Tjk)' 
Therefore E[ejkl = E[Ijk]' 
Now for the entire cohort j, the term ej is defined as 
N· 
ej = Vejk 
ftl 
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and the expected number of deaths (had standard mortality applied 
in this cohort), dj, is given by 
(AS) 
Equation (AS) shows that ej is an unbiased estimate of dJ. Therefore, 
the statement that the aggregate integrated standard force of 
mortality in cohort j can be interpreted as the expected number of 
deaths in cohort j had standard mortality rates is justified. 
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The Small Plan Audit Program: 
The Opinions of the Court 
Arnold F. Shapiro* 
Abstract 
One of the most important issues of recent years from the perspective of many pen-
sion actuaries is the IRS's small plan audit program. The program initially was 
expected to raise two-thirds of a billion dollars by targeting well-funded defined bene-
fit plans with five or fewer participants. The focus of the audit was the assumed 
interest rate and the normal retirement age, both of which the IRS generally regarded 
as too low. 
While the focus of the audit was relatively narrow, the issue it raised was a 
funda mental one. The basic question was the extent to which the IRS could impose its 
unilateral interpretation of actuarial principles on pension actuaries. 
Not surprising, many small plan audit cases ended in the tax courts. In due course 
decisions and opinions have been rendered in three lead cases. This article presents the 
opinions of these cases as they relate to actuarial practice and discusses some of their 
implications. 
Key words and phrases: defined benefit plans, actuarial assumptions, unit credit method, 
IRS 
1 Introduction 
One of the most important issues of recent years from the perspec-
tive of many pension actuaries is the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) 
small plan audit program. 1 The program began in November 1989, 
when the IRS2 initiated a nationwide plan to audit the actuarial 
assumptions of approximately 18,000 small well-funded defined bene-
* Arnold Shapiro, Ph.D., F.5.A., is Professor of Actuarial Science and Insurance, Robert 
G. Schwartz Faculty Fellow, and director of the Risk Management Research Center at 
Penn State University. He serves as editor of Actuarial Research Clearing House and 
associate editor of Insurance: Mathematics and Economics. 
1 Even though this paper deals only with court cases in the United States, the opinion 
of the court may have implications in any country where actuarial assumptions are at 
issue. 
2 Throughout this paper, the abbreviation IRC means the Internal Revenue Code and 
the abbreviation IRS refers to the Internal Revenue Service of the U.s. 
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fit pension plans. The program initially was expected to raise two-
thirds of a billion dollars in additional tax revenue. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The specific plans to be audited shared several characteristics: 
The plan year ended in 1986, 1987, or 1988;3 
The plan covered one to five participants; 
The plan annual contribution generally, but not always, was 
$100,000 or more; 
The plan was valued with an interest assumption of less than 8 
percent (IRS memo, November 29, 1989); and 
The normal retirement age of the plan was less than age 65. 
It was estimated that deductions would be disallowed retroactively 
in 85 percent of the plans to be examined. 
The program fell considerably short of its expectations. Although 
all the audits under the program were concluded by July 31, 1992, 
only $38 million in revenue had been produced by December 1992, and 
the program appeared to be floundering; see the BNA Pension 
Reporter (1992). In retrospect this is not surprising because the effort 
immediately met intense and unrelenting resistance from small plan 
actuaries, their associations, and their advocates. 
It was not long after the small plan audit program was instituted 
before several of the ensuing cases reached the tax court. These cases 
were assigned to Judge Charles E. Clapp II, who, after observing that 
there were likely to be many more such cases, selected some represen-
tative ones for trial. His stated intent was to develop judicial prece-
dence and guidance so that subsequent cases could be resolved without 
costly litigation. 
The suits comprise two institutional and eight noninstitutional 
cases. The two institutional cases, the first to be tried, involved large 
successful law firm partnerships that had adopted individmll 
defined benefit (IDB) plans for their partners.4 The firms were the 
Texas-based firm of Vinson & Elkins and the New York firm of 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (Wachtell Lipton). In both 
instances, assumptions used for valuing their plans were deemed 
3 These plan years were chosen because the statute of limitations was ended for plan 
years pnor to 1986 (IRe §6S01) and the tax law changed for plan years that ended 
after 1988. The primary relevant changes in the tax law were the revision of the full-
funding limitation to include current liability (IRe §412(b)(S),(c)(7) and (1)(7» and the 
amendment to IRe §412(c)(3), which requires that each actuarial assumption (rather 
than actuarial assumptions in the aggregate) be reasonable. 
4 In view of IRe §401(a)(26), individual defined benefit plans of this type no longer 
are allowed, and these plans have been terminated. 
120 
• 
 
Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 1, No.1, 1993 
unreasonable by the IRS, which sought to disallow their deductions. 
These cases were tried in January 1992, and a decision was handed 
down the following July. 
The remainder of the cases involved a variety of small busi-
nesses, each of which had a small defined benefit pension plan for 
one or two key employees. Because the cases arose under an audit 
program in Phoenix, they came to be known as the Phoenix cases, but 
subsequently were referred to as Citrus Valley because they were con-
solidated and tried as Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. et a1.5 These cases 
involved frontloading of the contribution under the unit credit funding 
method in addition to actuarial assumption challenges. The cases 
were tried in February 1992, and a decision was handed down the fol-
lowing September. 
This article presents the opinions of the court as they relate to 
the actuarial practice associated with small defined benefit plans 
and discusses some of their implications. First, the actuarial issues 
contested by the IRS are summarized. Then the opinions of the court 
relating to these issues are discussed. The paper ends with a comment 
on the implications of the court's opinions. 
2 The Actuarial Issues Contested by the IRS 
The general actuarial issue raised by the IRS was whether actu-
arial assumptions used by the enrolled actuary to determine the 
plans' costs were reasonable in the aggregate and represented the 
actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plans as 
required by IRe §412(c)(3). The specific issues contested by the IRS 
are summarized in Table 1.6 For example, for the Vinson & Elkins 
plans the IRS contested the 5 percent preretirement and post-
retirement interest rate assumption, the normal retirement age of 62, 
the 5 percent postretirement expense load, and the preretirement mor-
tality assumption. Moreover, the IRS contended that these assump-
tions were not offset by any other assumptions that would make the 
assumptions reasonable in the aggregate. 
5 Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. , Robert J. and Janice A. Davis, Old Frontier Investment, 
Inc., Lear Eye Clinic, Ltd., Robert Stephan, Jr., Ltd., Boren Steel Consultants, Inc., 
Arizona Orthopedic Institute of Traumatic and Reconstructive Surgery, Jonathan R. and 
Renee K. Fox, and Brody Enterprises, Inc. Although separately docketed, Arizona 
~rthopedic is a successor to Jonathan Fox. 
This paper does not deal with the nonactuarial issues of these cases, which included 
timing of amendments, automatic approval of a cost method change, and validation of 
hours worked. 
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Most of the issues of Table 1 are self-evident,7 but those related 
to the mortality tables and the cost methods need clarification. For 
the institutional cases, the lOB plans that contained life insurance 
used the 1958 Commissioners Standard Ordinary (CSO) mortality 
table for the preretirement mortality assumption and the 1971 
Individual Annuity Mortality (lAM) table for the postretirement 
mortality assumption. While the IRS agreed that such plans may 
provide a preretirement death benefit and may fund these benefits 
using envelope funding,S it contested the use of the 1958 CSO table on 
the grounds that it grossly overstated the expected actual mortality 
experience. 
TABLE 1 
Actuarial Issues Contested by the IRS 
Interest Rate Mortality 
Expenses Table Cost 
Pre Post NRA Pre Post Pre Post Method 
Vinson & Elkins 5% 5% 62 5% ..J 
Wachtell Lipton 5% 5% 55 7.5% 5/7.5% ..J 
Citrus Valley et a/. 
Citrus Valley 5% 5% 
Davis 5% 5% 55 
Old Frontier 5% 5% 
Lear Eye Clinic 5% 5% 55 ..J 
Robert Stephan 5% 5% 55 ..J 
Boren Steel 5% 5% 
Arizona Orthopedic 5% 5% 55 ..J ..J 
Fox 5% 5% 55 ..J ..J 
Brody Enterprises 5% 5% 55 6/4.5% ..J ..J 
7 Some of these plans could be differentiated only on the basis of their credible experi-
ence. It had been anticipated that the court's decision would be affected materially by 
plan experience, but this turned out not to be the case. 
S The envelope method may be used with any cost method and with any type of 
insurance policy. It is the method that generally is used with the unit credIt funding 
method or with insurance policies that do not have guaranteed projected cash values 
at retirement. Under the envelope method, assets are adjusted by adding the cash 
value of the insurance as of the valuation date. The normal cost and accrued liability 
are calculated using the adjusted assets. 
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The situation in Citrus Valley was somewhat different. In one 
instance, an insurance company's guaranteed female annuity table was 
used for a plan with a single male participant; in another, a female 
mortality table with a seven year age setback was used for a plan 
with a single male participant; and in another, an age setback was 
used for a participant with a substandard family medical history. 
The IRS contested the mortality assumption in each instance. 
The IRS contested the actuarial cost method in a significant num-
ber of the Citrus Valley cases. The issue was straightforward. These 
plans provided for the accrual of all, or a significant portion, of the 
benefits provided under the plan in a very few years, a procedure 
commonly referred to as frontloading. Using the unit credit funding 
method, the benefits then were funded as they accrued with the con-
tribution currently deductible. The IRS contended that while front-
loading of benefit accruals is permissible from a qualification stand-
point, an equivalent frontloading of the deductible contribution is not 
permitted and that no more than 10 percent of the maximum benefit 
may be allocated to a given year's normal cost, just as the maximum 
benefit that can be provided to a participant with one year of service 
is 10 percent of the overall IRC §415 limit. 
3 The Experts 
Before proceeding to the findings of the court, it is worth noting 
the credentials of the experts chosen by each side and the focus of 
their testimony or report. 
3.1 The Institutional Cases 
The experts for institutional cases included James F. Rabenhorst, 
managing partner at Price Waterhouse, who testified regarding the 
retirement age assumption; Richard R. Joss, Ph.D., F.S.A., M.A.A.A, 
E.A., resource actuary for the Wyatt Company, who testified regard-
ing the actuarial assumptions; Mary S. Riebold, F.S.A., M.A.A.A., 
E.A., F.C.A., managing director for Mercer and then-president of the 
Conference of Consulting Actuaries, who testified regarding the actu-
arial assumptions; Steven H. Schechter, director of management 
information systems at Wolper Ross, who testified regarding interest 
rate assumptions based on an analysis of Form 5500 data; and John W. 
Peavy III, Ph.D., C.F.A., professor of finance at Southern Methodist 
University, who served to rebut the contentions of Shapiro and 
Haneberg regarding the interest rate assumption. 
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The experts for the IRS in these cases included Ronald L. 
Haneberg, J.D., F.S.A., M.A.A.A., F.CA., previously a consulting 
actuary with Buck Consultants, who testified regarding the actuarial 
assumptions; Claude Poulin, F.S.A., M.A.A.A., E.A., president of 
Poulin Associates, Inc., who testified regarding the actuarial assump-
tions; Alan C Shapiro, Ph.D., professor of banking and finance at the 
University of Southern California, who testified regarding the inter-
est rate; William S. Borden, Ph.D., senior program analyst at 
Mathematica Policy Research, who testified regarding the invest-
ment return and in rebuttal to Joss; and Jeffrey F. Jaffe, M.B.A., Ph.D., 
associate professor of finance at the Wharton School, who provided 
an expert report on the validity of the interest rate assumption. 
3.2 Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. et al. 
The experts for Citrus Valley included Kenneth D. Klingler, 
F.s.A., M.A.A.A., E.A., a consulting actuary with the Wyatt 
Company, who testified regarding the assumptions; and Arthur W. 
Anderson, A.S.A., M.A.A.A., E.A., who previously had been a consul-
tant for William M. Mercer, Johnson & Higgins, and the Wyatt 
Company and was the author of Pension Mathematics for Actuaries, 
testified as an expert with respect to the unit credit funding method. 
The experts for the IRS included J. Ruben Rigel, J.D., F.S.A., 
F.CA., M.A.A.A., E.A., who testified with respect to the assump-
tions and the unit credit funding method; Roger Ibbotson, M.B.A., 
Ph.D., president and chief executive officer of Ibbotson & Associates, 
Inc., who testified with respect to the interest rate assumption; 
William S. Borden, Ph.D., who testified with respect to the interest 
rate and retirement age assumption; and James E. Holland, A.S.A., 
E.A., chief of the Pension Actuarial Branch of the Service, who pro-
vided an expert report dealing with the unit credit funding method. 
4 The Findings of the Tax Court 
The court generally found against the IRS on most of the issues. In 
the institutional cases, for example, the court held that "[t]he actu-
arial assumptions made by the plans' enrolled actuary were reason-
able in the aggregate and represented the actuary's best estimate of 
anticipated experience under the plans, as required by §412(c)(3); 
accordingly, as the assumptions used were not substantially unreason-
able, [the IRS] is precluded from requiring a retroactive change of 
assumptions. " 
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The court held similarly for the noninstitutional cases that all of 
the challenged actuarial assumptions for each of the plans at issue 
were reasonable. Further, the certifying actuaries for the plans using 
the unit credit funding method funded within allowable limits and 
made reasonable allocations of costs, except for one plan that was 
complicated because of an amendment issue (Citrus Valley, p. 101). 
Accordingly, the actuarial assumptions and methods used for the 
plans were reasonable in the aggregate. A fortiori, these assumptions 
were not substantially unreasonable in order to permit retroactive 
changes of assumptions for years prior to the year in which the audit 
was made. 
The outcomes of the cases were not obvious prior to the decisions. 
It is interesting and informative to read how an unbiased legal 
authority interprets the actuarial issues involved. The following is a 
recapitulation of how the court reached its conclusions. 
4.1 Deference to the Enrolled Actuary 
A major conclusion was that deference must be given to the 
assumptions chosen by the enrolled actuary who certifies the funding 
of the plan. In this regard, Judge Clapp gave his interpretation of 
Congressional intent the full weight of legal authority. 
Judge Clapp emphasized that Congress was aware in enacting 
ERISA that actuaries would playa major role in ensuring that retire-
ment plans would be sufficiently able to provide retirement income 
when due. He observed that Congress recognized the importance of 
the actuarial assumptions and the cost methods chosen by actuaries 
in determining plan funding amounts and that Congress explicitly 
noted that such determinations by actuaries would involve making 
predictions and would be a matter of judgment involving many factors 
and producing a range of results. He also commented that Congress 
decided that accepting a range of reasonableness for funding amounts 
for retirement plans would be more desirable and more effective than 
imposing an inflexible legislative standard on actuaries and, there-
fore, rejected imposing mandatory funding assumptions and methods 
(Wachtell Lipton, pp. 10-11). 
4.2 The Interest Rate Assumption 
In reaching his decision on the interest rate assumption, Judge 
Clapp identified what he regarded as particularly important fac-
tors. He noted that the combination of these factors weighed heavily 
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in favor of concluding that 5 percent was reasonable. For the institu-
tional plans these factors were (Vinson & Elkins, p. 46): 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The nature of the responsibility Congress entrusted to enrolled 
actuaries in the statutory scheme enacted for defined benefit pen-
sion plans; 
The conservative nature of the actuarial assumption selection pro-
cess; 
The fact that IDB plans were long-term plans, with funding to 
occur over a 30 year to 50 year period; 
The fact that IDB plans were self-directed, with each partici-
pant being a co-acfministrator,9 especially because most of the 
IDB plans did not employ a professional manager; 
The fact that IDB plans lacked credible experience with respect 
to earnings, investment strategies, and otherwise; 
The risk of losing compounded earnings in a tax-exempt trust asso-
ciated with using overly optimistic assumptions and the resulting 
requirement for unanticipated higher contributions in later years; 
The relative closeness of all the actuarial experts' reasonable 
ranges;lO and 
The fact that most actuaries used interest rate assumptions of 
between 5 percent and 6 percent for small plans during the years 
at issue.ll 
He listed the same factors, except for the relative closeness of the 
reasonable ranges, for the noninstitutional plans (Citrus Valley, p. 69). 
Judge Clapp also clarified the role of a prudent actuary in the 
selection of the interest assumption. He noted that the actuary's pri-
mary duty to plan participants under ERISA is to establish a realis-
tic contribution pattern over the long term so that the plan sponsor 
will provide adequate funding for the ultimate pension obligation. 
Thus, prudent actuaries maintain a long-term conservative view that 
9 It is relevant that each partner/participant served as a coadministrator because that 
meant that the plan assets of the IDB prans were not commingled for the purpose of 
investment and, therefore, could not realize the rates of return earned by larger plans. 
10 Not all the experts agreed that their reasonable ranges were close. See, for 
example, Ronald 1. Haneberg, "Not All Experts Agree," Enrolled Actuaries Report 
(November, 1992), p. 3. 
11 This conclusion follows from Schechter's testimony that actuaries established 
interest rate assumptions between 5 percent and 6 percent for 1986 plans with fewer 
than 100 participants for 76.6 percent of the preretirement assumptions and 82.5 percent 
of the postretirement assumptions. Schechter's conclusions were based on his analysis 
of data obtained from the Department of Labor. 
The court was not swayed by the IRS's contention that rates in general use during 
the time were irrelevant. 
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will ensure benefit security for plan participants in selecting actuar-
ial assumptions (Vinson & Elkins, p. 27) 
Rejecting the IRS's contention that 8 percent would have been a 
reasonable interest rate assumption because that amount could have 
been earned during the years at issue, the court commented that 
"Congress did not entrust the nation's tax-advantaged retirement sav-
ings system to hypothetical returns that the markets 'should' bear" 
(Vinson & Elkins, p. 49). 
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the court attached only 
minor importance to the testimony and reports of nonactuaries, in 
spite of the fact that they were experts in the field of investment. 
This was true, for example, even with the testimony of the well-
known Roger Ibbotson.12 The rationale was that these persons were 
not actuaries and that conclusions they drew would have limited 
application in the determination of the reasonableness of actuarial 
assumptions (Vinson & Elkins, p. 47). The court reasoned that if a 
financial analyst's predicted rate is higher than the actual rate 
earned, the investor simply earns less than expected, whereas if an 
actuary makes the same mistake, there is a significant risk that the 
plan will become underfunded and the pensioners' full benefits will 
be unpaid (Citrus Valley, p. 71). 
4.3 Retirement Age Assumption 
The court seemed willing to accept a normal retirement age 
(NRA) assumption that was less than age 65 as long as it was based 
on reasons that were "sincere, credible, and reasonable." It explicitly 
rejected the IRS's argument that statements by the participant in a 
one person plan were merely self-serving, even when there was no 
evidence that the underlying reasons had been explained to the plan 
actuary. (See, for example, Citrus Valley, p. 83.) 
The IRS took the position that failure of a key participant to 
retire at the assumed normal retirement age was clear evidence that 
the assumption was unreasonable. In rejecting this position, the court 
noted that" ... the certifying actuary is not charged with the respon-
sibility of determining when a plan participant will actually begin 
to receive the plan benefits. That would be an impossible task. 
Further, the fact that a plan participant might choose to, or actually 
does, delay receipt of the plan benefits beyond the assumed retire-
12 Ibbotson & Associates, Inc. sells financial software and data and provides consulting 
services to investment management firms. Roger Ibbotson is an often-quoted authority on 
stocks, bonds, Treasury bills, and inflation. 
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ment age does not make the retirement age assumption unreasonable. 
An actuary is charged with looking into the future and making a 
determination as to, among other things, when benefits under the 
plan could begin" (Vinson & Elkins, p. 58). 
Some of the Citrus Valley plans contained a segregated account 
provision, which meant that at the normal retirement age benefits 
were segregated into a separate account even if the participant chose 
to continue working beyond that age. The present value of accrued 
benefits at the normal retirement age is treated in effect as an 
account balance in a defined contribution plan. The experts of both 
parties agreed that the inclusion of a segregated account provision in 
a plan rendered the date of a participant's actual retirement irrele-
vant (Citrus Valley, p. 75). 
Given that the experts agreed, the court concluded that the segre-
gation provision justified the finding that it was reasonable for the 
assumed retirement age to be the normal retirement age stated in the 
plan, because that would be the age at which the participant would 
elect to segregate the accrued benefits. This obviated the retirement 
issue for a number of plans that had a normal retirement age of 55. 
4.4 Expense Loadings 
The court held for the taxpayer in each instance where the IRS 
challenged the expense loading. While Judge Clapp had some mis-
givings about the 7.5 percent expense loading in the institutional 
cases, he found it not to be substantially unreasonable and acceptable 
on the basis of reasonable in the aggregate. 
He rejected the IRS's argument in the noninstitutional cases that 
expense loading is merely a device to increase deductions. His opinion 
observed that "[the IRS] offered a rather perfunctory rebuttal, stat-
ing simply that [the] addition of postretirement expense load 
assumptions would further increase the funding goal and the amount 
of the deduction ... This is not, however, unreasonable per se, as [the 
IRS] seems to believe ... A postretirement expense load is a reason-
able manner in which to fund the postretirement administrative 
fees" (Citrus Valley, p. 91). 
4.5 Mortality Assumptions 
The court found that it was reasonable in the institutional cases 
to use the 1958 CSO mortality table to compute the cost of the pre-
retirement death benefit. It explicitly rejected the IRS's arguments 
that a preretirement mortality assumption was unreasonable in a one 
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person plan and that even if it were appropriate to use a preretire-
ment mortality assumption, it was unreasonable to assume the 1958 
CSO mortality table for the preretirement mortality and the 1971 
lAM table for the postretirement mortality for the same person 
because the tables are incompatible. As the court pointed out, the 
probability of the participant's preretirement death was not at issue. 
The issue was to estimate the life insurance premium expense, and 
this could be done best by using the same type of mortality table as 
would be used by the insurance company (Vinson & Elkins, p. 67). 
In the noninstitutional cases, while the court was "not entirely 
convinced that the mortality assumption ... is completely reasonable, 
it is not substantially unreasonable so as to justify a retroactive 
adjustment" (Citrus Valley, p. 87). Thus, even in situations as extreme 
as the case involving a male participant that used the 1983 lAM 
table for females with a seven year age setback, the mortality 
assumption implicitly was approved by the court in its approval of 
the funding assumptions in the aggregate. 
4.6 The Unit Credit Funding Method 
One of the surprises to emerge from the Citrus Valley cases was 
the court finding against the IRS on the frontloading issue under the 
unit credit funding method. The IRS previously had won the well-
publicized Mirza case (Jerome Mirza & Associates, Ltd. v. United 
States, 882 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1989)), where the same issue was in 
question and the same argument was used. In Mirza, the court agreed 
with the IRS's interpretation that IRC §404(a)(1)(A)(iii) provides 
that the maximum that can be deducted in any year is the "normal 
cost" plus an amount necessary to amortize "past service" and other 
supplementary cost over ten years, as determined under regulations 
prescribed by the Secretary. It reasoned that "[i]t is simply incon-
ceivable that Congress would take pains to provide for the amortiza-
tion of past service credits but intended to allow taxpayers to circum-
vent this requirement by the device of structuring their plans to 
accrue benefits in a single year" (Mirza, p. 232) 
Judge Clapp enumerated three reasons for rejecting the Mirza con-
clusion (Citrus Valley, pp. 104-105). First, "[t]he language of 
§404(a)(1)(A)(iii) setting forth the limit on deductible contributions 
used the conditional phrase 'if *** provided by the plan' when set-
ting forth the treatment for past service cost." Thus, there would be 
only a past service liability if it were provided by the plan. Second, 
"[d]espite [the IRS's] assertions to the contrary, there is no 
express[ed] or implied connection between the limitations of §415 and 
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any allocation under §1.412(c)(3)-1(e)(3)" (Citrus Valley, p. 99). That 
is, there is no requirement that the allocation between normal cost 
and past service liability be consistent with the limitations on bene-
fit accruals. Third, "the Unit Credit Funding Method-in connection 
with a career-average pay plan-inherently allocates benefits in a 
reasonable manner to the past and future years of service for which 
benefits accrued and will accrue." 
This finding is only relevant for plan years beginning prior to 
1987, as the approach discussed is not possible for plan years begin-
ning after December 31, 1986. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 amended 
§415(b )(5) so that the dollar limitation is phased in over the first 
ten years of participation in a plan rather than ten years of service 
with the plan sponsor. 
4.7 Evidentiary Matters 
The IRS consistently has objected to actuaries' use of its training 
manuals, audit guidelines, internal and external correspondence, and 
transcripts of speeches made by Service employees regarding the mat-
ters at issue in these cases. The court concluded (Vinson & Elkins, pp. 
75-77), however, that actuaries can take into account IRS documents 
that have been disseminated publicly because "they are part of the 
actuarial universe within which all actuaries must live, think, and 
work in arriving at their conclusions as to reasonableness and their 
best estimates regarding appropriate contributions." Moreover, actu-
aries can be guided by the speeches of high-ranking Service employ-
ees. 
One specific comment that had been referenced by many pension 
actuaries is the highly publicized transcript of the Ira Cohen speech 
at the 1986 Enrolled Actuaries meeting, wherein he stated that a 4 
percentage point corridor on either side of the prevailing long-term 
Treasury bond rate was within the reasonable range of interest rate 
assumptions. In spite of the fact that Cohen was the director of the 
Actuarial and Technical Division of the Service at the time of the 
speech, the IRS claimed that he had not spoken for the Service and, 
moreover, the speech was merely hearsay. The court disagreed with 
the IRS's position, and asserted that such a speech, heard by many 
actuaries and disseminated by publication to many more, is not 
hearsay, as long as the transcript is "true and correct." 
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5 Implications 
There seems to be a consensus among small plan attorneys that 
the opinions rendered in these cases are likely to be afforded consid-
erable credibility.13 Not only are they "lengthy, studious, and thor-
oughly analyzed," but they are based to a large extent on "factual 
conclusions," which makes them difficult to overturn; see Reish and 
Ashton (1992). Moreover, 14 of 15 participating tax court judges in the 
Phoenix cases concurred with the opinions. 
It is difficult to anticipate how the courts will react in future 
cases where the issues are similar, but the facts and circumstances are 
materially different. The following basic principles, however, seem 
to have emerged: 
• 
• 
• 
The intent of Congress is that deference should be given to the 
assumptions chosen by the enrolled actuary; 
While assumptions are required to be reasonable and Con~ress did 
not permit actuaries unfettered liberty,14 the pragmatIc test is 
that assumptions are not "substantially unreasonable;"15 and 
When formulating assumptions, it is appropriate for the actuary 
to be guided by the "sincere, credible, and reasonable" expecta-
tions of the plan sponsor and IRS documents and insights that 
have been publicly disseminated. 
In the past actuaries have struggled to formulate a workable 
interpretation of pension laws and regulations for small plans. In 
most cases, actuaries are not attorneys, however-while their inter-
pretation of these laws and regulations may have seemed reasonable 
to them, there has been a need for an authoritative unbiased inter-
pretation. These cases, with their scholarly exposition of the rules 
and regulations, have done much to help put things into perspective. 
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Options and the Management of Financial Risk, Phelim P. Boyle 
(Society of Actuaries, 1992), 210 pp. 
Reviewer: A. Hoque Sharit 
Option pricing has been an active area of research in the field of 
finance during the past 20 years. There are several textbooks that 
cover options pricing theory in great detail (including texts by Cox 
and Rubenstein (1985), Bookstaber (1991), Hull (1993), Jarrow and 
Rudd (1983), and Ritchken (1987». Do we need another textbook? 
Yes, for actuaries there is a need for a book that explains the man-
agement of financial risk at an introductory level. There is no similar 
text written for actuaries. 
In recent years, actuaries have become more involved in various 
aspects of corporate finance. In fact, the Society of Actuaries has 
already incorporated some courses on investment and finance in its 
education program and has opened a finance track (fall of 1993) for 
its Fellowship examination process. One expects Professor Boyle's 
Options and the Management of Financial Risk to play an important 
role in this process and in the education of a new generation of actu-
aries. 
There are two major topics covered in this text: (1) models of the 
term structure of interest rates, and (2) the analysis and valuation of 
derivative securities. Only a few basic concepts in finance are intro-
duced, and they are dealt with at an introductory level with 
numerical examples. Unfortunately, Professor Boyle does not refer the 
reader to any introductory level text. The only other textbooks 
referenced are by Malliaris (1982), Merton (1990), and Van Horne 
(1970). None of these can be considered as an introductory text. It 
* A. Hoque Sharif ASA (1984) is a Ph.D. student in actuarial science in the 
Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, 
Canada. He received his undergraduate education at the Dhaka University, 
Bangladesh, M.Sc. (Statistics) in 1979 from the University of Saskatchewan, and 
M.Math (Actuarial Science) in 1988 from the University of Waterloo. Prior to enrolling 
at the University of Waterloo, he was employed by the Dhaka University, the 
University of Saskatchewan, Reed Stenhouse AssocIates, Sovereign Life Insurance 
Company, and Wright Mogg & Associates. His current research interest is in multistate 
life table modeling and its applications. 
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should be pointed out that the actual reference to Malliaris should 
be Malliaris and Brock (1982). In addition, a more recent edition to 
Van Horne's text was published in 1990. 
My only criticism of Options and the Management of Financial Risk 
is that it lacks exercises, graphs, and a subject index. None of the 
chapters has any exercises for readers. This is inconsistent with the 
philosophy of learning in the mathematical sciences, where doing 
actual problems is of vital importance. I hope that Professor Boyle 
corrects this by developing a companion text consisting of worked 
examples and exercises. Graphs are an efficient means of quickly 
communicating information, but they are used infrequently in this 
book. For example, inclusion of the two figures above (drawn using 
tables 2.2 and 2.6 on pages 28 and 35, respectively, of Professor 
Boyle's text) would have conveyed the essential information at a 
glance and would have helped to buttress his excellent points. There 
are several other places where graphs would have expedited commu-
nication with the reader. A subject index would have benefited read-
ers. 
Options and the Management of Financial Risk covers a sufficiently 
broad range of topics to provide a sound introduction to the manage-
ment of financial risks. The book is well written and can be covered 
easily in a one semester university or college course. An elementary 
knowledge of interest theory and probability theory is sufficient 
background for understanding the material presented. 
The book consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides an intro-
duction to the subjects of insurable risk, finanCial securities, financial 
risk, and financial risk management. It also provides an overview of 
the text. Chapter 2 introduces the framework for analyzing the term 
structure of interest rates in a deterministic setting. Classical defini-
tions of duration and convexity are covered in Chapter 3. Derivative 
securities (options, forwards, futures, and options futures) are dis-
cussed at the grassroots level in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 several 
relationships that option prices must obey (namely, put-call parity) 
are derived using the no-arbitrage principle. Chapter 6 assembles 
several results from probability and statistics, including the central 
limit theorem, normal and lognormal distribution, and a simple ran-
dom walk model, all of which are useful in option pricing. The 
famous Black-Scholes formula for pricing European call options is 
analyzed in great detail in Chapter 7. The concluding chapter deals 
with stochastic interest rate models and their applications. 
There are several existing textbooks on option pricing, but 
Professor Boyle'S Options and the Management of Finance Risk provides 
an excellent starting point for actuaries, especially those unfamiliar 
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with modern finance theory. This book will be welcomed by actuar-
ies. 
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Group Insurance, W.F. Bluhm, principal editor (Winsted, CT: 
ACTEX Publications, 1992), 784 pp. 
Reviewer: Charles Fuhrer * 
This 784 page book includes 34 chapters by different authors. The 
chapters are assigned to eight sections, each with a section editor. 
The principal editor is William F. Bluhm. I will comment about the 
book as a whole and then cover each section briefly. 
The book is comprehensive and well-written. The authors and 
editors are to be commended for the high quality of the text. This is 
particularly impressive, given the difficulties associated with 
preparing such a large volume with so many different contributors. 
The dust cover states that "Group Insurance is intended to serve 
as both an educational text for beginners in the field, and as a refer-
ence text for experienced practitioners." It is difficult for any text, 
however, to serve both beginners and experienced practitioners well. 
Group Insurance is an excellent text for beginners. It covers a vast 
amount of material (most of it in summary form) at a level appropri-
ate for beginners. Unfortunately, this may detract from its usefulness 
to experienced practitioners who usually need detailed information. 
It is interesting to compare this book with Group Insurance Handbook 
(1965) which could be considered its precursor. Group Insurance 
Handbook contains much more detail than does Group Insurance. 
Group Insurance has very few references to other articles and 
books. There are only 30 endnotes: 12 cite court cases or government 
rulings, eight are tables, two are current pamphlets, one is a current 
events bulletin, one is an investment-ratings publication, two are 
accounting standards opinions, and only four are original articles. 
Even the venerable Group Insurance Handbook is not mentioned any-
where. 
This lack of references is unfortunate for several reasons: 
• References would allow the reader to verify the accuracy of the 
facts that are used. Group Insurance includes many facts and fig-
ures without mentioning their sources; 
• References enhance an educational work because they give the 
beginner (and even the experienced practitioner) a guide for fur-
ther study; and 
* Charles S. Fuhrer, FSA (1977) of the Washington National Insurance Co. in 
Lincolnshire, IL has been a group insurance actuary since 1973. He is co-editor of 
Actuarial Research Clearing House and has given numerous presentations at actuarial 
meetings. Mr. Fuhrer has written many parers and has been awarded the 1988 
Practitioner's Prize by the AERF and the 199 Health Section Research Papers Prize. 
137 
Book Reviews 
• Discussion of other works gives the reader a sense of the histori-
cal development of the subject matter and how the current mate-
rial fits wIth other thoughts about the subject. For example, the 
reader will be able to determine if the current work is consistent 
with standard or classical thinking in a particular diScipline or 
if the current work is new and origmal. 
Chapter 25, "Bayesian Statistics and Credibility" by Thomas N. 
Herzog, is a notable exception. This chapter contains 24 endnotes, 
with other works mentioned throughout the chapter (particularly on 
page 516). The reader can understand how the author's thoughts fit 
into the total work on the subject. 
Comments about specific sections follow. Also included are refer-
ences for some of the subjects. 
• Section l-"Introduction," Robert B Cumming, editor. For a 
more detailed history of group insurance through 1965, see 
"Development and Significance of Group Life Insurance" by C. 
Manton Eddy and "Development and Significance of Group 
Health Insurance" by J.F. Follmann, Jr. in Group Insurance 
Handbook (1965). Several statements by Richard S. Bilisoly in 
the current Chapter 1 are very similar to those made by Eddy 
and by Follmann in Group Insurance Handbook. 
In Chapter 2, David F. Ogden tells us what the 1990 market 
shares of the players are. The author should state the sources of 
this information. 
A more detailed (but somewhat outdated) version of Chapter 
3, "Overview of Sales and Marketing," by Gary K. Swager is 
given in Chapters 26 and 27 of Group Insurance Handbook (1965). 
Also, see the publications of the Life Insurance Marketing 
Association (UMRA). 
• Section 2-"Group Coverages, Benefits, and Plan Provisions," 
Alan D. Ford, editor. The reader interested in Chapter 4, "Group 
Life Insurance Benefits," by Michael J. Thompson, should see 
Chapters 7, 8, and 9 of the Group Insurance Handbook (1965). 
In Chapter 5, "Group Disability Income Benefits," David W. 
Simbro does not mention that under most long-term disabilit)' 
(LTD) plans the benefit is not reduced further by any Social 
Security cost of living increases that occur after the disabled 
individual becomes eligible to receive benefits. 
Chapter 6, "Medical Benefits in the United States," by 
Darrell D. Knapp, defines medical benefits by the dimensions of 
services and conaitions, the degree to which the insured shares in 
the cost, and the degree to which the provider participates in 
the cost. This is an original and clever way of organizing a com-
plicated subject. For historical purposes (and because many still 
exist today), base plus supplementary (or superimposed) major 
medical and comprehensive major medical plans should be 
defined. See the Group Insurance Handbook (1965), Chapter 18. 
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Chapter 7, by Bruno Gagnon, examines medical benefits in 
Canada, while David R. Nelson analyzes miscellaneous cover-
ages in Chapter 8. 
In Chapter 9, Bruce D. Schobel studies government plans in 
the United States. Robert J. Myers' Social Security (1985 and pre-
vious editions) generally has been considered to be the Bible of 
Social Security for actuaries. Of course, there have been many 
other works and numerous u.s. government publications on social 
insurance. 
• Section 3-"The Legal and Regulatory Environment," Charlotte 
A. Furman, editor. This section contains only a brief discussion of 
the legal environment; the regulatory environment is covered in 
much greater detail. See, for example, W.F. Meyer's Life and 
Health Insurance Law, A Summary (1976). 
Keith M. Andrews looks at regulation in the United States in 
Chapter 10, while David B. Martin studies the Canadian situa-
tion in Chapter 11. Chapter 12, by Edward P. Po tanka, is devoted 
to regulation of HMOs, PPOs, and managed care in the United 
States. 
• Section 4-"Underwriting and Managing the Risk," W. Duane 
Kidwell, editor. There is a gap in this section between the large 
groufs of Chapter 13 (as few as 50 or 100 employees) and tFte 
smal groups of Chapter 15 (under 25 employees). The group 
underwriter traditionally has made decisions based on qualita-
tive opinions. Given the advances in actuarial modeling, soft-
ware, computer technology, and data gathering, however, it is 
time for group insurance underwriting to be based on quantitative 
data. Neither these chapters nor a later chapter (Chapter 26) 
devoted to data sources and structure discusses this issue. 
Chapter 13 covers large group underwriting. The authors are 
James T. Lundberg and Jean C. McFadden. 
The introduction to Chapter 14, "Underwriting Small 
Groups," by Barbara Niehus, includes some statistics on the 
extent of insurance in small employers. These statistics appear 
without citation of source. 
Chapter IS, "Managing Multiple-Choice Situations," by Scott 
M. Snow, can be supplemented with Fuhrer and Shapiro (1992) 
and Gifford and Seltz (1988). 
Raymond F. McCaskey covers claim administration and man-
agement in Chapter 16. 
• Section 5-"Funding and Rating," Francis T. O'Grady, editor. 
One section of Chapter 17, "Estimating Claim Costs for Life 
Benefits," by Stephen T. Carter, deals with the effective date 
adjustment. This adjustment factor is used to adjust for the fact 
that the manual claim table is set to be correct for rates effective 
on July 1 based on calendar year of birth ages. If the rates are 
effective on another date, all employees wifl be a few months 
older or younger. The adjustment factor is set at approximately 
0.5 percent per month. This, of course, is equal to tne weighted 
average of monthly increases in mortality weighted over the 
ages of a typical employee group. With the avairability of mod-
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ern data processing equipment, there is no reason to use this 
weighted average. Instead, an effective date interpolation can be 
done for each age. The extra accuracy may not be of the utmost 
importance, but it costs almost nothing because the basic age/sex 
rating usually is done by computer. 
The book (Chapters 17, 22, or 25) contains a brief treatment of 
credibility for group life insurance. If the standard assumption is 
made that all of tfie experience is equally relevant, then credi-
bility can be shown to equal efl(ef+K). Here e is the expected 
number of claims in the experience period, f is an adjustment fac-
tor to reduce the credibility for variation in the size of benefits 
so that f = 1/(1 +v/b2), and v and b are the variance and expecta-
tion of the benefits given a claim has occurred. Note that J = 1 if 
all benefits are the same; otherwise, f < 1. This formula assumes, 
as is usually done, that credibility is applied against total dol-
lars of incurred claims. A better way would be to apply credibil-
ity to the number of claims, in which case f = 1. Here K is a con-
stant whose value is probably in the 3 to 12 range. This is the 
constant k in formula (4) on page 525. Herzog explains how K 
could be estimated on page 530. 
Chapter 18, "Estimating Claim Costs for Traditional Health 
Benefits," by Susan J. Comstock, contains almost no discussion of 
the experience rating of health benefit claim costs. The method 
of using claim (charge) experience to build a probability distribu-
tion for determining the cost-sharing impact (Le., deductibles, 
coinsurance, out-of-pocket maximum, and plan maximum) on pages 
333-336 is not optimal. Unfortunately, this method is used by 
most health insurance actuaries. In this method the charge data 
are put into size ranges. The probability distribution is defined as 
a dIscrete distribution with points set at the average of the 
charges in each range. The probability is set equal to the number 
of charges that fall into the ranl$.e divided by the total number of 
claims. A simple calculation will show that this method under-
states the cost for all deductibles except those that fall exactly 
at a range boundary. For deductibles at a range boundary (or for 
deductioles that fall in a range with zero or one charge in it) the 
cost matches the data. Another method is suggested in another 
context by Gerber and Jones (1976). A better method might be to 
use the full charge data. The methods of Hogg and Klugman 
(1984) could be used. Also see Lowrie and Lipsky (1990). 
Lee E. Launer details in Chapter 19 various ways to calculate 
premiums for managed care plans. 
Readers interested in reading further about the topics covered 
in Chapter 20, "Estimating Claim Costs for Disability Benefits," 
by John C. Antliff and Roy Goldman, should see the discussions of 
Roy Goldman's paper (1990) for more detail on credibility calcu-
lations for LTD. 
There is considerable literature on the general business prob-
lem of pricing products based on internal expenses and market 
conditions. There should be some information in Chapter 21, 
"Calculating Gross Premium and Contribution Rates," by Richard 
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S. Wolf, on the problem of determining item expenses from 
expense studies in the field of cost accounting. 
Chapter 22, "Experience Rating and Funding Methods," by 
William F. Bluhm, is similar to his (Bluhm, 1989) study note of 
the same name. I will discuss a few of the points he raises in this 
chapter. For example, Bluhm states (pages 410-411) that one of 
the theoretical considerations entering the choice of credibility 
levels is the confidence interval chosen by the insurer. Modern 
least squares credibility (see Chapter 25) does not use confidence 
intervals, even implicitly. On page 414 Bluhm correctly states 
that pooling methods are used in order to dampen random statis-
tical fluctuations to make the rates charged as attractive as pos-
sible. Pooling methods, however, also are used in prospective 
experience rating to make the claim projections more accurate. See 
Fuluer (1988a) for a method of setting individual claim pooling 
levels to optimize the calculation of claim cost levels. 
For more information on group credibility see Fuhrer (1988a) 
and compare this to Margolin (1971). For a good method of calcu-
lating deficit risk charges, see Panjer and Mereu (1980). Bowers, 
Gerber, Hickman, Jones, and Nesbitt (1986), Fuhrer (1988b), and 
Panjer (1980) are good sources for more on calculating ag~regate 
stop loss premiums. There have been some papers on indIvidual 
stop loss type insurance (casualty) in some of the other actuarial 
journals. Lowrie and Lipsky (1990) deal with specific stop loss. 
• Section 6-" Economics and Statistics," Jerry E. Lusk, editor. 
There has been considerable work done by economists on the prob-
lem of estimating trends and analyzing business cycles. Chapter 
23, "Medical Claim Cost Trend Analysis and Underwriting 
Gain/Loss Cycles," by John P. Cookson, continues this body of 
work. 
It would have been useful to include times series extrapola-
tion in Chapter 24, "Forecasting," by Bruce C. MacLeish. 
Chapter 25, "Bayesian Statistics and Credibility," by 
Thomas N. Herzog, is similar to the Transactions of the Society of 
Actuaries (TSA) paper by the author (Herzog, 1989 with discus-
sion). The TSA dIScussions of the paper contain valuable info and 
are quite insightful. The chapter concerns credibility, especially 
as it relates to Bayesian statistics. There are many books on 
Bayesian statistics; see, for example, Berger (1985). 
• Section 7-"Information and Its Uses," William F. Bluhm, edi-
tor. Chapter 26 is devoted to the topic "Data Sources and 
Structures." It was written by Randalf P. Herman. Chapter 27, 
"Management Information Systems," was authored by William 
R. Lane. 
Many books and pal?ers (including Chapter 28, "Claim 
Reserves," by Mark E. Lttow) have been written on insurance 
claim reserves. I include a bibliography with over 60 entries on 
this subject in my discussion of the author's paper (Litow, 1989). 
The development method described by the author has many 
variations and is only one of myriad methods. 
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Chapter 29, "Group Insurance Financial Accounting," by James 
T. Blackledge, J. Harvey Campbell, and Pierre Saddik, is one of 
a number of books and articles on insurance accounting. The inter-
ested reader should see Saunders (1986). 
• Section 8-"Management," Bertram N. Pike, editor. Chapter 
3D, "Strategic Issues," was contributed by Donald M. Charsky. 
Pike discusses the strategic issues facing corporations in general, 
not the group insurance industry in particular. There are many 
references to these issues in the genera1 business literature. 
For more on the issues raised in Chapter 31, "Measuring 
Capital, Profit, Growth, and their Relationships," see Brender 
(1984) and Peterson, Fuhrer, Snook, and Weller (1991). 
Chapter 32, by Irwin J. Stricker, is devoted to product devel-
opment. 
Chapter 33, "Organization Structures" by James P. Galasso 
could be supplemented with references in the general business sec-
tion of any lIbrary related to this subject. 
In Chapter 34, Francis G. Morewood details planning and con-
trol issues. 
In summary, Group Insurance includes many chapters that pro-
vide an excellent pedagogy. I hope that future editions will contain a 
more complete list of references. 
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